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CHAPTER 1
 
INTRODUCTION
 
1.1 Summary
 
The cognitive space is introduced as a Euclidean spatial repre­
sentation of an individual's perception of the dissimilarity of a set of
 
stimulus objects. Since certain -experimental__evidence.suggests that.con­
text affects perception, a change in the perceived context is expected
 
to change the cognitive space. Yet investigations of the effect of con­
text on cognitive spaces defined for a group have been inconclusive.
 
Intergroup differences in cognitive spaces have not been explained by
 
context differences. This research argues that the analysis of groups
 
tends to obscure context effects because of interindividual differences,
 
and demonstrates at the individual level, that substantive, statisti­
cally significant and replicable changes in cognitive spaces do occur
 
because of context changes. The spaces defined from four experiments
 
differed in dimensionality, dimension identity and configuration of
 
stimulus object points in the spaces.
 
1.2 Cognitive Models
 
Expressing preferences for, or assigning values to alternatives
 
can be viewed as the end result of a two-stage cognitive process:
 
comparison and evaluation. While both stages are fundamental to a
 
1­
comprehensive understanding of human decision making, this research
 
focuses on the comparison process part of the complex cognitive oper­
ation. Furthermore, this research suggests that explicit recognition of
 
the influence of context on comparisons can substantially enhance the
 
ability to explain and understand evaluative judgments.
 
It is assumed that the comparison-process can be described-by a
 
model of an individual's cognitive structure and that affective disposi­
tion is associated with elements of that structure. The content of the
 
model consists of mental representations of stimuli (people, concepts,
 
things, etc.) defined in terms of their attributes. The model structure
 
reflects the behavior of the stimuli and their interaction with the indi­
vidual and his environment in specific situations. The mental represen­
tations are related or connected by association or similarity and their
 
interdissimilarity dictates metric relationships in the model.
 
The theoretical analysis of similarity relationships has been
 
dominated by geometric or spatial models which represent stimuli as
 
points in a coordinate space such that subject-defined stimulus inter­
dissimilarities correspond to metric distances among the respective
 
points. The Euclidean spatial model resulting from a nonmetric multi­
dimensional scaling of the dissimilarity data is used to model an
 
individual's cognitive structure; this model is called a cognitive
 
space.
 
There is ample evidence from a wide variety of experiments and
 
applications which demonstrates the usefulness of the cognitive space.
 
Examples of various stimuli include human traits (Walters and Jackson
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1966), combat situations (Cliff and Young 1968), occupations (Burton
 
1972), colors (Indow and Uchizono 1960), presidential candidates (Mauser
 
1972), speech patterns (Matsumoto, Hiki, Sone and Nimura 1973), bakery
 
items (Green, Maheshwari, and Rao 1969), saline solutions (Gregson
 
1968), natural resource planning objectives (Harris 197-7), shapes of
 
U.S. states (Shepard and Chipman 1970), and artistic drawings (Skager,
 
Schultz, and Klein 1966).
 
1.3 Context and Cognitive Spaces
 
Attneave (1950) seems to have been the first to recognize that
 
cognitive structures dependent upon dissimilarity or similarity measures
 
can be influenced by context. Similarity needs a referent; when things
 
are similar, they are similar with respect to something. Consequently,
 
the way in which they are similar may also change.
 
Consider, for example, three stimuli: table, fable, and chair.
 
Table and fable are similar because they sound alike. Table and chair
 
are also closely associated, but as furniture. The pattern of similar­
ity among these three words will differ for an individual depending on
 
whether he is working a crossword puzzle or responding to a word associa­
tion quiz; on whether he considers the meaning of the words or merely
 
their sounds; on whether other homonyms are included in the stimulus set
 
or merely other pieces of furniture; and whether the individual is a lin­
guist or a furniture salesman. Attneave suggests that a separate cogni­
tive structure might be achievable for each state of attention, or as
 
interpreted here, for each facet of context. Context could thus affect
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a person's cognitive structure and hence its representation by the cogni­
tive space. It could also affect his evaluation of the objects and his
 
behavior in relation to them. This study will explore the influence of
 
context on cognitive spaces.
 
Context is believed to have an effect on personal statements of
 
value. This effect has been demonstrated in word ratings (Heise 1969,
 
Halff, Ortony and Anderson 1976), bread and pastry preferences (Green
 
and Rao 1972), and gift selection (Hansen 1972). Sometimes, however,
 
personal statements contradict personal behavior (Bickman 1972).
 
Anecdotal evidence of context influence on behavior is also available.
 
For example, in retail settings, the presence of children (Wells and
 
LoSciuto 1966), friends (Bell 1967), and sales personnel (Albaum 1967)
 
have been observed to alter purchase outcomes.
 
In contrast to these studies, Green and Carmone (1972) found
 
that evaluations of magazine ads were generally independent of context.
 
Similar results concerning the negligible effect of context on percep­
tion were also reported by Green, Maheshwari and Rao (1969), Ryans
 
(1974), and Heeler (1974). After a series of studies of various stim­
uli, Cliff concluded that changing the context of a decision making task
 
had only the effect of changing the use of the cognitive space, not the
 
cognitive space itself (Cliff 1966, Cliff and Young 1968). Negative
 
results such as these may have encouraged a neglect of context. Dif­
ficulties in explaining behavior by measuring attitudes, for example,
 
have been ascribed to the neglect of context, most explicitly by Rokeach
 
(1968). Further research in this area is clearly needed. Are context
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effects on individual perception a common occurrence or a rare event? If
 
it is a common event, it raises serious questions about consumer product
 
design or marketing concept evaluation models that assume invariant per­
ception or preference structures under context changes (e.g., Pessemier
 
and Root i973-,- Ryans'-1974 -Shocker -andSrinivasan-1-9-74-Raoand-Sountar
 
1975). This research uncovers evidence on the circumstances in which
 
perception of stimulus objects changes, and the cognitive structure
 
which an individual uses to combine .his,-perceptions-of-the stimuli
 
changes.
 
It is no doubt due to the inconclusiveness of the evidence that 
has prompted authors to continue to speculate on whether or not context 
affects the spatial cognitive model. Day says "there is widespread 
unsupported (emphasis added) agreement that perceptions (and cognition) 
and preferences are context bound" (Day 1972, p. 284). And Green and 
Carmone note, "The question of (cognitive space) invariance over changes 
in ... scenarios appears wide open for future study. It seems that 
similarities and preference judgments ought to be context bound . . 
(Green and Carmone 1972, p. 204). They are right, there seem to be no 
studies in the literature which clearly show that similarity perceptions 
are context bound. Moinpour, McCullough and MacLachlant(976i) also­
recognize the need to investigate the nature of changes in individual 
cognitive spaces in response to context changes in order to apply spa­
tial cognitive models to marketing. Ryans and Deutscher (1978) note 
that although cognitive models have been studied extensively as an 
invariant structure, their potential for improving the understanding 
5
 
of the dynamics underlying consumer choice is largely unrealized. To
 
this writer's knowledge, no one has shown that an individual's cognitive
 
space changes under different contexts and that the changes are quanti­
fiable and replicable. This study addresses that void.
 
The systematic-research-on the effects of context on cognitive
 
spaces to be reported here has5 to the contrary, found substantive, sta-­
tistically significant and replicable changes in the cognitive spaces
 
due to context. The cognitive spaces differed in dimensionality, dimen­
sion identity and configuration of points. It was found, however, that
 
the separate spaces for each context could be embedded in a "master"
 
cognitive space of which they were special cases in which particular
 
dimensions were given more, less, or even zero weight depending on the
 
context. Whereas other studies have treated the cognitive model as an
 
independent variable or invariant structure, the research presented here
 
treats the cognitive space as a dependent variable and investigates the
 
effects of a limited set of other independent variables defining context
 
upon the dynamics of the cognitive model.
 
1.4 Study Organization
 
In Chapter 2, context is defined and analyzed and an account is
 
given of how it would be expected to affect judgments of dissimilarity
 
and the spatial cognitive model resulting from such judgments. Chapter
 
3 provides a critical review of the literature relevant to context
 
changes and their effects on spatial models. Conclusions are drawn and
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implications are defined for this study. With the review as a back­
ground, specific study objectives are presented.
 
All four experiments in this study used the same procedures and
 
data analyses. These methods are discussed in Chapter 4. The four ex­
periments are detai-l-ed-i-n-rChapters -5-8'-Eah-ofthes-eexperimanthas "
 
been selected to investigate a different type of context change. In
 
each chapter, the nature of the effect of the particular type of context
 
on the cognitive spaces is discussed, quantified, andsubstantiatedby
 
replication- and significance tests.
 
Chapter 9 summarizes the principal results of the study and dis­
cusses their implications for practical applications with specific
 
examples.
 
Three technical Appendices cover areas of particular interest to
 
this study. An extensive review of nonmetric multidimensional scaling
 
(NMDS) is covered in Appendix A,. especially the NMDS algorithm (fDSCAL)
 
used to produce cognitive spaces in this research. Basic assumptions
 
and unique features of the algorithm are also discussed. Finally, tech­
niques for determining the proper cognitive space dimensionality and sig­
nificance of results are also given.
 
Appendix B discusses the INDSCAL model which.is used to develop
 
a cognitive space with differentially weighted dimensions. The use of
 
this technique to produce a master space which spans a set of cognitive
 
spaces is also addressed.
 
A major objective of this study is to demonstrate that two cogni­
tive spaces formed from different contexts are different. Appendix C
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provides a metric for comparing two spaces and suggests a measure of
 
congruence. Furthermore, a test of significance is developed for this
 
measure.
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CHAPTER 2
 
EFFECTS OF CONTEXT ON JUDGMENT
 
2.1 Overview
 
The term context is defined in this chapter and analyzed into
 
its component aspects.._-Much__ofth-definition-adopted results from-a- ­
survey of the literature of situation but-an important distinction is
 
made between situation and context. A review is then given of the exper­
imental research on the effects of context on human behavior. Finally,
 
an account is made of how context would be expected to affect judgments
 
of dissimilarity and how those effects would be represented by changes
 
in the parameters of the general form of the spatial cognitive model.
 
This is in preparation for presentation in subsequent chapters of experi­
mental work demonstrating such changes.
 
2.2 Context
 
2.2.1 Context vs. Situation
 
The terms context and situation are used almost interchangeably
 
by human behavior researchers with much of the psychological literature
 
on this subject using the term situation. The term context, however, is
 
preferred in this report because of a significant distinction. The dic­
tionary (Webster's Third New International 1968) defines situation as
 
the sum total of internal and external stimuli (physical, social and
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psychocultural factors) that act upon an individual in orienting and
 
conditioning his behavior in a given interval. Context is defined as
 
the interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs so as to
 
characterize or indicate its meaning. The difference lies in the use of
 
the phrase "indicate its meaning." Where situation is objective, poten­
tially measurable, and is described in terms of physical, psychological
 
and social stimulus features, context is subjective and represents a
 
person's response to those stimulus features. It is described in terms
 
of aspects of the psychological .significance of the situation, of how it
 
is perceived and reacted to. Confusion has existed in the literature
 
because of a failure to recognize this difference. Magnusson (1971),
 
Ekehammar (1974) and Pervin (1975) noticed, however, a difference in
 
usage of situation and context depending on whether the terms are used
 
to mean objective description or personal perception. Their views sup­
port a definition in which context results from the perception of a
 
situation, and attaches meaning to it.
 
Since context depends on situation, a discussion of how situa­
tion is treated in the literature is given next. Bieri et al. (1966,
 
page 209) and Belk (1975) suggested that. a situation may be viewed as
 
comprising all those factors peculiar to a time and place of observa­
tion which do not follow from a knowledge of individual or external
 
stimulus attributes, and which have a demonstrable and systematic effect
 
on current behavior. Several attempts to inventory "all those factors"
 
have met with limited success. Sells (1963), for example, classified
 
situations in terms of their objectively measured characteristics which
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are external to the individual. However, he listed 5 major categories,
 
16 subcategories, and over 50 further subdivisions which appeared to
 
vary in the ease with which they could be measured (e.g., terrain, natu­
ral resources, language, social organization, novelty). Classification
 
attempts-by Bellows (196-)-, Wol'f- (1966) and-Moos. (1973), are less- com--­
plex, but also are impractical from the standpoint of measurement. A
 
limited taxonomy by Allen (1965) of the situational factors found to af­
fect conformity, highlighted several important social dimensions (e.g.,
 
public/privte,. interdependence-of-par.ticipants) andtask-dimensions-....
 
(e.g., difficulty, importance) of the situation. Magnusson (1971) fac­
tor analyzed similarity judgments of typical student activities or situa­
tions in an academic domain to investigate the cognitive aspects of
 
situations. Social, task and personal involvement dimensions were in­
cluded in his list of factors.
 
Barker (1963) described a situation in terms of the entities and
 
actions of which it is composed; that is, the physical objects, the peo­
ple present and the processes going on. Finally, Bieri et al. (1966,
 
pages 14-15, 209-210) considered three types of situational influences
 
on judgment: social, interpersonal, and contingency. Social influences
 
refer to the relatively stable characteristics of the social structure
 
within which the subject makes his judgment. Interpersonal characteris­
tics address the nature of the relationship between the judge and the
 
stimuli, subdivided into role, purpose, inferences, and personal involve­
ment. Situational contingencies consist primarily of situational events
 
that are antecedent to or precede a judgment. By such terminology, it
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is obvious that Bieri addressed the perception of situation; i.e., con­
text.
 
In contrast to objectively defined properties of situation,
 
Endler and Magnusson (Endler and Magnusson 1974, Magnusson 1974) and
 
Ekehammar (1974) emphasized-how the -individual represents-and'hconstructs
 
the situation. Hansen. (1972, page 47) believes-that the individual's­
perception of the situation depends upon the actual elements in the situ­
ation. Since perception is unique to the individual, the same situation
 
can yield different- contexts-fortcdifferent.persons -(Magnusson, Gerzen,
 
and Nyman 1968). Restle (1961), however, blurs the distinction between
 
situation and context by defining identical situations as those with ex­
actly the same perceived characteristics. This has led toward a defini­
tion of situation in terms of perceived properties (Berlyn 1967, Palmer
 
1975), essentially the definition of context to be adopted for this
 
study.
 
Bobrow and Norman (1975) show that context determines how infor­
mation contained in memory is interpreted and used; it delineates some
 
restricted set of elements or connections within the memory that are rel­
evant to the situation and used to understand it. Reitman (1965, Chap­
ters 3-4) relates context to an individual's cognitive structure by
 
describing context as a link from the abstract or general to the spe­
cific; a connection between the meaning of an element in the cognitive
 
structure and its relation to other elements. Others emphasize that con­
text serves to limit the range of possible meanings of information or
 
bound the internal representations of a concept (Kaplan 1972, Halff,
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Ortony, and Anderson 1976). For Neisser (1976), context is embodied in
 
what he (after Bartlett) calls schemata, preexisting structures that di­
rect perceptual activity by determining what stimulus features will be
 
perceived, and that are modified as perception takes place. Dreyfus and
 
Dreyfus (1976)-sugges't that the-context ai-ds:the-indtviduat to'perceive­
which stimulus attributes are relevant to the task, the importance of
 
these attributes relative to each other, and the extent to which each at­
tribute is present in the stimuli. In support of this, Haber's (1966)
 
study-sugg.ests-.that-thfe-seLection--of.-stimulus-attraibtesthought rale.. ­
vant to the task follows a "tuning" hypothesis whereby attending to a
 
certain context results in a cleaier and more vivid perception of cer­
tain properties--they stand out more. By the same token, the incidental
 
attributes are not as clear and do not stand out.
 
The need for contextual representation of a situation for intel­
ligent behavior has been extensively analyzed by Minsky (1975) who pro­
,poses the notion of "frames," information processing structures that act
 
as schemata, for implementing context in artificial intelligence. Some
 
attempts have been made to implement frames in machine vision (Kuipers
 
1975).
 
2.2.2 Characteristics of Context
 
For purposes of the present research, situation is defined as
 
the sum total of external and internal stimuli that act upon an individ­
ual in orienting and conditioning his behavior in a given time interval.
 
13
 
Context is then defined as an individual's interpretation of the per­
ceived characteristics of a situation which gives it meaning for him.
 
By selectively combining features suggested in the various
 
studies and taxonomies cited earlier, a notion of the factors that com­
prise a context may-be-offered. The-reviewed-experimental-research sug­
gests. that context depends on the meaning- attached to who is,involved,
 
including the possibility that the individual is alone, why he is in­
volved, where the action is taking place, what the nature of the action
 
occurring is. and when it occurs. The context is defined by. the per­1 

ceptual organization of these various components so that it takes on
 
a gestalt quality and if one of the components changes sufficiently,
 
the context is considered to have changed. These components' suggest
 
five aspects of context that may have an influence on spatial cognitive
 
models:
 
1. Physical environment factors are generally related to the site
 
or facility where the action takes place but may also reflect the physi­
cal state of the subject. Some of the more readily apparent features of
 
physical environment include geographical and institutional location,
 
decor, sounds, aromas, lighting, weather, and visible material configura­
tions surrounding the stimulus objects. The environment also includes
 
intangibles such as scenic beauty and physical facts like gravity and
 
limitations (e.g., deafness) of the subject.
 
2. Social environment describes the presence or absence of other
 
individuals (participants and non-participants) in the task action. The
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social environment considers the number of such individuals, their per­
sonal characteristics and backgrounds, and the extent and nature of
 
their previous interactions with the subject. The actual or assumed
 
attitudes and beliefs of these individuals concerning the subject, the
 
stimuli andt-het~as l-are zl-so---of--imortance-zespecial-yth-emanne-r:in-­
which such information is exchanged between the individuals and the sub­
ject. 
3. Task definition-specifies -thedesired _condi.tions--asto-how. the 
task will be.-penformed4aswewl as- ..cr.itrt a-,and-const~raint-svofp..pe-rf-erm-,­
ance. The definition always reflects a stated or implied objective or
 
purpose of the task. This purpose is instrumental in the subject's se­
lection of a set of stimulus attributes which are appropriate to the
 
specified use of the stimuli or the purpose of the task.
 
4. Individual perspective represents the relationship of the per­
son judging the stimulus objects to the task, to -the objects, or to the
 
purposes which the task or the objects serve. It is essentially the
 
role the person plays in relation to the other aspects of context and
 
his view of that role. Some factors which may influence perspective are
 
familiarity with the stimulus objects or the task, fatigue, commitment
 
to task purpose and ownership of the stimulus objects.
 
5. Temporal setting characterizes the context along the time dimem
 
sion and relates the subject to actual or assumed past or future events.
 
This allows considerations such as time of day, season of year, time
 
since payday, and time constraints imposed by prior commitment or exter­
nal limitations.
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2.3 	Context Characteristics Experimentally Investigated
 
There are two relevant kinds of situations and hence contexts
 
which relate specifically to spatial cognitive models. The first con­
text is identified with the stimulus comparison task itself (i.e., the
 
dissimilarity judgments-)j-wh-ile the--second- is--identif ied-with -the- real ­
or imagined application, use,or consequences of the stimuli. For exam­
ple, if the stimuli are political candidates, the first context may deal
 
with a subject's choosing-among tha-candidates.at the- polls while the
 
second context may-be associate& -with the- candidates.being in office.
 
Situational characteristics that affect context apply to either. Of the
 
two kinds of context specifically related to spatial cognitive models,
 
this research held the stimulus comparison context fixed by intention
 
and did not consider it further. Rather this research was concerned
 
with the context of stimulus application.
 
Five context characteristics were identified above: physical
 
environment; social environment; task definition; individual perspec­
tive; and temporal setting. The physical environment was not analyzed
 
because its features were too numerous and difficult to identify, quan­
tify or control, and it is not at all clear which features can be mani­
pulated to affect context. Similarly, temporal setting was not analyzed
 
because of the difficulty in controlling experimental conditions over
 
any appreciable interval of time. This research investigated the re­
maining three characteristics of context: social environment; task
 
definition; and individual perspective. Task definition, however, was
 
subdivided for further study.
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One of the more interesting features of task definition is the
 
individual's interpretation of how the stimulus objects are to be ap­
plied or used in the task. Many tasks differ on whether or not the use
 
is made specific. Accordingly, these two features of task definition
 
called specificusnamn&nonsp-erific use-tof-the stimnus-ob'jects)wete­
investigated in this report. 
Experiments, presented in four subsequent chapters, were de­
signed to produce changes in these-context charactenistcs-and_to-test -­
- - the -effects. of-these-changes.:o-i~ndv:dualCogni-i-s paces --T-Each- ex­
periment assumed that context characteristics of 2hysical environment 
and temporal setting were held constant. 
For context to be a useful concept, it must not only be defined,
 
but shown to have a systematiceffect on behavior. The following sec­
tion reviews some empirical research on the effect of context on judg­
ments other than those used to derive spatial cognitive models (i.e.,
 
dissimilarity judgments) and examines the extent to which contextual
 
knowledge can be expected to add to one's ability to explain human
 
behavior.
 
2.4 Context in Judgment Tasks
 
In the past decade, an increasing number of empirical studies of
 
contextual influence on human behavior have been conducted using various
 
consumer-oriented contexts and stimulus objects. Typically, subjects
 
are asked to rate the likelihood that they would choose each of several
 
alternate products or services under each of different contexts. The
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trends indicate a general influence of context on preference judgments
 
but the results are far from conclusive. For example, in a series of
 
studies of preferences for beverages (Sandell 1968), meat products (Belk
 
1974a), snack products (Belk 1974b), and fast foods (Belk 1975), it was
 
shown that -systematic context differences explained a -sizable proportion
 
of variance in individual preferences- for the first two cases, context
 
explained more variance than did individual differences. When leisure
 
activities (Bishop and Witt 1970) were analyzed, the effects of context
 
were lightly overshadowedby individual differences. In the case of
 
preferences for motion pictures (Belk 1974b) and TV programs (Friedman
 
and Fireworker 1977), however, the results indicated that subject pref­
erences did not depend on context. Individual differences explained the
 
largest variance in preferences.
 
Regarding contextual influence on consumer behavior, Lavidge
 
(1966) maintains that for many products, consumption is closely related
 
to specific contexts, and he cites evidence from media and other
 
studies. Longman (1968) makes the same point in relation to attitude
 
measurements and consumer purchase studies.
 
In the general areas of psychology and sociology, the question
 
of contextual influence upon behavior has been raised most directly by
 
Endler and Hunt (1969). Based on a study of variations in human anxiety
 
responses from different situations, their findings consistently showed
 
that more variation is explained by contextual factors than by individ­
ual differences, and that interaction between these two sources of
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variation accounts for more variation than either of the other two
 
sources taken separately.
 
In summary, evidence strongly supports the proposition that con­
textual factors, separately and in interaction with personal variables,
 
influence behavior. In particular, this influence appliesto consumer
 
behavior. However, it is worth noting that all of the above experimen­
tal research deals with the effects of context on behavior assessed by
 
aggregating individuals' responses. Such studies rely on the question­
able assumption that interpersonal .comparison of context is meaningful.,
 
a topic to be addressed further in Chapter 3.
 
2.5 Spatial Cognitive Model and Context
 
2.5.1 Origins of Spatial Cognitive Models
 
One's actions are based on an understanding of the world, and
 
this understanding can be thought of as being embodied in cognitive
 
structures built up through successive interactions with the world. The
 
cognitive structure is linked to the world by perception and is modified
 
by context. The concept of spatial cognitive structures has been used
 
variously in psychological theories, including Sarbin's (1960)
 
"modules," Osgood's (1957) "representations," and Kelly's (1955)
 
"constructs." Although there are a variety of conceptions of cognitive
 
structure, there are at least four common areas of agreement among cog­
nitive theorists:
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1. The individual is assumed to possess a finite number of
 
(usually) bipolar dimensions represented by an adjective and its oppo­
site.
 
2. The individual perceives and discriminates stimulus objects in
 
terms of these dimensions.
 
3. The individual is. assumed tozuse,a-hyperspace,formed- from these
 
dimensions to assess his perception of a set of stimulus objects.
 
4. The hyperspace, the stimulus objects, and their interrelation­
ships as represented in the hyperspace comprise the individual's cogni­
tive structure.
 
Cognitive structures are impossible to observe directly. If one
 
is willing, however, to assume that such a structure would imply specifi­
able behavioral consequences, it may be possible to construct a descrip­
tive model of the structure from observable behavior. The notion of an
 
n-dimensional hyperspace is central to the concepts of "space" employed
 
by Sarbin, Osgood, and Kelly. All three of these theorists suggest that
 
nonmetric multidimensional scaling (NMDS) procedures are appropriate for
 
describing an efficient representation of an individual's cognitive
 
space. A NMDS-derived spatial model is proposed to be a descriptive
 
model of a cognitive structure. Whether the model represents what actu­
ally is going on inside an individual, whether one thinks spatially as
 
it were, is a separate question and will not be addressed here.
 
Many researchers have developed NMDS numerical techniques (e.g.,
 
Torgerson 1958, Shepard 1962a, 1962b, Kruskal 1964a, 1964b) for construc­
tion of spatial cognitive models. Each procedure represents stimulus
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objects as points in a Euclidean space. The position of each object is
 
determined in relation to the cognitive dimensions used by the individ­
ual when he discriminates among objects. Psychological content of the
 
objects is represented by their projections on these dimensions, which
 
can be related to -perceiv-d-stimulus attxibutes.__ Observed A-ssimi-.­
larities between objects correspond to metric distances between the re­
spective points in the cognitive space. The more psychologically dissim­
ilar two objects are, the more separated they are assumed to be in the
 
space.
 
2.5.2 The Spatial Cognitive Model Used in the Present Research
 
The present research uses the MMS approach to derive individual
 
spatial models, but modifies it under the assumption that some salient
 
attributes will be more important than others in discriminating among
 
stimuli, or more desirable or essential for the stimulus to possess in
 
a given context. The result is a model called a master space which
 
spans the several spaces for an individual obtained under several
 
contexts.
 
If dijk is the distance between points representing stimuli i
 
and j in the cognitive space derived under context k (context space k),
 
and if
 
Yir = projection of stimulus i on master cognitive space dimen­
sion r 
Wkr = subjective relevance of master space dimension r under
 
context k
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then the spatial cognitive model is specified by
 
dijk /tkrYir - yiJr)2 
where symlol.- means- approximation in a,least sum,of squares sense.
 
The model parameters of dimension projections (y), dimensions
 
weights (w) and proper choice of dimensionality (M) are obtained in a
 
two-part process. The first part employs an ordinary NMDS analysis that
 
incorporates the weights implicitly in the definition of the stimulus
 
projections. It requires a matrix of dissimilarity judgments () taken 
under one context and produces one spatial model for that context (con­
text space k) by finding the dimension projections (x) and dimension­
ality (m) such that 
dijk 
 ijk
 
and
 
= Z'irdijk m - x 
where 6ijk = dissimilarity judgment between stimulus i and j under 
context k, and 
xir =WkrYir 
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The symbol = means a monotonic transformation which requires dijk > dpqk 
whenever 5 ijk > Spqk-
Procedures for finding the x's, d's, and m are discussed in Ap­
pendix A. Note that the derived projections (x) are implicitly depen­
- -dent -upon--thecontext-kt--Theepro-ect-i-nrs ae-col-et drfor-eahr--of--­
several contexts and serve as input to the second part. . 
The second part analyzes the-several spatial-configurations ob­
tained under the various contexts -and produces- a mas.ter- configuration. 
such that-when dimens-iansreweightadit--appoximatasi-- naias t­
squares sense) each input configuration from each separate context.
 
Inputs to this part are each of the configurations (x) derived by an
 
NMDS analysis of the dissimilarity judgments made under various contexts
 
and output consists of the dimension-weights .(.w) -and a master- space
 
dimensionality (M), such that
 
2
dijk - E lr - xj r yir)ZWkr ir -
The solution for the parameters is based on an algorithm adapted
 
from a procedure of individual difference scaling (INDS-CAL)_ developed by
 
Carroll and Chang (1970). The procedure was modified to work with spa­
tial configurations rather than dissimilarity judgments and a detailed
 
discussion is given in Appendix B.
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2.5.3 The Relation of Context to the Spatial Cognitive Model
 
The spatial cognitive model is based on experimental observa­
tions that people act as if the following processes were carried out:
 
1. Context development: The individual subjectively develops the
 
judgment context by:--noti-cing-the-physical and sncial- environment and
 
temporal setting, perceiving the task definition, and establishing an in­
dividual perspective. The outputs from this process are the set of at­
tributes or dimensions the individual considers relevant to stimulus dis­
crimination.and-a-set.-of--dimensional.-weights which-reflect the. relative
 
importance of the dimensions. (See Bobrow and Collins 1975, p. 133,
 
Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957.)
 
2. Stimulus analysis: Each stimulus is analyzed to discern partic­
ular values of relevant attributes. This information is used to prepare
 
a stimulus description or concept. The perceived attributes may be aug­
mented with information from observation, retrieved from memory (Baker
 
and Santa 1977) or inferred through the use of personal heuristics
 
(Gregory 1970).
 
3. Cognitive organization: Weighted information is organized by
 
representing the stimuli as points in the cognitive space. The dimen­
sions reflect relevant attributes with relative importances implied by
 
dimensional weights.
 
4. Stimulus classification: The stimuli are classified in the spa­
tial model such that the perceived dissimilarity of two stimuli is a
 
monotonic nondecreasing function of the distance between the two points
 
representing these stimuli.
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Context is expected to affect the pattern of stimulus values and
 
weights that an individual uses in a particular judgment task. The
 
value of stimulus information is defined to be the quantitive represen­
tation of that information on a particular relevant judgment dimension.
 
Weight refers to the functional importance of that dimension for the
 
required judgment, and is always in reference to a particular context.
 
A change in context, then is expected to change the stimulus coordinates
 
(i.e., attribute values) because a different dimensional weight in the
 
spatial cognitive model becomes relevant. Changes in weights could then
 
account for differences in dissimilarity judgments made under different
 
contexts. The next chapter reviews the pertinent literature that deals
 
with the effect of context on spatial cognitive models.
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CHAPTER 3
 
LITERATURE REVIEW
 
3.1 Introduction
 
In Chapter 1 it was noted that the usefulness of a cognitive
 
space has been demonstrated in a wide variety of experiments and appli­
cations. A review of those applications will not be attempted here.
 
Most of the studies, however, treat the cognitive space as a well­
defined invariable structure. Yet a few authors have conjectured that
 
the space could change with a change in context. The idea that a vari­
ety of cognitive spaces could exist for the same stimulus set, depending
 
upon the context under which they are perceived, is not original to this
 
research. But this research is the first to demonstrate that changing
 
the context while maintaining the same set of stimuli and requiring the
 
same set of judgments can change the cognitive space for a given indi­
vidual. Some studies have shown that a cognitive space defined for a
 
group of subjects can change because of variations in experimental treat­
ment but none have addressed variations in context or the effect of
 
these variations on an individual's cognitive space. (The use of the
 
term group does not refer to "an assemblage of persons belonging together
 
with established reciprocities" as social psychologists would define the
 
term, but rather to a process whereby the responses from a number of
 
subjects are pooled or aggregated in some way under the assumption that
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the 	individual differences can be treated as noise.) Nevertheless,
 
these studies are reviewed to demonstrate the nature of cognitive space
 
changes and to indicate theories of change and methods of analysis which
 
proved untenable.
 
A literature review of the relevant experimental treatment of
 
groups of cognitive-spaces-suggests that the treatments can be broadly
 
categorized into five types:
 
1. 	Variations in skill or experience level
 
2. 	Changes in stimulus attributes
 
3. 	Context confounded with stimuli
 
4. 	Variations in the cognitive space over time
 
5. 	Specification of stimulus attributes considered
 
The review will be divided into sections corresponding to those
 
types.
 
There is one study that addresses context directly and it will
 
be discussed separately. Cliff (1966a) had three respondent groups
 
judge the similarity of photographs according to different instructions.
 
These instructions determined the context. The cognitive spaces derived
 
from the three groups as well as from a fourth control group were found
 
to differ only slightly and the differences could be directly attributed
 
to differences among groups. This apparent insensitivity of cognitive
 
space to context changes was essentially replicated in a later study
 
(Cliff and Young 1968) involving human trait adjectives and simulated
 
combat conditions as stimuli, and prompted Cliff to conclude that chang­
ing the context of the decision making task had only the effect of
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changing the use of the cognitive space, not the space itself. The
 
present research, however, contradicts this finding. Here, the cogni­
tive space did change with a change in context in a replicable and sta­
tistically significant way. Cliff's studies may have obscured contex­
tual effects by only investigating groups or by not analyzing stability
 
of the cognitive spaces.
 
3.2 Review of Specific Studies
 
Although none of the-studies reviewed-addresses-context di--­
rectly, all demonstrate the potential dynamics of the cognitive space
 
with appropriate manipulation of experimental treatments. The studies
 
differ in the variable treated, but all derive cognitive spaces at the
 
group level.
 
3.2.1 Variations in Skill Level
 
Shepard (1963) reanalyzed four separate previously published
 
studies of subjects judging whether two successive Morse code signals
 
were the same or different. The studies differed in the number of
 
subjects, data collection techniques, signal similarity measures, signal
 
content, and signal generation procedures. In spite of this, Shepard
 
found that there was a common underlying two-dimensional structure that
 
could be recovered from independent groups. In two studies (Keller and
 
Taubman 1943, Rothkopf 1957), however, the nature or identity of the di­
mensions differed depending on whether the group consisted of subjects
 
who were skilled or unskilled in understanding Morse code. But a
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reanalysis of these two studies indicates that there was a context
 
change which may have caused the difference in group cognitive spaces.
 
The task purpose differed between two experiments: one required judg­
ments of discriminability while another required stimulus identification
 
and therefore constituted a learning task. Consequently skill may have
 
been confounded with context obscuring its effect on cognitive spaces.
 
Furthermore, all of the studies reviewed by Shepard were perception
 
tasks rather than cognitive tasks and the transfer of findings between
 
the two 	domains is not at all clear.
 
In a similar study, Neidell (1974) had three groups (ordinary
 
drivers, traffic engineering students, and traffic engineering experts)
 
view wide angle movies of road segments and evaluate each segment for
 
driving safety. A spatial cognitive model was formed for each group
 
based on similarity data derived by averaging individual road evalua­
tions along specific attributes over the group. Neidell found very lit­
tle difference among group cognitive spaces. In contrast to Shepard's
 
findings, the differences could not be related to differences in road
 
safety training among the groups.
 
3.2.2 	 Changes in Stimulus Attributes
 
In their report of attempts to modify cognitive spaces, Moinpour,
 
McCullough and MacLachlan (1976) describe two types of modification:
 
1) structural -- a change in the number or character of dimensions, and
 
2) spatial -- a change in the importance of dimensions or position of
 
stimuli on dimensions. Their study dealt with the impact of persuasive
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communications on group cognitive -spaces-. - Haif of the- groups received 
instructions designed to cause spatial changes for actual toothpaste
 
brands, while the other half received instructions designed to cause
 
structural changes.
 
Spatial changes attempted by linking a particular brand with a
 
favorable message were unsuccessful. A second procedure informed sub­
jects of the- abrasion levels of all- brands- which seemingly--caused a sig­
nificant repos-itioning- of--brands' along the--abras-i-venes-s- dimes-ion-and-an --. 
increase in the- importance- of that dimension Since the -in-formation. 
about abrasion could be consulted by the subjects while they made their
 
judgments, the observed change in the group's spatial model does not nec­
essarily reflect an internal change in group perception of that informa­
tion. The observed change might be appropriately considered the result
 
of judging a new set of stimuli.
 
Attempts at changing the structure of the groups' spaces by in­
structing the subjects to use only one of two attributes were totally
 
unsuccessful. This result has been previously demonstrated by Peak (1960),
 
Axelrod (1963), and Lutz (1975) using Fishbein's (1963) linear-sum-of­
weighted-beliefs model to predict behavior. Also Briar (1963) has shown
 
that physical environment effects persist even when subjects are instructed
 
to ignore their actual environment when making judgments under experimental
 
conditions. It seems that subjects have difficulty ignoring attributes
 
which they know to exist, and which, it seems, they consider important
 
in a specific judgment context.
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Based on their findings, Moinpour et al. (1976) stated that spa­
tial changes are easier to accomplish than structural ones. They also
 
observed that attempts to cause cognitive change will be quite difficult
 
when the stimuli are unfamiliar and cognitively complex (e.g., more than
 
two important attributes). The present research did not find either
 
of these observations to be the case.
 
Ryan (1975) demonstrated that information causing cognitive dis­
sonance can reshape -one's perception of-reality and cause distortions in­
a cognitive space. He-had undergraduates rank distances between a num­
ber of campus landmarks before and after detouring around an imaginary
 
barrier, and substituting new landmarks for some original ones. He
 
found that while landmark substitutions caused little perturbation to
 
the group cognitive space, the introduction of the barrier generated sig­
nificant distortions.
 
It is important to note that both Ryan and Moinpour et al. manip­
ulated stimulus attributes in trying to affect the cognitive space.
 
The stimuli with the changed attributes technically amount to a differ­
ent stimulus set and it is reasonable to expect different (but related)
 
cognitive spaces to result from judgments concerning different (but re­
lated) stimulus sets.
 
3.2.3 Context Confounded With Stimuli
 
Wish (1976) had college students rate communication episodes on
 
bipolar scales. The episodes consisted of interpersonal relations
 
(e.g., between business associates) in a specific situation (e.g.,
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having a brief exchange about a minor -technical-prob-lem).--Wish, Deutsch
 
and Kaplan (1976) essentially repeated this experiment with a larger set
 
of relations. In both studies dissimilarity measures between the epi­
sodes were derived by averaging individual ratings over the group.
 
In these studies the context is that of the "actors" being
 
judged and not that of the judges themselves relating to the actors.
 
Thus context, .as used in -these.exper-iments-, is confounded- with--the stim­
uli. Furthermore-the- two-studi-es roeacho-coifl-icti-g-conflfcsion s he 
earlier study- indicated that -the-way 'groups-perceived--hw -peopi-e-in.-­
different kinds of relationships communicate with each other is influ­
enced by the communication context; the later study did not support this
 
finding.
 
Wish's work dealing with the effect of context changes on spa­
tial models was. contemporary--with-this -authon's-pre±iminaryresearch- - ­
(Dupnick 1975.). In Wish's studies, however, the context is part of the 
stimulus and the question addressed in the present study is the effect 
of the subject's context on his cognitive organization of the stimuli. 
Context, in the sense used in the present study, is in the person per­
ceiving the stimulus, and not in the stimulus itself.
 
Some of the episodes (stimuli) in Wish's experiments specified
 
the subject as a participant in the stimulus event (e.g., communication
 
between you and your mother vs. between a child and his mother) and thus
 
the social environment characteristic of context was addressed. These
 
cases, however, were not sorted out or even separately identified in
 
Wish's experimental analyses.
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3.2.4 Variations Uver Time
 
Osgood and Luria (1954) performed an analysis of semantic differ­
ential ratings of abstract concepts (e.g., truth) obtained from a sub­
ject exhibiting multiple personalities and presumably undergoing psycho­
logical therapy. Osgood and Luria knew nothing about the person. The 
ratings were obtained while the subject was- "inV each,of three person­
alities, with a 2-month period between two testings of each personality. 
The spatial representationof the-goodness;-activeness-andstrength di---­
mensions (the usual dimensions in-semantic differential analyses) of the 
concepts showed that there was little similarity in relationships of the
 
concepts across the personalities. For all practical purposes, three
 
separate persons existed. Each person's perception remained stable over
 
the 2-month interval since none of the personalities showed significant
 
repositioning of the concepts. Differences in-spatial models stemming
 
from phenomena of this kind (e.g., multiple personalities, hypnosis,
 
drugs, etc.) are due to changes in the subject and are not the result of
 
a context change.
 
In a study of a group's perception of presidential candidates in
 
the 1973 election, Moinpour and MacLachlan (1973) assessed the impact of
 
news events on a group's cognitive space over a 9-week interval. Both
 
similarity and preference measures were taken at 5 times and a separate
 
group cognitive space was derived for each. The five cognitive spaces
 
were extremely similar except for small position differences of some can­
didates. At least three factors peculiar to each individual could ac­
count for the differences: 1) inconsistency, 2) cognition (i.e., time
 
34
 
-
to think about-the comparisons);-or -3) informatioon-acquisition. -The-au­
thors favored the latter explanation but since the others were not
 
explored, they cannot be ruled out.
 
Although the cognitive space did not change appreciably over
 
time, the preferences for the candidates did, and shifts in preferences 
were shown to be related to-major -news-events; campaign.is.sues; and can­
didate characteristics.: Thiszfind-ing- supports-Cli-ffs earlier state-: - -: 
men ts that -chang ing..the-judgmenttcontext- hadtonlyxhe-effect-of -changing­
the use of--the-cognitive-space--not--the space-itse-t- (Cli-f-1966a; . . 
1968):
 
Jones and Young (1972) performed a longitudinal study which
 
sought changes in perceived social structure for members of a research
 
group during one year. It was predicted that various subgroups (e.g.,
 
new graduate .studen-ts,-oid"-graduate=studentaseauity)-wou-1d-systemati,.:
 
cally change in their perceptions of the relationships among-themselves
 
and others; i.e., the stimulus objects, over the year. An INDSCAL anal­
ysis was used to form two 3-dimensional research group cognitive spaces
 
based on two annual surveys. From a comparison of the positions of the
 
stimulus persons common to the two group spaces, the authors concluded
 
that the group structure did not change over the intervening year. A
 
clustering analysis of changes in dimensional weights revealed, however,
 
small but significant differences among the various subgroups in the two
 
group spaces. The differences suggest that a subject's perception of
 
the relationships among the various members of the group, including him­
self, stabilized with increasing seniority in the research group. The
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inference is that additional (i.e., new) information available about the
 
stimulus persons diminishes over time ("as people get to know one
 
another") which tends to stabilize perception. But some of the weight
 
changes may have been caused by a change in composition of the research
 
group (both in the stimulus persons and the judges) over the two-part
 
study, so that the stimulus set and the subject set were changed. Fur­
thermore, group judgment consistency was not assessed.
 
3.2.5 Specification of.Stimulus Attributes Considered
 
Three studies required the subjects to judge stimuli on each of
 
several specified attributes separately. This procedure generally
 
resulted in larger than usual cognitive space dimensionalities and ap­
proximated the concept of the master space formulated earlier in Chap­
ter 2.
 
Fenker and Brown (1969) defined a conceptual space as the collec­
tion of all linearly independent psychological dimensions underlying the
 
multidimensional scaling of a set of tasks. They reported a total of 10
 
linearly independent dimensions obtained from a single subject in judg­
ing similarity of random polygons under 15 different task conditions
 
which required the subject only to consider each of 15 verbally-defined
 
shape attributes. Green and Carmone (1971) extended this work to four
 
subjects and used bakery-type food items as stimuli and specific attri­
butes such as flavor, caloric content, etc. Four to six linearly inde­
pendent dimensions were obtained depending on the subject involved.
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Finally i Wallace (1969) note& that a limit-ton the complexity of
 
kinship terminology apparently exists among human cultures, from modern
 
to primitive. He found that for six very diverse cultures, six ortho­
gonally related distinctions, binary due to sex, were needed to contain
 
the definition of all kinship terms. Furthermore, the number of -kinship
 
terms bore no relationship to.the-complexity of.the" cIlture,.-­
3.3 General Review-Observations.
 
A number of-conclusions- -can-be- drawn -aboutcantext rasearch.. 
needs or from faults identified in the experiments: 
1. None of the studies provides a model of how cognition is
 
formed, influenced, or changed. Context has not been defined and no one 
has suggested how it might affect a spatial cognitive model. Without 
supporting -theoruse-of-thespat-ialcognitive-aodelmay te-a-starihes­
statistical or geometric exercise. 
2. All of the studies, in one form or another, have contrasted the
 
behaviors of different groups. Experimental results concerning the ef­
fects of context on group behavior are inconclusive. Part of this incon­
clusiveness is resolvable through analysis of subject inconsistency and
 
the effects of aggregating subject responses. Intraindividual analysis
 
is essential in the validation of cognitive models, especially where
 
model changes are concerned, yet none of the studies has investigated
 
subjects at the individual level.
 
3. There is a conspicuous absence of cognitive space replication
 
so that their stability (or alternately, subject consistency) can be
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assessed. Consequently little significance can be attached to findings
 
of changes in cognitive spaces in response to changes in experimental
 
conditions when subject response variability may also be an underlying
 
cause of such changes.
 
4. Aggregation of response data from a group can obscure possible
 
individual changes. Kaplan (1972) has noted that a change in a single
 
element of the cognitive structure of one individual may be offset or 
outweighted -by -serendipitous changes in- -cognitive -eementsof 'other - ­
individuals.-- Bass-and Wilkie (1973)- argued that the use of groups re­
quires very strong assumptions (e.g., meaningfulness of interpersonal 
utility or dissimilarity comparison, adjustments for within subject vari­
ance, and respondent homogeneity) which are often difficult to substanti­
ate. Additionally, group analysis assumes substantial similarity of in­
dividual contexts,. which-.implis -that-all.individuals-perceive-the-same. ­
meaning of a situation. Consequently aggregation of response data from 
a group may obscure any context effects by averaging over individual 
contexts. 
5. Cognitive space dimensionalities are not inherently limited to
 
three or less as Shepard (1969) stated. Task instructions may require
 
the subject to consider many different stimulus attributes in making com­
parison judgments and could result in large cognitive space dimension­
alities. Yet the spaces are related sufficiently to be represented by
 
a master cognitive space. It is likewise reasonable to expect that con­
text variations would also result in different cognitive spaces and
 
these spaces could be contained in a master space for an individual.
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6. No study has addressed context as-an -experimental-variable-and
 
demonstrated how context changes alone can cause changes in a subject's
 
cognitive space. Indeed, up to now it has been an open question as to
 
whether and how context affects the formation and dynamics of cognitive
 
spaces, 	although as shown in Chapter 1, -there has-been some speculation
 
that it 	is influential.
 
3.4 Research Objectives
 
The research -to-be-discussed in -this-report--is-an-attempt to' sat- -"
 
isfy a need stated in earlier chapters and restated immediately above:
 
To determine how the context in which dissimilarity judgments are made
 
of stimulus application, affects the formation and dynamics of cognitive
 
spaces for an individual. The studies reviewed in this chapter sug­
gested 	 the.research procadurensed here:_: -
Chapter 2 outlined a theory of how cognition is formed, reviewed
 
the nature of a cognitive structure which behavioral psychologists sug­
gest an individual uses to form judgments, and related the cognitive
 
structure to the spatial cognitive model introduced in Chapter 1. Con­
text was also defined and an account was given of how it would be ex­
pected to affect judgments of dissimilarity and how those effects would
 
be represented by changes in the parameters of the general form of the
 
spatial 	cognitive model.
 
Four context characteristics were selected for investigation
 
1. Social environment
 
2. Specific stimulus application
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3. Nonspecific stimulus application
 
4. Individual perspective
 
Experiments presented in four subsequent chapters were designed
 
to produce changes in each of the above four characteristics of context
 
and to test the effects of these changes upon individual cognitive
 
spaces,. To ensure that any observed changes would clearly be those
 
sought, and to avoid the possibility of compensating changes as Kaplan
 
(1972) had warned-, -only--one-characteristic-of context was-varied-in each
 
experiment. Furthermore-each---cognitive- spacr was replicated in- order to-­
show that cognitive space changes were due to context change rather than
 
to inconsistency of judgments or to cognitive model instability over
 
time. Lastly, the experiments were drawn from different areas of appli­
cation and used different kinds of stimuli. This minimizes the possibil­
ity that. a demonstratecLchange in the.. spatial cognitive-model -was due 
-only to a fortuitous choice of experimental setting, and it indicates 
the generality of the context effect. 
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CHAPTER 4
 
EXPERIMENT PROCEDURES-AND DATA ANALYSES
 
4.1 	Overview
 
-
The experiments-deser;ibed-in-Chapters -5-8-were-designed -to, demon­
stra te ha t-c ontro-edvrch-anges--ni-tcoutext-cancause---chcanges-iwar qp-at-iai­
-cognitive- model-for-an individua-r 	-Each experiment- consi-sted- of- de-ter = ­
mining the cognitive space for a particular set of stimulus objects for
 
each of a number of subjects under each of two or more contexts -­
context being the manipulated "variable" in the research. The contexts
 
were chosen to represent the types analyzed in Chapter 2 and the stimu­
_Aus obj ec t sweaa-zchsenm-to -hs Lu- abile or-.the-zconts-mtz-o-po-emean 
ingful and relevant-experimental Atasks-for the subjects.
 
To show that the spatial cognitive 	model changes were due to
 
context rather than to inconsistency of judgments or to cognitive model
 
instability over time, it was necessary to show that:
 
1. A spatial cognitive model can be formed for each subject under
 
each context.
 
2. The model is replicable under each context.
 
3. There are significant changes in the model across context -­
changes in the number, identity or importance of dimensions or in the
 
positions of stimuli on dimensions.
 
41
 
The judgments of dissimilarity from which the spaces were
 
created were replicated once for each subject under each context. The 
judgments and the resulting spaces were then analyzed to determine sub­
ject consistency and space stability within context, and the changes in 
judgments and cognitive spaces across context. --
A master cognitive-space was formed for- each-subject, one which
 
spanned his individual cognitive spaces for the various contexts. A set
 
of dimension weights was determined peculiar to each context such that
 
when these weights were -applied to .the--masterspace,°.they.approximated,
 
in a least-sum-of-squares sense, an individual cognitive space.
 
In addition, an attempt (usually successful) was made to label
 
the dimensions of subjects' spaces. For this purpose, selected subjects
 
under each context were asked the characteristics they thought they
 
might have considered in making their judgments. Then some or all sub­
jects were asked to rate each of the stimuli on these characteristics.
 
These data along with measurable characteristics of the stimuli were
 
analyzed to obtain labeled dimensions for these subjects' spaces. These
 
subjects' master cognitive space was also labeled for dimension identifi­
cation. The changes in dimension weights and labels across context were
 
interpreted in light of this information.
 
All four experiments used the same procedures and data analyses
 
and these methods are described in detail below. This chapter thus
 
serves as a reference to the four chapters on the specific experiments.
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4.2 Procedures
 
4.2.1 Dissimilarity Judgments
 
Nonmetric multidimensional scaling (NMDS) was used to obtain cog­
nitive spaces from subjects' comparison judgments of stimulus objects.
 
The experimental tasks consisted of having the subjects rate all pairs
 
of stimuli. -or n stimuli, there are n(n-l)/2 pairs of stimuli since
 
the order isznot- consdered-important crRatings-werecmade on'ca subjec-­
-
tive, presumablyratio-y ityb cowt-­staie o-fdi-ssizm:iart entOtan-dslOc0--
numbers meant-iow-drs-i-il-arity-wi-le-a -high number meant -high -issimi­
larity. 
A set of instructions along with all stimulus pairs was con­
tained in a booklet which also served as a response recording sheet.
 
The instructions introduced the experimental task, the stimulus objects, 
-the-judgment - otext ,x.:and -tne-manr ---otzmak lng-an-&dicar-dngcompa-r-i- 
­
son judgments. -No mention was made of spatial thinking;
 
For each subject and for each context, two sets of judgments
 
were made. The random sequence of stimulus pairs in the second set differe
 
from that in the first, but the pairs were otherwise the same. The second
 
set of judgments was never made immediately after the first, but followed
 
it from about 4 hours to 1 week later depending on the subject and the
 
experiment.
 
4.2.2 Attribute Specification
 
After making their judgments under the various contexts, some or
 
all of the subjects were asked to specify the stimulus attributes they
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thought they might have considered in making the dissimilarity judgments
 
for any of the specified contexts. When possible, known measurable
 
properties of the stimuli were added to the list of attributes provided
 
by the subjects for purposes of analysis.
 
4.2.3 Attribute Ratings
 
Some or all of the subjects rated each of the stimuli on each of
 
the nonmeasurable attributes-by giving a number to indicate the degree
 
to which the stimulus possessed or was characterized by the attribute.
 
Comery's (1950) technique was used to obtain ratio scaled ratings be­
tween 0 and I for the first experiment (Chapter 5). A scale value of
 
unity characterized the stimulus having the greatest degree of an attri­
bute. For the attributes used in the remaining experiments (Chapters
 
6-8) the subjec-tswere--required.only -to -rank order-the;stimuli.-The-set
 
of ratings of all stimuli on one attribute by one individual is called
 
a property vector. The measurable or otherwise known values of the phys­
ical properties of the stimuli also constituted property vectors but
 
these did not depend on subjective judgment. A separate set of property
 
vectors was maintained for each subject in each experiment although in
 
the case of physical properties, some of the property vectors were iden­
tical for all subjects within an experiment.
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4.3 Analysis
 
4.3.1 Construction of Spatial Cognitive Models
 
The comparison judgments for each context and each subject were 
represented as an individual symmet-rical--dissimilarity matrix where cell 
i-j indicated=the-tdegreeoftdiassii-l-arty eteen-st-imuli--i--ad-j--under­
a given context. Each matrix was analyzed using Kruskal's (1964a, 
1964b) iterative nonmetric multidimensional scaling (NMDS) algorithm 
called MDSCAL-V .(Kruskal-i169)to.give -aspatiaL-epreentation.of-the­
stimuli. -- The-al gor £thm- seeksman m=dimens~onaL"spatta--r-pr-esenation-of-­
points, one for each stimulus, such that the rank order of the inter­
point distances approximates the rank order of the input dissimilarity
 
judgements (see Appendix A for a more detailed description of Kruskal's
 
algorithm).
 
A value of stress S(m) is associated with an m-dimensional repre­
sentation of a set of stimuli, and indicates the degree of nonmonotoni­
city between distances in the representation and the dissimilarity judg­
ments. Since stress decreases with increasing spatial dimensionality,
 
a problem exists as to choosing the "correct" value of m. If m is cho­
sen too large, noise is treated as meaningful information resulting in
 
spurious dimensions. If m-is chosen.too.small,-the spatial representa­
tion inadequately describes the dissimilarity judgments. A statistical
 
test for choosing the "correct" value of m using a simulation derived
 
empirical sampling distribution for stress was used in this research
 
and is described in Appendix A.
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4.3.2 Comparison of Judgments
 
To avoid confusing change due to context with inconsistency of
 
response or instability of the cognitive model over time, analysis of
 
consistency and stability of the judgment data is necessary. If consis­
tency and stability can be established, then a comparison of judgment
 
data,over,context changes can be used to detect contextual influences..
 
Two direct measurements were used for these comparisons: a product­
moment-correlation between sets of judgments, and a matrix similarity
 
measure between the cognitive spaces derived from these judgments. The
 
judgments came either from replications of the experiment under the same
 
context if consistency was being assessed, or from two experiments per­
formed under different contexts when context effects were analyzed. An
 
indirect measurement using a master space to represent several cognitive
 
spaces from one individual was avlso used to detect-contextuai-influences.
 
These techniques are described in turn.
 
4.3.2.1 Product-Moment-Correlation. Each subject was required
 
to make two sets of dissimilarity judgments for each context, the sec­
ond set being a retest. The check for subject response reliability was
 
performed by computing the Pearson product-moment-correlation rS between
 
the test and retest judgments when the contexts were the same (S). Since
 
the correlations were expected to be high for reliability, accepting a
 
null hypothesis that the population correlation coefficient PS is non­
zero between sets of judgments when the context is the same, is a weak
 
test. A stronger test would be to accept the reliability hypothesis that
 
PS > p, where p = .90, say. Dissimilarity judgments were assumed to be
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reliable if the reliability hypothesis could not be rejected at the .05
 
significance level.
 
Differences in dissimilarity judgments-when the context was­
changed were detected by computing rD between sets -of judgments--nmade--­
-- when--the-:contextstwere-d fferen&t* t.tfrthes--judgmentisr'ere--induryen-­
dent, the population-coefficient PD between them wou-d-be zero. When-.
 
the context changes, however, it is expected that the judgments will ap­
pear to be from differencognitive-spaces,. ut-not sodiflerent-that-no... 
_correlation-wi Ie-osereci-, -T-easonable-difer-en-hypothes-is
 
is that PD < P, where, say, P = .40. Dissimilarity judgments were as­
sumed to be different and therefore influenced by context changes if
 
the difference hypothesis could not be rejected at the .05 significance 
level. 
Although the true sampling distribution of r when p # zero is 
- very difficult.to.derive, a large sample-approximation to a normal,­
statistic is given by 
Z = ( + r)(l - p) ()Vn 

2 (1- r)(1 +p)
 
where k is the sample size (Fisher 1921); here k = n(n-l)/2 and n is the
 
number of stimulus objects in the experiment. This statistic can be
 
used for a test of the reliability hypothesis and the difference hypothe­
sis. Curves for a significance level of .05 for these hypotheses were
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computed using Fisher's normal approximation for n 9 and n = 14
 
stimuli and are given in Figure 4-1. In order to simplify the presen­
tation of comparison statistics when several contexts were involved,
 
worst-case estimates were made for the population correlation coef­
ficients 0S and 0D using worst-case reliability and difference sample
 
correlation coefficients rs and'rD and Figure 4-1. Worst-case means:
 
that the values used for rS were the lowest of those from the various
 
contexts investigated for each subject for assessment of judgment relia­
bility, and the values of rD were the highest per subject when the ef­
fects of context changes were assessed. This procedure provided the
 
lowest value of PS and the highest value of PD for which the reliability
 
hypothesis and the difference hypothesis could not be rejected at the
 
.05 significance level.
 
The effect of context changes on dissimilarity judgments was
 
also demonstrated by determining the significance of the difference be­
tween the two population correlation coefficients. This tests the hy­
pothesis PS > PD where the subscripts refer to comparisons in which the
 
contexts were the same (S) or different (D). A normal deviate for
 
testing this hypothesis is
 
S (2:z in ( + rs)(i; rD)(1 - rs)(l +rD) 
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Figure 4-1.- Significance level a = .05 for product moment correlation
 
coefficient.
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a result also due to Fisher (1921). Curves for a significance level
 
of .05 for this test are given in Figure 4-2. If the worst-case relia­
bility coefficient rS for each subject is used as a reference value,
 
Figure 4-2 gives a worst-case value of the difference correlation coef­
ficient rD consistent with the two coefficients being statistically dif­
ferent at a .05 significance level. This value of rD is referred to as
 
rDmax

"
 
Although the product moment correlation coefficient can be
 
thought of as simply a measure of linear fit, the use of the above sig­
nificance tests assumes that the two judgment sets used in comparison
 
tests are bivariate normally distributed. This assumption was not
 
tested rigorously since there was no theoretical reason to-suppose that
 
the population of judgment pairs were bivariate normal. The actual ex­
perimental data, -however,-were; examined, for outliers and-appeared -to be
 
approximately bivariate normally distributed.
 
4.3.2.2 Matrix Similarity Measure. Cognitive spaces derived
 
from the original dissimilarity judgments under each context and across
 
context were compared by using a similarity measure based on a matrix
 
fitting technique proposed by Schonemann and Carroll (1970). Since the
 
stimulus coordinates of a cognitive space could be written in the form
 
of a rectangular matrix (stimuli x dimensions), configurations of two
 
spaces could be compared by comparing their matrices. The matrix fit­
ting technique examines the similarity of two cognitive spaces by ro­
tating, translating and rescaling (i.e., a similarity transform) one
 
matrix to attempt to "match" the other (see Appendix C). The matrix
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Figure 4-2.- Significance level a = .05 for difference between 
reliability and difference correlation coefficient. 
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similarity measure (MSM) used to determine the degree of match was
 
adapted from a measure (S) proposed by Lingoes and Schonemann (1974) to
 
measure the success of that technique, where MSM = VIJT. MSM varies
 
from 0 (no match) to 1 (perfect match). A perfect match means that an
 
appropriate similarity transform can be found to make the spaces identi­
cal. An.empirical cumulative distribution function F(MSMInjm) for the
 
statistic MSM was generated by the present author using Monte Carlo simu­
= 
lation for n 9 and n = 14 stimuli for dimensionalities m = 1-5. Se­
lected values of this function are given in Table C-i of Appendix C.
 
The simulation procedure consisted in repeatedly computing the MSM be­
tween two random n x m matrices with uniformly distributed column ele­
ments that were scaled to zero mean and unit variance. This distribu­
tion- was used to test the null hypothesis that the two matrices were
 
random and independent-.--.When-cogni--ive -space re:l-iabi-il-y -was beingas-< -­
sessed, the test of the null hypothesis was weak since the sampling dis­
tribution of MSM under the alternative hypothesis could not be speci­
fied. It was expected that in tests for reliability, the null hypothe­
sis would be rejected. The MSM was also used to demonstrate differ­
ences between cognitive spaces. Here, the test of the null hypothesis
 
was strong since it was reasonable to expect some similarity in two
 
cognitive spaces from the same experiment even though the context was
 
changed.
 
Since the application of a matrix similarity measure was new to
 
the area of cognitive spaces, the more familiar correlation coefficient
 
between the judgments was used in parallel in this research. Yet close
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- -
° 
comparisons b-etween these two-measures can -not be made since correla­
tions were used to measure similarity of the input judgments while the
 
MSM was used to measure the similarity of the output cognitive spaces
 
derived from the judgments.
 
4.3.2.3 Master Cognitive Space. An indirect_measure of change
 
in cognitive space resulted from the use of a master space which quant­
ified and- ass is:ted imtepretatio- -_thet change-. Carroll and':Chang...-. 
(1970) devei'oped-an -a~gori th-calted -NDSOSAL fbt'-cbmrarisonr-of, cognitive 
spaces from -different-subjects-; - It-defins - -common space; a-space -com­
mon to a group of individuals, and a set of dimension weights which are 
unique to each individual (see Appendix B for a description of INDSCAL). 
When applied to the common space, an individual's dimension weights­
provide an approximation to his cognitive space. In the present work, 
Carroll-andChans-t-hniquetwasadapteptorcompantsonz--oi-cogni-iv = 
spaces derived from-a: single subjett -under-1i-f-ferent--ontext -cond-it-onr.
It resulted in a master space -- a cognitive space for one individual 
common to two or more context conditions with a set of dimension weights 
unique to each context. When applied to his master space, an individ­
ual's dimension weights for a context provided an approximation to his 
cognitive space for that context. Thus all single context spaces were 
spanned by the master space. The dimensionality of the master space was 
no less than the greatest dimensionality of the various context spaces 
and no greater than the sum of their dimensionalities. The basic inter­
pretation is that the individual acted as if he had the master space at 
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his disposal and differentially weighted dimensions according to the con­
text. The weights indicated how the subject emphasized or used certain
 
jimensions in certain contexts and a change in weights demonstrated
 
the effect of context.
 
The degree to which the master space approximates a cognitive
 
space is determined in INDSCAL by the product-moment-correlation between
 
the squares of the stimulus interpoint distances in the original space
 
and the respective--distances-in'the dimensionally-weighted-master space-.
 
the choice of minimum dimensionality can be based-on-either 1) the low­
ast correlation among those for a set of cognitive spaces, or 2) an 
average correlation over a set of spaces. Both parameters are available 
from INDSCAL. This research derived the minimum dimensionality by in­
creasing the dimensionality until no appreciable gain in average cor­
relation between-the.-input.-intepoint-distances-and:-,the.reconatructed 
interpoint distances was realized. The sum of the squares of the dimen­
sion weights for a context space measured the goodness of fit between 
the dimensionally-weighted master space and that context space. 
4.4 Cognitive Space Dimension Labeling
 
Nonmetric multidimensional scaling (NMDS) analysis of dissimilar­
ity judgments results in individual cognitive spaces in which objects
 
are represented by their projections on m dimensions. However, the anal­
7sis does not reveal the nature of the dimensions. If the dimensions
 
:an be identified or labeled, they can suggest how the subject arrived
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at his judgments- and -how they -are affected -by,,context,--Since the-indi-­
vidual can describe the stimuli in terms of attributes, either measur­
able ones of the stimuli, or subjectively perceived ones, it would seem
 
reasonable to assume a relationship between the attributes he would name
 
and the spatial cognitive-dimensions. -One might then -expect to infer
 
the identity-of:-r: to:derive, lab-els for--the -limensions-from this. set- of. 
attributes . Yior-.analysis-, . -- for-each su4--c,a-pr ert-yr vettor: Bwa-s 4rx-medt -­
ect for: each-namedatttiue----A -cumvonent-o-f--this -ve7ctor.pyjr-indcaed-at ­
- the- degree- tn--ikich;--for-him--stim-lus--j-possessad--or--wqas---characteri-z-ed-­
by the attribute. The property vector P was defined on either an inter­
val scale or a rank order scale depending on how the attribute's compo­
nents were assessed. 
A label is a directed line in the cognitive space and consti­
.-_tutesa-_newt- dimension-in:t'hat-smacezc_.ot of---telabe--ing..Zenhinetzzz:­
used in this research and described here-are concerned--with finding -­
labels in the cognitive space such that, the-projections of -the-stimulus 
points in the space on the label are maximally correlated with a prop­
erty vector. The directional cosines of the label are determined from
 
a linear regression of a property vector (the coordinates of which are
 
values of the dependent variable) over the stimulus coordinates (the in­
dependent variables). The label, or new dimension in the cognitive
 
space is thus linked to a property vector and the identity of that dimen­
sion is based dpon the attribute that the property vector represents.
 
The labels do not necessarily identify "old" cognitive space dimensions,
 
although they might, but generally define "new" dimensions for which the
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identity (label) is known. Simply, a label defines a direction with
 
known identity.
 
A cognitive space is considered to be labeled if the property
 
space (a space that has property vectors parallel to the corresponding
 
labels) spans the original-cognitive spac&; That is, each cognitive
 
space dimension.(viewed as a--vector defined by the projection of the
 
stimulus points on that dimension) is a linear combination (in a vec­
tor algebra sense) of one or more of the property space dimensions
 
(i.e., labels). This-requires that 1) there are at least as many la­
bels (i.e., property vectors) as there are cognitive space dimensions,
 
2) the labels are sufficiently independent (measured by correlation),
 
and 3) the labels correlate well with the cognitive space. The possi­
bility that one or more of these requirements may be unsatisfied will
 
be taken up subsequently.
 
Two techniques were used in this research to construct labels
 
for the cognitive spaces, linear regression and monotonic linear regres­
sion. The choice depended on whether the property vector had been meas­
ured on an interval scale or a rank order scale, respectively. The re­
gression techniques are sometimes referred to as "fitting" techniques
 
since their aim is to orient or "fit" the property vector in the cogni­
tive space in order to label the space.
 
4.4.1 Linear Fitting
 
Linear fitting is a technique of finding directed lines (labels)
 
in the cognitive space so that the projections of the stimulus points on
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the lines are maximallyscorrelated.with-the values:.oft-the-property
 
vectors. Linear fitting is only appropriate if the property vector is
 
defined on at least an .interval scale. Then the directional cosines of 
the line are defined by the beta coefficients from a multiple linear re­
gression of the components- of-a property vector-(dependentwvarfable)-.... 
over the stimulus -coordinates:zin. the- -cognitive-:spyacer(independentvar-i­
ables). - Thexgoodnass.=of-eittis:dtermined-xby the mu-ltiple" corre-lation .. 
coe ffic i enttandmea sutesrrthe--ab'-±t--of-the----attx±brt- -ornwhiclthe-c nr s-z 
-property vector-is..based, -to- -identify--or-l-ab-e-l-r-d-irection--or -dimen 
sion) in the cognitive space where the direction is defined by the 
constructed line. That the correlation is nonzero is tested with the
 
two-tailed student's-t distribution. This research used the linear
 
fitting technique available in the "maximum r method" (i.e., maximum
 
product momentc orreLat on=-c ofttfient)-prQcedurecof aMtil er-.;Shepard 
and Chang (1964) which has been convenient-ly implemented into Chang - ­
and Carroll's (1964) computer program-PROFIT-(Property-Fitting)g-----­
4.4.2 Monotonic Linear Fitting
 
When the property vector -was defined on a rank order-scale, a­
fitting technique called CM5 (Conjoint Measurement) devised by Lingoes 
(1973) was used to find labels. The objective of this technique is to
 
find directed lines (labels) in the cognitive space so that the projec­
tions of the stimulus points on the lines are maximally correlated with
 
a set of ratio scaled numbers (called a psuedo property vector) which
 
have the same rank order as the components of the original property
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vector. This objective is tantamount to maximizing the rank order cor­
relation between the property vector and the projections of the stimulus
 
points on the label. The term conjoint is derived from the fact that
 
the lines and the set of numbers with the specified rank order are si­
multaneously or conjointly determined. Lingoes' technique begins with
 
an arbitrary pseudo property vector which is monotone with the rank
 
order of the property vector. Then a standard linear- multiple regres­
sion model is- used to -re-late -the-pseudor propertyvector to rthe- cognitive 
space stimulus -coord-inattes-; - -Next-, the- pseudo property-vector- is-ad­
justed based on the results of the linear regression and another lin­
ear multiple regression is performed. This process is repeated until
 
a multiple correlation coefficient between the pseudo property vector
 
and the stimulus coordinates is maximized. The beta coefficients from
 
the final regrezsioa pio.vde.the~dirnctioa&-co-sinasof.&-iinc in the.
 
cognitive space such that the stimulus projections on this line have
 
the same rank order (or nearly so) as the respective property vector.
 
The collection of lines produced by these fitting techniques de­
fine a new coordinate system (and new stimulus point coordinates) for
 
the cognitive space. Since the identities of these lines are known as
 
they represent known properties, the new coordinate system and the origi
 
nal cognitive space are said to be labeled.
 
4.4.3 Nonorthogonal Labels
 
It is frequently the case that the labeled dimensions obtained
 
in the above manner are not mutually orthogonal. This situation may
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occur when the number of property vectors available exceeds the dimen­
sionality of the cognitive space, or when the labeled dimensions (and
 
the underlying property vectors) are interdependent. The interdepend­
ency of the labels can be described-by their- label intercorrelation -_ 
- matrix. - A-probL-emmay~the-nexrstr:-asmtocfind-igasetzo:orthngont''--n-m 
dimensions that -labels the cognitive space-; The solution lies .in factor
 
analyzing the intercorre-ationnmatrix. -- The -application-of- factor anal-­
ysis to the problem of finding orthogonal lines, or- the labeling-of a­
cognitive. space- iq riginal--to.this_-esear ----- eader--is-rezr-ed-to 
other sources (e.g., Fruchter 1954) for information on factor analysis.
 
The general goal of factor analysis is the redefinition or reduc­
tion of a set of intercorrelated variables (scores) used to represent
 
data from subjects to a-smaller set of new, uncorretated scores (fac7­
tors) which are difined's6lel int&rm6 of the original kc6re6, and
 
which retain the most Uimportant" information-in the nriginal-scores.-

This relationship can be represented by the matrix equation
 
S = FV (3)
 
where S represents the standard scores (zero mean, unit variance), F the
 
uncorrelated factors, and V the factor loadings of the scores. A basic
 
assumption of factor analysis is that the intercorrelation between the
 
scores can be accounted for by the nature and extent of their common
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factor loadings. This results in the basic equation factor analysis for
 
independent (orthogonal) factors
 
R = FF' (4) 
where R is the intercorreation-matrix--of--the "scores-and--F-,'-is-the'-,. 
matrix transpose of F.
 
When factor analysis was applied to the labeling problem, the
 
directed lines or labels obtained by either of the above, fitting proce­
dures were viewed-as correlated.-scores_"_ and-represented;as matrix-L..
 
Factor analysis determined a set of independent labels (i.e., factors)
 
A
 
represented as matrix L which were the most "important" information from
 
the total set of labels. That is, factor analysis determined the m inde­
pendent lines that underlie the p lines, where m was the dimensionality
 
of the cognitive space to be labeled and p was the number of property
 
vectors (m < p). The m-dimensional cognitive space could then be de­
fined in terms of these m orthogonal lines. Since the identities of
 
these dimensions were known, the cognitive space was said to be labeled
 
by the m lines.
 
Let Rpp be the intercorrelation matrix among the p lines. Then
 
this matrix can be factored to find factor loadings Fpm such that
 
(5
R =F F 
pp pm mp (5)
 
and the matrix of m independent lines Lmm can be obtained from
 
A 
pm pm mm (6)
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where Lpm is the matrix of-p-intercorrelated-lines in-the m-dimensionl
 
cognitive space.
 
Although factor analysis can determine a set of orthogonal
 
labels, it does not indicate how these labels are correlated to the
 
°
 cognitive space. This informationls obtained from the fitting-tech­
niques and is- ontainedithe multiple correlation coefficients ber -...
 
tween the labeis andazthezcognitime- space -stimulus-cordinates-; c--abel 
.and cognitive-spacerre-atediess-a-s-rirnrrprated- n-ithe-labeingrproc ­
ess by weighting-the-or±ginal--factor lroadings-for--each-1label-by-the . 
respective multiple correlation coefficient and then rotating this new
 
factor loading matrix to a varimax condition (Kaiser 1958). The vari­
max condition results in a simple structure in which the variances of 
all the coordinates (factor loadings) are maximized. In other words, 
each-column .as. imp-ilid-asmuch s :ashi-zirlcaepingzw -ththe_-_­
restrictions of--orthogona-lity-of-colunns.- Ideally -a-factor loading ma---... 
trix with simple structure would have only one nonzero loading in m­
of p rows and only one nonzero loading in each of the m columns.
 
In general, one must make a judgment as to what labels are appro­
priate for describing the cognitive space. The procedure suggested here
 
and used in this research was to examine the rotated multiple correla­
tion coefficient-weighted factor loading matrix for the m rows (repre­
senting lines) which had the largest values in the columns and rows in
 
which they appeared, where m was the dimensionality of the cognitive
 
space. Additionally, the other values in these rows and columns should
 
have been small. Then the cognitive space was said to be labeled with
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the attributes represented by the lines associated with the m rows
 
(lines) so chosen.
 
4.4.4 Cognitive Space Labeling:- Quantitative Measure
 
The labels chosen for a cognitive space are required to be mutu­
ally orthogonal .(or nearly-so),.to be significant descriptors, and to 
span the space.. While-the first,two.requirements have been addressed ­
above, the -ability of -the-chseinT-labelssto:ispan thercognitivE--spacatcan-=- ­
be assessed by computing the -matrix simil-arity-measure (MSM).-between the ­
component factor scores and the cognitive space. (The MSM is an index 
developed for this research to determine the similarity of two cognitive 
spaces and is discussed in detail in Appendix C.) 
If the original property vectors (or in the case of monotonic 
linear fitting, -.- seudo. property,_vec.tors-) ar-rescaled zas.-zscorea#. then .... 
the following formula expresses the method of computing component factor 
scores: 
XA = Z F - (7) 
np pmmm
nm 

A
 
where X = component factor scores, an approximation to the 
cognitive space
 
Z = z scores of property vectors
 
F = factor loadings
 
E = diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of Rpp
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A 
The ability of'X to span the 'original cognitive-space--X -is 'then 
A 
measured by computing -the MSM between X and-X.- A-high value-of -MSM­
(approaching unity) indicates that the cognitive space.can be
 
approximated by a linear combination of the set of property vectors and
 
strongly Suggests -that -the-individual acts as if" the respective attri­
butes were ,directly-used-i .makingthe -comparison- judgments'.. Con-­
versely, the MSM can approach-zero-if _l the-set-of-property.tvectors
 
- analyzed -doesot---rep.rpeent-one-(otr--toe- --u-tr- btatsa~cua lausedtzb-y 
the ind ividuarl---or-2 )- the--abe-l--are-pooriy--correl-ated-with- tire-property ­
vectors, or both. 
4.5 Summary of Analyses 
This section lists the analyses performed for each experiment. 
Eor : someexp enmntsr aIeci serth-ez-numb-erzo:--b-tfj ectsr-sasc-so _ tar.ge', 

either a summary of -certain--results o-f -the--analysis-4s- -given-or de­
- a ­tailed analyses are--provided--forr typtcal subject in--the- experiment. 
The following analyses were performed for each subject in each experi­
ment:
 
1. Development of and selection of an appropriate dimensionality
 
for a spatial cognitive model of original and replicated judgments for
 
each context.
 
2. Comparison of dissimilarity judgments for the same context and
 
across different contexts.
 
3. Comparison of cognitive models for the same context and across
 
different contexts.
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4. Development of and selection of -an appropriate dimensionality
 
of a master space for all contexts.
 
5. Examination of the change in dimensional weights of the
 
master space with a change in context.
 
The following analyses were performed for some of the subjects
 
randomly selected in each experiment:
 
1. Development-of property vectors
 
2. Labeling "of-cognitive -space -for--each context- ­
3. Labeling-of 	 the master space 
4. Comparison 	of the individual cognitive space labels with the 
master space labels with consideration of the master space dimension
 
weights
 
5. 	Examination of the change in cognitive space labels with a
 
:
change in-contex-t--.'.-s­
6. Comparison of-cognitive-mod-el--and--a spatial model represented­
by component factor scores from labeling for each context
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CHAPTER 5
 
THE EFFECTS OF-SOCIAL-ENVIRONMENT CHANGES-

UPON SPATIAL COGNITIVE MODELS OF TV PROGRAMS
 
5.1 Summary
 
Twenty-three subjects judged the dissimilarity of the same set
 
.of41_-4o-prilar progr-ams--ile-,as-ming-diffexent-cotexts-in-which-­
viewing would take place. The specified contexts were the social envi­
ronments defined by the other persons (spouse, close friends, young chil­
dren, church minister) who viewed the programs along with the subject.
 
Four different cognitive spaces, one for each context, were de­
veloped for each subject and the four spaces generally differed in
 
dimensionality,, imension-abels and stimulus-point configuration. For...­
each subject, it was found that the four cognitive spaces could be con­
tained within a high dimensional (often 6 or more) master space. Each
 
of the four spaces obtained with the four contexts was represented in
 
the master space by a set of unique weightings for the orthogonal dimen­
sions with some near zero weights indicating that the-associated dimen-­
sions or attributes were not necessary for discrimination among the TV
 
programs in certain contexts.
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5.2 Experiment Background
 
Probably the most pervasive and influential environment effects
 
are social. The social environment can be described by the additional
 
participants to the task action, their apparent roles, and their inter­
personal re-lationshipswitlrth-subject- This--chapter, presents-the-re­
suits of an experiment dealing with the effects of social environment on
 
spatial cognitive models. The experimental results have implication for
 
marketing, especially in the use of visual media and TV programming.
 
Predicting intvidualchoice s_.critical.toefifec tiva-marketing.-----
Many researchers have attempted to predict purchase rates or brand 
choice from respondents' demographic or personality characteristics, but 
results have not been encouraging (Evans and Roberts 1963). Some more 
recent research shows that individual.choice among similar alternatives 
appears to be governed by specific atttibutes of those alternatives
 
(e.g., Frost 1969). Lehmann (1971) examined the effectiveness of a
 
preference model for TV programs based on specific attributes. The
 
model assumed that the programs were points in a multidimensional space
 
and that preference was inversely related to the distance of a point
 
from an ideal point (defined by the ideal amount of each attribute). The
 
model was somewhat successful in that the average correlation between
 
subjects' stated preference ratings of TV programs and model predictions
 
of preference ratings was .49.
 
Context may also alter the relationships among attitude, choice,
 
and preference. Friedman and Fireworker (1977) have noted an apparent
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belief among TV executives that certain types of programs should only be
 
shown during specific time slots when certain audiences are watching.
 
This suggests that the executives consider context to influence program
 
preferences.
 
preference, but- the results demonstrated that changes in the context,­
the social- environment--in--which- -a program was-viewed- produced- substan- .­
tial changes in the perception of the program.. These changesain turn,.
 
Mwouldbeexpact dtoadexerl-tsignificaninfluencason-indivIdual
 
preference and choice behavior.
 
5.3 Method
 
5.3.1 Stimuli -
The stimuli were the names of 14 TV programs selected from a
 
(then current) 19-5 TV Guide (see.Table-5-1) . All-programs..were sched=_
 
uled for prime time viewing, thought to be familiar to most people who
 
at least occasionally watched TV, and representative of the variety of
 
available shows.
 
5.3.2 Subjects
 
Twenty-three subjects participated in the phases of the experi­
ment requiring dissimilarity judgments, but due to subsequent unavail­
ability of the remainder of the subjects, only five were carried through
 
all phases with accompanying analyses. The subjects included 15 men and
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TABLE 5-1.- STIMULI FOR TV PROGRAM EXPERIMENT
 
1. The Smothers Brothers
 
2. The Rookies
 
3. Adam-12
 
4. National Geographic Special
 
5. M*A*S*H
 
6. Hawaii Five-0
 
7. Marcus Welby
 
8. Little House on the Prairie
 
9. Petrocelli
 
10. The Waltons
 
11. Wide World of Sports
 
12. All in the Family
 
13. 60 Minutes
 
14. Hot'l Baltimore
 
8 women ranging in age from about 25 to 50 who were volunteers from a
 
book discussion group.
 
5.3.3 Procedures
 
The 23 subjects rated the subjective dissimilarities of the 91
 
pairs of the 14 TV programs in accordance with the general procedures
 
detailed in Chapter 4. The subjects were instructed to make the dis­
similarity judgments by considering that they would view the programs
 
under each of four social environments; (1) good, close adult friends,
 
(2) one's church minister, (3) one's children, and (4) one's spouse.
 
All judgments for each context were replicated using different random
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orderings of the stimulus pairs and different orders of context presen­
tation, but the stimulus pairs were otherwise the same.
 
All subjects were asked to specify the attributes of the pro­
grams they considered-in-making,the dissimilarit.Judgments.... Because
 
-
- collectivelytheir.9 -atributeszcovemed.-thase-moste-f-requenty-ment-oned 
10 of the 23 subjects were interviewed individually to solicit words or
 
phrases descriptive of the 9 attributes-mentioned. These are-given-in
 
Table 5-2.
 
TABLE 5-2.- STIMULUS ATTRIBUTES USED IN TV PROGRAM EXPERIMENT
 
1. Maturity, average age level
 
2. Invites personal involvement
 
3. Humorous, comical
 
4. Suspenseful, mysterious
 
5. Educational, informative, value-laden
 
6. Active, dynamic
 
7. Well-produced and directed
 
8. Depicts goodness, well-being, harmony
 
9. Controversial, satirical
 
10. Personal preference
 
Only 5 of the original 23 subjects completed the remaining part
 
of the experiment which required these subjects to rate the programs on
 
the 9 attributes and also on personal preference. A set of 10 ratio­
scaled property vectors was formed for each of the 5 subjects from these
 
ratings. The description of the analysis and the discussion which fol­
low refer, for convenience, to one subject chosen at random from the
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5 who completed all phases of the experiment because his data are typi­
cal. He is referred to as subject A. (Results for the other 4 subjects,
 
for whom property vectors were also derived, will be referred to where
 
appropriate.) Subject A's property vectors for the 14 programs are given
 
in Table -5-3; intercorre-atons are--giverir Tab-If-5-4.......
 
5.4 Analysis
 
5.4.1 Construction of Cognitive Spaces
 
-Four cognitive spaces..wereadeveloped for- eaclt.of -the 2a subjects 
under the 4 contexts using the techniques discussed in Chapter 4. One­
to 4-dimensional spaces resulted for each context. The stress values
 
for each number of extracted dimensions for subject A is shown in Figure
 
5-1. Using the dimensional selection procedure described in Chapter 4,
 
spatial models dimensionalities for the friend, minister, child, and
 
spouse context were selected to be 3, 4, 3 and 2, respectively, for sub­
ject A. The dimensionalities selected for each of the 23 subjects
 
are given in Table 5-5.
 
5.4.2 Comparison of Judgment Data
 
Chapter 4 described procedures for comparing sets of dissimilar­
ity judgments using the Pearson product-moment-correlation coefficient
 
(r), and for comparing cognitive spaces derived from the judgments using
 
the matrix similarity measure (MSM). Table 5-6 presents worst-case sum­
mary statistics for comparison of judgments for the 23 subjects. Worst
 
case means that the values listed are the lowest comparison statistics
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TABLE 5-3.- PROPERTY VECTORS FOR SUBJECT A:
 
TV PROGRAM EXPERIMENT* 
Televisotf -. U 
program o 
4- Cd 
ci 
04 
z 
0 
P4 
o0)
ci 
~ 
~4 0 
> 
0) 
:ci 
t 
0) >  
4~ 
C 
$4 
Cd g)P4 1 co ') $4P o 0 0 $4P 
Smothers ..... -87- 84- 31-- 98 2-7-- 71 26 .- 43>- 34, 36 
Rookies 100 45 60 49 36 75 42 52 53 42 
Adam-12 65 61 27 89 27 79 21 37 28 15 
Geographic 82 91 40 70 21 47 46 63 57 29 
M*A*S*H 71 - 70- 13 -71 -78 70 -46--- 63 - 23- 32-­
Five-O 87 53 27 100 88 78 56 41 30 42 
Welby 58 41-- 18 72 - 84- 100 69 66 30 48 
Little House 54 100 27 73 51 - 90 45 62 29 51 
Petrocelli 78 99 41 83 74 72 65 100 23 100 
Waltons 80 79 29 64 95 79 74 66 47 26 
Sports 70 82 18 20 100 65 100 93 20 55 
Family 95 73 100 23 17- 51 27- 44 100 29 
60 Minutes 80 62 60 75 33 71 44 47 71 28 
Hot'l 92 61 84 33 56 42 63 48 96 58 
*Decimals omitted. 
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TABLE 5r4 -, INTERCORRELAT-IONS-.r0 PROPER-TY-VECTORS:.
 
SUBJECT A OF THE TV PROGRAM EXPERIMENT"
 
Attribute r r" 
4-' p-
z 
zt 
.C: 
0 
0 
4-
Cu 
04 
0 
O 
' 
0 
1 
0) 
.) 
0 
CO 
p-
i 
* 4 
Cd 
U 
:3Oi 
t 
wi 
0 
-­
> 
H 
U 
-~P 
' 
4 
:1 
o 
0 
p1 
a)
0 
0 
r 
0 
0 
D 
0 
Ci 
0 
C 
Personal -22 
Humorous 69 -12 
Suspenseful -
Educational 
-26 
-33 
03 
-06 
_-52 
-56 -04 
Active -63 -21 -65 52 38 
Produced -21 07 -30 -37 84 07 
Goodness -33 50 -34 -27 58 09 73 
Controversial 63 -19 93 -53 -51 -68 -25 -44 
Preference -05 33 -00 -07 40 03 50 71 -22 
*Decimals omitted. 
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.3 
Child
 
Friend
 
Minister
.2
 
LL 
CSpou
,1 
50/o acceptance level
 
Appendix A, Table A-1
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
 
Number of dimensions extracted
 
Figure 5-1.- Final stress vs. number of dimensions extracted for four
 
social environments: Subject A of TV program experiment.
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TABLE 5-5.- COGNITIVE SPACE DIMENSIONALITY SELECTED FOR EACH SUBJECT: 
TV PROGRAM EXPERIMENT 
[p < .05] 
Context Subject -
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N '0 P' Q R S T U V W 
Friend 
Minister 
Child 
Spouse 
3 
4 
3 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
4 
3 
4 
2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
4 
3 
2 
4 
2 
3 
2 
1 
3 
2 
4 
4 
3 
1 
3 
3 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
4 
4 
2 
4 
2 
1 
4 
4 
2 
4 
2 
4 
2 
3 
3 
4 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
4 
2 
4 
4 
4 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 
of those from the various contexts compared for each subject for assess­
ment of judgment reliability, and the highest comparison statistics when
 
the effects of context changes were-assessed. Table 5-6 also gives a
 
worst-case va-lue of the difference -or-relat-ion ccoe-fficient -suchthat it 
ficient at the .05 significance level. 
Table 5-6 shows that the reliability hypothesis can be-accepted­
at the .05 .level for each snhj eat -for.kS .P.I That -is, whenithe -con­
-text- -is.-fixed-,-.the--p-rbabTi -a tre-testZdiasimi--Tt -n 
larity judgments are related with a population reliability correlation
 
coefficient PS of less than or equal to .41. Similarly, the difference
 
hypothesis can be accepted at the .05 level for each subject given a pop­
ulation difference correlation coefficient D < .63. With.the-exception.
 
of 6 subjects (E, K, M, R, S, and V), the worst-case (lowest) population
 
reliability correlation coefficient exceeded--the worstzcase .(highest_).____
 
population difference correlation coefficient. But, for all subjects ex­
cept M, a difference between the two correlation coefficients was statis­
tically significant at the .05 level or better.
 
Table 5-5 demonstrates that for most subjects the cognitive
 
model undergoes a change in dimensionality, but. even more convincing -...
 
data that support a change in the cognitive model are found irTable _
 
5-6. The generally low values of the difference coefficients show that
 
the change in context caused substantial repositioning of the stimuli
 
in an individual's cognitive space. That this repositioning is not
 
attributable to inconsistency of subject responses or instability of
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TABLE 5-6.- CORRELATIONS (r) BETWEEN DISSIMILARITY JUDGMENTS AND SIMILARITY
 
MEASURES (MSM) BETWEEN COGNITIVE SPACES FOR EACH SUBJECT:
 
TV PROGRAM EXPERIMENT* (p < .05)
 
[Sample Size = 91]
 
Relationship Subject -
A B C D E F C H I J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U V W 
Context compared: Same 
rS 
pS 
NSMS** 
86 
80 
84 
80 
72 
81 
57 
44 
62 
87 
81 
91 
57 
44 
72 
78 
69 
83 
75 
66 
84 
82 
75 
85 
67 
54 
71 
71 
61 
83 
73 
63 
74 
69 
59 
88 
54 
41 
50 
91 
84 
97 
95 
90 
87 
79 
71 
89 
76 
67 
74 
66 
55 
89 
72 
62 
83 
91 
84 
85 
90 
83 
88 
56 87 
43 82 
53 92 
Context compared: Different 
rD 37 47 19 17 34 05 40 34 25 21 49 16 45 34 13 48 08 45 49 20 47 33 13 
PD 
MSMD** 
51 
43 
61 
20 
35 
11 
33 
05 
48 22 
k***** 
50 05 
54 
30 
48 
23 
41 
19 
37 
44 
63 32 
*** 
48 14 
59 
27 
48 
46 
29 
09 
62 25 
*** 
33 03 
59 
51 
63 
*** 
43 
36 
36 
61 
36 
47 
41 
29 
19 
rDmax 78 70 38 80 38 65 62 72 51 58 60 54 34 86 92 68 64 50 58 86 85 37 80 
*Decimals omitted. 
**p < .01 
***p < .10 
the cognitive model is supported by the reliability coefficients. The
 
worst-case difference coefficient is substantially less than the worst­
case reliability coefficient and the difference in correlation coeffi­
cients is statistical-1y si-gnifican-., _Thisuimplies that: each.cogni-tive­
-
Ss-pace-repre-s-ent-s-a-..un-kqne- =t-extt~or--an-i~n iv.id-aa-1-.---hese--dat~r---o 
vide strong support that changes in the context -of-stimulus:applica-­
tion (social environment) can cause the spatial cognitive model for
 
an 	individual to change. ­
-.... -sN) -as posaible~exception---osome of--­--- Subjec-t ,A,.-amngothe 
these statements. Detailed results of the comparison-analysis of-A's 
judgments appear in Table 5-7. The subject was quite consistent for 
fixed contexts. When the context changed, the cognitive space changed
 
TABLE 5-7.- CORRELATIONS -BETWtEE DISSTMIL!ARITY.UDGMENTS-AND - .
 
-COGNITIVE :SP-ACE.-SMILARITY -MEASURES aCTN -ARENTHESES)_,BE- WEEN 
COGNITIVE SPACES UNDER FOUR SOCIAL ENVIRONMENTS:
 
SUBJECT A.OR TV PROGRAM EXPERIMENT*
 
Diagonal terms are values of rS and (MSMs);1 
off-diagonal terms are rD and (MSMD) J 
Friend Minister Child Spouse
 
Friend 92
 
(84)**
 
Minister 27 	 87
 
(19) (92)
 
Child 17 37** 94
 
(16) 	 (21) (85)
 
28 15 21 86**
Spouse 

(43) (07) (10) (96)
 
*Decimals omitted.
 
**Values shon in table 5-6.
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substantially except for the apparent relationship between the friend
 
and spouse cognitive spaces. The moderate similarity between these two
 
cognitive spaces is not surprising and may be a reflection of the fact
 
that there is a moderate simii-arity-in the-relationships -betweenadult­
friends and betweeh spouses. A -similar re7-tionshir-between--ti-friend-­
and spouse cognitive spaces for subjects E, K, M, R, S, and V accounted
 
for the worst-case (lowest) reliability correlation coefficient being
 
less than the worst-case (highest) difference correlation coefficient as.
 
noted in Table-5-6-and -discussed above.
 
5.4.3 Master Cognitive Space
 
A master cognitive space for one individual is an approximation
 
to 
the union of the cognitive spaces formed under different contexts. An
 
INDSCAL analysis of subject A's 4 context spaces indicated that 6 lin­
early independent dimensions could reasonably span the spaces. The
 
given in
dimensional weights for the master space of subject A are 

Table 5-8. The sum of the squares of the weights measures the goodness
 
of fit between the dimensionality-weighted master space and the separate
 
cognitive spaces. The manner in which the master space spans each cogni­
tive space can be examined by identifying the dimensions with the k
 
largest weights where k is the dimensionality previously chosen for the
 
cognitive space based on an MDSCAL analysis. For the friend context,
 
the dimensionality chosen was 3, and according to Table 5-8, the 3 larg­
est weights are for dimensions 3, 4 and 6. Such weights are circled in
 
Table 5-8 and indicate the manner in which the master space spans those
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TABLE 5-8.- DIMENSION WEIGHTS FOR THE 6-DIMENSIONAL
 
MASTER SPACE: SUBJECT A OF THE TV
 
PROGRAM EXPERIMENT*
 
Dimension Cognitive space -
Friend Minister Child Spouse
 
2 S 8 
3 800 
4 42
 
5 1il
 
6 @ 
Fit** 83 97 89 98
 
*Decimals omitted; weights < .10 deleted.
 
**Sum of squared weights.
 
cognitive- spaces under-the-noted-context. -The--mini-ster-and-child con­
text appear to use unique dimensions that no other spaces use, dimen­
sions 1 and 5. The remaining- dimensions are shared- in -various -ways--ove 
the four contexts.
 
Master cognitive spaces were developed for each of the 23 sub­
jects and Table 5-9 presents a summary of pertinent results extracted
 
from these analyses. The upper bound on dimensionality is the sum of
 
the dimensionalities of the individual spaces. -The master space dimen­
least half of the upper bound implying
sionality for any subject is at 

that about half of the dimensions of the individual cognitive spaces
 
are unique. Dimension sharing, however, is more common than dimension
 
uniqueness. Only for subject B did the number of unique dimensions
 
(4) exceed the number shared (3). Subject M had complete sharing of
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TABLE 5-9.- SUMMARY OF MASTER COGNITIVE SPACE ANALYSIS FOR EACH SUBJECT: 
TV PROGRAM EXPERIMENT 
Parameter -Subject -
A B C D E F C H I J K L M N 'O'P Q R"S T U V W 
000 
Dimension 
upper bound 
Dimensionality 
Worst fit* 
12 
6 
86 
10 
7 
78 
13 
8 
81 
7 
4 
68 
10 
5 
88 
6 
4 
65 
11 
6 
78 
10 
5 
61 
11 
7 
59 
'8 12 
5 6 
85 94 
11 
5 
81 
7 
4 
70 
11 
5 
84 
10 
5 
67 
12 
6 
79 
11 
5 
64 
12 412 
6 ' 7 
87 91 
11 
6 
83 
12 
6 
74 
13 
7 
89 
10 
6 
82 
Best fit* 98 95 93 87 95 83 84 90 83 96 99 91 79 91 94 88 92 96 98 97 92 93 96 
Average fit* 
Shared 
dimensions 
Unique 
dimensions 
92 
4 
2 
88 
3 
4 
86 
5 
3 
76 
3 
1 
86 
2 
3 
86 
3 
1 
82 
4 
2 
78 
3 
2 
73 
4 
3 
91 
4 
1 
96 
4 
2 
87 
3 
2 
76 
4 
0 
88 
4 
1 
83 
4 
1 
84 
5 
1 
83 
3 
2 
91 
3 
3 
94 
4 
3 
90 
3 
3 
86 
5 
1 
9] 
4 
3 
91 
3 
3 
*Decimals omitted. 
dimensions meaning that the four contexts evoked a set of four independ­
ent dimensions but they were differentially weighted in each context.
 
5.5 	Dimension-Labeling _ 
b e ­
-Five--fthke -2-3 -hbjats- sppTie'd-iforat-bn--that--cold ued 
to label their cognitive spaces. A set of 10 property vectors were ob­
tained for each of the 5 subjects using this information according to 
the- procedures discussed -in--Chapter-_4. - The-vectors-represented -the ­
-- subj e ct--s-- rat-rngs-of-the---T-p-rogr-ams--aecord-i-it-e-he---0---tr-ibu e&--­
specified in Table 5-2. Property vectors for-subject A are given-in -
Table 5-3. Cognitive space labels were developed for each of the 4 con­
text spaces for the 5 subjects investigated using the linear regression 
property fitting technique-discussed in Chapter 4.- Table 5-10 presents
 
the results of a factor analysis of the interlabel correlation matrix
 
for subject A's cognitive space under-the friend context. The factor
 
loadings have been weighted by the multiple correlation coefficient be­
tween the property vector and the cognitive space stimulus coordinates
 
and rotated to a varimax condition.
 
The maturity, action and goodness attributes have the highest in­
dividual weighted loadings on the three dimensions that define this space
 
and are noted in Table 5-10. Hence, the friend cognitive space can be
 
defined for subject A by the labels representing these attributes.
 
Dimension labeling for the four individual cognitive spaces and
 
the master space for subject A is summarized in Table 5-11. A check
 
mark appears in an attribute-cognitive space cell if labeling analyses
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TABLE 5-10.- WEIGHTED FACTOR LOADINGS OF INTERLABEL
 
CORRELAToION-MATRIDXFOR -FRiE-NDfCGNTEX11:- -SUBJECT A 
OF THE TV PROGRAM EXPERIMENT*
 
Attribute-	 Factor** 2 * *
 r
 
1 .2 3­
1. Maturity 12 -11 	 95
 
2. Personal 	 02 21 61 64
 
3. Humorous -10 00 78 79
 
4. Suspenseful 24 48 22 58­
5. Educational -19 38 -28 51
 
6. Action 	 -09 -13 89
 
7. Produced 	 19 30 14 38
 
8. Goodness 10 @16 	 89
 
9. Controversial 24 -08 47 73
 
10. 	 Preference -13 57 19 70
 
*Decimals omitted.
 
2

**Loadings rescaled to rms value of r .
 
***Multiple correlation coefficient from linear
 
regression (ra=.ol = .78).
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TABLE 5-11.- SUMMARY OF LABELING ANALYSIS FOR FOUR COGNITIVE
 
SPACES: SUBJECT A OF THE TV PROGRAM EXPERIMENT
 
Attribute Cognitive space -
Master Friend Minister Child Spouse
 
Personal / / 
Educational / / / 
Action / / V / 
Goodness / / / 
Controversiaol --- /--- / 
Maturity / /
 
Humorous /
 
Unidentified /
 
indicated that the particular attribute was used in making dissimilarity
 
judgments in that context. Of the 10 attributes mentioned by the sub­
jects, 7 were sufficient to identify dimensions in the four spaces for
 
subject A. The suspenseful, well-produced, and preference attributes
 
did not figure in any of subject A's spaces. The strong similarity be­
tween the pattern of checks in Table 5-11 and the pattern of relative
 
sizes of the master space dimension weights in Table 5-8 confirms the
 
ability of the master space to span the 4 cognitive spaces since the
 
master space uses a majority of the same labels used in the 4 spaces.
 
Table 5-11, for example, indicates that only the minister context evoked
 
the personal attribute and Table 5-8 indicates that only dimension 1
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has a substantial weight under the minister context and no other con­
texts. This suggests that dimension 1 of the master space is linked
 
to the personal attribute. In like manner, the master space dimension
 
labels can be compared with the individual space labels in Table 5-11.
 
The labering'abnlysis, hbwe er," did not iddntify-the-sixth-di ­
mension of the-master'space, yet Table 5-11 suggests its identity. The
 
the 4 individual
attributes of maturity and humorous, applied to 3 of 

spaces, were not represented among the 5 attributes identified for the
 
master space.- Because of-their apparent subjective similarity, it is
 
are somehow blended
conjectured that these two missing attributes 

(their intercorrelation of .69 noted in Table 5-4 supports this possi­
bility) into the unidentified sixth master space attribute; perhaps
 
the master space to represent the
adult humor. Finally, -in order for 

first three contexts adequately (and the goodness-of-fit values in
 
Table 5-8 indicate that it does), the unidentified attribute must be
 
a combination of humorous and maturity, or else the dimensionality of
 
the master space must be increased to include these attributes.
 
The ability of selected labels to span the cognitive space they
 
described was determined by computing the cognitive space similarity
 
measure (MSM) between the cognitive space and the cognitive space repre­
sented by the component scores obtained from the factor analysis of
 
label intercorrelations. Table 5-12 indicates the MSM's for the four
 
context spaces and the master space for each of the 5 subjects investi­
gated in the labeling study. The generally high values indicate that
 
the selected labels provide a good description of the respective space.
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TABLE 5-1Z.--SIMILARITY4EASURES BETWEEN COGNITIVE SPACE 
AND COMPONENT SCORES FOR FOUR CONTEXT SPACES AND MASTER 
SPACE: .5SSUBJECTS-OF-TH/EfTS PROGRAM EXERIMENT - .--
Space Subject -

A G K M U 
Friend 79 . 67 84 z-52 83 
Minister 84 73 91 74 89 
Child 81 76 79 66 80 
Spouse 86 74 87 71 79 
Master 76 71 74 64 75 
*Decimals omitted.
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5.6 Conclusions
 
The change in context produced different spatial cognitive 
models for all 23 subjects. Some of the differences were structural in 
that the number and identity of dimensions of the models changed. 
Others were shifts iridimensioial emphasis (weighting) -and modification- -­
of the stimulus configuration. These changes support the major hypothe­
sis of this research that changes in the context of judging stimulus ob­
jects can cause changes in a spatial representation of their perception
 
(i.e., spatial -cognitive--ode-lfor a given -individua-I.......
 
The preference attribute did not feature in any of the labels
 
used in the cognitive spaces of the 5 subjects studied in detail. That
 
is, preference did not explain any of the cognitive space dimensions 
so
 
these subjects judged dissimilarity-of the-TV programs without reference
 
to preferences. Only one set of preferences was obtained from each of
 
the 5 subjects who rated the programs for labeling purposes. The con­
text, however, was not specified when preferences were solicited. Had
 
a set of preferences been obtained for each context, the conjecture that
 
context affects perception and ultimately preference, might have been
 
tested.
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CHAPTER 6
 
THE-EFFECTS-OF-RCHAVGESIA SK-PUOS'hPON-c- --
SPATIAL COGNITIVE MODEL OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS 
6.1 Summary 
One subject,--sk-illed in -the-visual- and--mat-hematical--interpreta-. 
-tr-----	 ate--rIte-Iphht--iiar,-j udg1-the-dsimi-l-arity-of-comptr-proc­
essed black and white aerial photos of a yacht basin. The 14 photos 
presented an identical view but appeared to be different because of dif­
ferent amounts of noise and blur introduced in their generation from 
the original photo-. -The--context-was--manipu--ted-in-th experiment--by ­
changing the stated purpose for which the photos would be used. 
The subject was-asked-f irst to judge--he-dissimi-arty-of-the7-... ­
photos for the purpose of identifying unspecified objects generally
 
(unspecified objects context). This task would essentially be akin to
 
using them for general photo interpretation. Next the task was changed
 
to judging dissimilarity of the photos for the purpose of surveying boat
 
classes; i.e.,- with objects -specified-(specified-objects-context).- The
 
first context produced a 3-dimensional space while the second-a 2­
dimensional space. The judgments were replicated with the same subject
 
about one week later and the entire experiment with replication was re­
peated one year after the original study with virtually identical
 
results.
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It was found that context change, in this case, change in the
 
stated purpose for which the objects would be used, produced a differ­
ence in spatial cognitive models for the subject. The differences were
 
the spaces differed in dimension­both structural and spatial; i.e., 

ality, dimensioN labels ahd stimulas cbnfiguratihf. A 3.dimehsional mas­
ter cognitive space was developed to span the two spaces for the sub­
ject. Each space was represented in the master space by a unique set of
 
weightings for--the three dimensions, with-a near zero weight for the di­
mension unnecessary-for-discriminating-among--the-aeria-l-'photos- for- the
 
objects specified context.
 
6.2 Experiment Background
 
This chapter addresses the task-definition-characteristic of con­
text. It presents the results of an experiment to study the effects of
 
changing the stated purpose for which- the stimuli would be used on spa­
tial cognitive models. Since the experiment setting deals with the ef­
fects of context on image perception, this topic is discussed and 
some
 
application of experimental results are given, especially in the area of
 
visual displays.
 
Zatoni (1978) has indicated that making the picture of a large­
screen TV display acceptable to the average viewer is a difficult problem.
 
Since the eye and the brain form a complicated system for interpreting
 
images, simple measures like brightness and contrast can't always deter­
mine if the picture is good. Huang, Tretiak and Schreiber (1971),
 
and Hunt and Sera (1978) have suggested
Marmolin and Nyberg (1975), 
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that there are different image properties of importance to image qual­
ity, and their importance-may-epend-on the-observer-'s-experience the
 
type of task to be performed with the images, the nature of the informa­
tion sought -fromrthe-image;-and-so oniv- Consequentlyq-image-qua'ity is=-=-­
- .- - '
 
likely to b a functionof- a'numbdr-of -dlfftrint-1 c-ptu =l'dmen-i 
It is the thesis-behind.the-present research-thatpercep-tion-de- -­
pends upon context.- If so, it-would.be reasonable.to-expect to-find 
that the- relationship-between 'subjecti-ve--pictu-r-e-qual-i-t-y -and-.phys.ica-.-
po-p-ert-es-a-lTo- -d P db -- on----co ntem-t-c--o-ic tU e-qui -7-&I~--i- l-
As Hunt and Sera suggest, human beings may adapt to circumstances in a
 
way that depends on the perceived context. A given level of image qual­
ity can be acceptable to an individual if associated with a human por­
trait, but unacceptable if the same quality is associated with an aerial-­
military reconnaissance photo. The same physiological vision processes 
are involved in-bth-c-as-s-,-bu-t-e -context-is-radic-ai-1-y-di-f-ferent--be-­
cause of different viewing purposes. Specifically, one should expect to
 
find that a model used to predict image quality and based upon subjec­
tive data gathered under one context will not perform satisfactorily
 
when the context changes sufficiently. Hunt and Sera recognized this
 
problem by limiting their study to nonperformance environments (i-.e-.-,
 
situations) characterized as viewing images for recreational, enter­
tainment, or aesthetic purposes. Context effects are likely to be
 
more pronounced in performance or task-oriented situations where the
 
image is a tool employed in achieving a particular goal. The study
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reported here supports this possibility, although image quality was not
 
directly assessed.
 
6.3 Method
 
6.3.1 Stimuli
 
The 	stimuli were 14 digitally processed images of an aerial pho-

Black and white Polaroid photographs were
tograph of a yacht basin. 

taken of CRT representations--of the images. The pictures were identica.
 
except that different-amounts- of---nose-(-givinga--a-a)pearanea-of-grain­
iness) and blur (giving the appearance of different numbers of gray
 
levels) were introduced by computer in production of the pictures from
 
the original photograph. The "best" and the "worst" pictures 
are
 
illustrated in the top and bottom portions of Figure 6-1, respectively.
 
The stimuli were those used in previous studies by Hunt and his associ­
ates and their production-is-described-in-detail in Hunt and Sera (1978
 
The loan of the stimuli by Dr. B. R. Hunt of the University of Arizona
 
Digital Image Analysis Laboratory is gratefully acknowledged.
 
6.3.2 Subject
 
One subject, skilled in the visual interpretation and mathe­
matical analysis of satellite photo data, participated in the experi­
ment. The subject routinely processes and uses digital images in her
 
employment.
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REPRODUCILTY TIM "Best" 
ORIGINAL PAGE is POOR 
'Worst" 
Figure 6-1.- Examples of two "extreme" photos from the aerial photo 
experiment.
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6.3.3 Procedures
 
The subject judged the relative dissimilarity of the 91 pairs of
 
the 14 photographs in accordance with the general procedures outlined in
 
Chapter 4. Pair judgments were performed by randomly arranging the 14
 
stimulus photos enclosed in individual opaque envelopes on a table in
 
front of the subject. The procedure then required the subject to obtain
 
the next pair of photo index numbers from a questionnaire, remove the
 
two appropriate photos from their envelopes, judge the dissimilarity of
 
the pair according to the stated context, record her judgment on the re­
sponse sheet, and finally return the photos to their respective envel­
opes. The 91 judgments took about an hour.
 
Two context conditions were used. The first required the sub­
ject to consider the pictures for the purpose of discerning unspecified
 
objects; i.e., for the general photo interpretation task of determining
 
what is in the photograph. Under the second context, the judgments were
 
repeated considering the pictures for surveying boat classes or sizes.
 
For this context, the objects were specified. Judgments under each con­
text were replicated and all sets of judgments used different random se­
quences of the 91 pairs of photos, but otherwise the procedures and
 
stimuli were the same.
 
The experiment was administered twice, first in 1976 and again
 
approximately a year later in 1977, with the same subject and stimuli
 
and with virtually identical results. Except where noted, the results
 
from the later version of the experiment are reported.
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Candidate attributes were needed to identify the dimensions of
 
the spatial model so the subject was asked to specify as best she could
 
the attributes used in making the dissimilarity judgments. Six were ob­
tained and the subject rated each photo on each of these. Table 6-1 con­
tains the definition of these 6 attributes as supplied by the subject.
 
Two known physical properties of the photos were available, blur and
 
noise, and they served as additional attributes. Thus there were 8 at­
tributes used to describe the photos. The 8 corresponding property
 
vectors are given -in-Table 6-2 and the rank order correlations-between
 
these vectors are given in Table 6-3. No property vectors were obtained
 
for the 1976 experiment since it essentially served as a pilot study.
 
TABLE 6-1.- DEFINITION OF SUBJECTIVE STIMULUS ATTRIBUTES:
 
AERIAL PHOTO EXPERIMENT
 
Attribute Definition
 
Sharpness A lack of sharpness has a tendency to
 
diffuse the outlines of objects and
 
makes them appear ragged
 
Clarity The degree to which certain features of
 
an object can be discerned sufficiently
 
to establish its identity
 
Contrast Difference or number of steps between
 
gray levels (tones) of contiguous objects
 
Granularity The average size of the unit cell (grain)
 
of which an image is composed
 
Density- The overall average gray level (tone) of
 
the image
 
Chroma The apparent number of different gray
 
levels (tones) used in the image
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TABLE 6-2.- PROPERTY VECTORS USED IN AERIAL PHOTO EXPERIMENT 
Attribute Photo number -
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Blur, pixels 1.6 5.0 5.0 0 1.6 1.6 1.0 0 4.0 0 5.0 2.5 1.6 0 
2. Noise, dB 6 6 15 15 9 9 15 9 6 
3. Sharpness; min (1), 
max (14) 
5 2 3 14 10 7 12 9 4 13 1 6 11 8 
4. Clarity; min (), 
max (14) 
6 2 1 14 11 5 13 10 4 12 '3 7 9 8 
5. Contrast; low (1), 
high (14) 
5 1 2 14 9 7 11 12 4 13 3 6 8 10 
6. Granularity; 
coarse (1), 
fine (14) 
3 5 7 13 11 4 12 2 8 14 6 9 10 1 
7. Density; light (1), 
dark (14) 
1 14 13 2 8 11 6 5 10 4 12 9 7 3 
8. Chroma; few (), 
many (14) 
2 1 3 13 10 9 12 7 6 14 4 8 11 5 
TABLE 6-3.- RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS OF PROPERTY
 
VECTORS USED IN AERIAL PHOTO EXPERIMENT*
 
Attribute
 
0 0 
Noise -31 
Sharpness -24 -13 
Clarity -20 23 06 
Contrast -30 48 40 33 
Granularity .36 -24 .32- -25 05 
Density 00 41 -27 64 26 -40 
Chrome 00 08 23 13 02 25 06
 
*Decimals omitted.
 
6.4 Analysis
 
6.4.1 Construction of Cognitive Spaces
 
Cognitive spatial models were developed for the subject under
 
the two contexts using the techniques discussed in Chapter 4. The
 
stress values as a function of extracted dimensions for the models for
 
the two context conditions are given in Figure 6-2. From this figure it
 
was concluded that the appropriate number of dimensions to -associate
 
with the unspecified objects context was 3 and with the specified
 
objects context, 2. The significance levels associated with the 3- and
 
2-dimensional cognitive spaces are about .08 and .01 for the 1977 experi­
ment and .12 and .05 for the 1976 experiment, respectively. Although a
 
minimum significance level of .05 had been arbitrarily established for
 
selecting model dimensionalities, the 3-dimensional unspecified objects
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1976 Objects/ specified
 
.2 1977
 
-n
 
1976 
_ Unspecified 
" objects
7

.11-x 
 /1977 
5% acceptance level 
Appendix A, Table A-1 
I II 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Number of dimensions extracted 
Figure 6-2.- Final stress vs. number of dimensions extracted for aeria
 
photo experiment.
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context was 3 and with the specified objects context, 2. The signifi­
cance levels associated with-the 3- and 2-dimensiona- cognitive spaces 
are about .08 and .01 for the 1977 experiment and .12 and .05 for the 
1976 experiment; -respectively;---A-though -a-mtnimum-significance-leve-l-of­
.05 had bdn'afbittarily'established'fbt-e-leting-ffodel--dimension- ­
alities, the 3-dimensional unspecified objects context model-was re- ­
tained in this case because (1) the 3-dimensional .model-consistently and 
adequately-described--the subject'-s-responses--in--the--two experiments-a .. 
--- year- ap art -(-2-choasing-or-y--2---dimensions-wou-1-d-have-been-ve-r-y-,onserv-a­
tive (significance level << .01), and (3) there was a substantial reduc­
tion in stress in going from a 2- to a 3-dimensional model. 
6.4.2 Comparison of Judgment Data
 
Chapter 4 described procedures for comparing sets of dissimilar­
ity judgments using--the--Pearson--product-moment-correl-ationx-coefficient-- ­
(r) and for comparing cognitive spaces derived from the judgments using
 
the matrix similarity measure (MSM). Table 6-4 presents worst-case sum­
mary statistics for comparison of judgments for the subject. Listed are
 
rs and the MSMS (reliability coefficients) for assessing reliability of
 
judgment and stability, of cognitive-spaces respectively, and rD and the
 
MSMD (difference coefficients) for assessing the effects of context
 
change on judgments and cognitive spaces. The highest value of the dif­
ference correlation coefficient rDmax such that it is statistically dif­
ferent from rS at a .05 significance level is also given. Table 6-4
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TABLE 6-4-.- CORREIATIONS-(r) -BETWEEN -DISSIMTARIT-Y-"' 
JUDGMENTS AND SIMILARITY MEASURES (MSM)
 
BETWEEN COGNITIVE SPACES FOR THE AERIAL
 
PHOTO EXPERIMENT (p < .05)
 
[Sample size --91].-

Contexts Parameter Valuea
 
compared
 
75b
 Same rS 

PS 66
 
MSM S 84c
 
Different rD 34
 
48PD 

38 d
MSMD 

rDmax 62 
aDecimals omitted.
 
bLower of two values.
 
Cp < .001
 
dp < .i00
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shows that the reliability hypothesis can be accepted at the .05 level
 
for PS > .66. Similarly, the difference hypothesis can be accepted at
 
the .05 level for a population difference correlation coefficient
 
PD < .48.
 
As an addition-l bh c~kz- nsubrj c--cn§is tenuy]-,-r"- --were-cmputed-­
between dissimilarity judgments made under the same context, but in dif­
ferent years (19.76, 1977oJ.- The.lowest- r-of-8values, including-replica­
tion judgments,. was .53, with an average of- .68. 
-
-The -d fferenne-aeffcients--shw-that--,the-c-angeir-contex 
caused substantial repositioning of the stimuli in the subject's cogni­
tive space., That this repositioning is not attributable to inconsis­
tency of subject responses or instability of the cognitive model is
 
supported by the reliability coefficients. The worst-case reliability
 
coefficient is substantially greater than the respective worst-case dif­
ference coefficient, and-the difference'between them-i-s -statisticatly- -..
 
significant. This supports the conclusion that each context evokes a
 
unique cognitive space for the individual; the same one is evoked for
 
the same context. When the context changes, another appropriate cogni­
tive space is evoked. In light of the reliability analyses, the dif­
ference analyses--provide strong-evidence-that changes in the judgment
 
context (task purpose) can cause changes in perception which cause the
 
spatial cognitive model for an individual to change.
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6.4.3 Master Cognitive Space
 
An INDSCAL analysis of the subject's 2 context spaces indicated
 
that a 4-dimensional master space could reasonably span the spaces. The
 
dimensional weights fot the subject are given in Table 6-5. The weights
 
indicate that the two contexts share dimensior'l. Dimefnsion§ 2 and 3
 
belong only to the unspecified objects context, while dimension 4 be­
longs only to the specified objects context. Changing the stated pur­
pose of the task from discerning unspecified objects to specified ob­
jects appears to cause-the-subject to-increase the-relevance-of--one--at---­
tribute slightly, to drop the other two attributes and adopt another
 
more important one.
 
TABLE 6-5.- DIMENSION WEIGHTS FOR THE 4-DIMENSIONAL
 
MASTER SPACE USED IN THE AERIAL PHOTO EXPERIMENT*
 
-Dimension Cognitive space -
Unspecified Specified
 
objects objects
 
1 44 59
 
2 62
 
3 47
 
4 66
 
Fit** 84 82
 
*Decimals omitted; weights < .10 deleted.
 
**Sum of squared weights.
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6.5 Dimension Labeling
 
A set of 8 property vectorsvwas obtained-from the-subject -­
using information supplied according to the procedures discussed
 
in Chapter 4. Six of the vec-tors -represented-the-subiect!'s ratings-of-­
the 14 photbT iccoriing-to-attribut s 9pecified-ifi-Table-61; "thehfe-'"­
maining two vectors represented-known physical..properties~ofth. photos.
 
Cognitive space labels were-developed.for-the-subjent-s 2context-spaces
 
using the-monotonic-linear reg-ression -property--fitting-technique-di-s­
-.-.-...-- cus-e-d--in-r-Ch-napr= 4.---abte-_--f repreis-ths--th-e-f-ac-to--ladigs-w-ghted
 
by the multiple correlation coefficients for the subject's cognitive
 
TABLE 6-6.- WEIGHTED FACTOR LOADINGS OF INTER-

LABEL CORRELATION MATRIX FOR UNSPECIFIED OBJECT
 
CONTEXT: AERIAL PHOTO EXPERIMENT
 
* *
 Attribute- . Factor** r2 
1 2 3 
Blur 78 18 -04 80
 
Noise -17 -67 13 70
 
Sharpness 36 27 -75 87
 
Clarity 35 -49 14 62
 
Contrast 37 73 13 83
 
Granularity -18 -35 23 46
 
Density 25 17 -61 68
 
Chroma -24 41 26 54
 
*Decimals omitted.
 2

**Loadings rescaled to rms value of r .
 
***!Iultiple correlation coefficient from
 
monotonic linear regression (ra=o.1 = .78).
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space under the unspecified objects context. The blur, sharpness, and
 
contrast attributes have the highest individual weighted loadings on the
 
three dimensions that define this space and are noted in Table 6-6.
 
Hence, the unspecified objects cognitive space can be defined for the
 
subject by the labels representing these attributes.
 
Dimension labeling for the two-individual cognitive spaces and
 
the master space is summarized in Table 6-7. A check mark appears in an
 
attribute-cogniti-ve space cell-if labeling analyses-indicated that the
 
particular attribute-was- used-i-n making-dissimi-arity-judgments in--tha-t
 
The physical attribute noise which was used in the generation
context. 

of the photos was apparently incorporated in the subjective dimensions.
 
The strong similarity between the pattern of relative sizes of the mas­
ter space dimension weights in Table 6-5 and the pattern of checks under
 
TABLE 6-7.- SUMMARY OF LABELING ANALYSIS FOR AERIAL
 
PHOTO EXPERIMENT
 
Attribute Cognitive space -
Master Unspecified Specified
 
objects objects
 
Blur V%/ 
Noise 
Sharpness V V 
Clarity 
Contrast V V 
Granularity %/ 
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the two cognitive spaces in Table 6-7 confirms the ability of the master
 
space to span the two -spaces- Table 6-7, for- example,- indicates- that
 
only the specified objects context evoked the granularity attribute and 
Table 6-5 indicates that dimension-4- alone has--a- sub-stantial-we-ight. 
under thisr confiext and no other context-. This sugests -that :dimensiof - ­
4 of the master space is--linked..to the- granularity-attribute.-.-jnlike_ 
manner, the master- space. dimension.-labels. can.he.. compaedw3ththeindi__ 
vidual space- labels- in -Table -6-7-...... 
...... Theabitit-y--f-thr-set~etted-ae-stO-sVan-h-t~fltt4ve-~eP -­
they described was determined by computing the matrix similarity measure
 
(MSM) between the cognitive space and the cognitive space represented by
 
the component scores obtained from the factor analysis of label inter­
correlations.-Tabi-e 6-S indicates- the MSM's for the two cognitive ­
spaces and the master space for the subject. The high values indicate
 
that the selected labets- provide-a-good descript-ion-of- -the-respect-ive-­
space.
 
TABLE 6-8.- SIMILARITY MEASURES (MSM) BETWEEN
 
COGNITIVE SPACE AND COMPONENT SCORES FOR
 
TWO COGNITIVE SPACES AND MASTER SPACE:
 
AERIAL PHOTO EXPERIMENT*
 
Space MSM
 
Unspecified objects 83
 
Specified objects 79
 
Master 86
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6.6 Conclusions
 
The change in context produced different spatial cognitive 
models for the subject. Some of the differences were structural in that 
Others ­
the number and identity of dimensions of the models changed. 

were shifts in dimensional emphasis (weighting) and modificatiff of the
 
stimulus configuration. These changes support the major hypothesis of 
this research that changes in the context of judging stimulus objects 
can cause changes--in- spatial -representation of their-perception (i.e., 
a spatial cognitive model) for a given indivi-dual- --------------
The subject displayed remarkable consistency; the judgments over
 
a year apart correlated fairly well. This was due, probably, to the
 
subject's high proficiency. She possessed an operational skill in proce­
dures that were very similar to those perf6rmed in the experiment and an
 
appreciation of the difference and importance of the differences in the
 
purposes for which photographs-may-be used. Considering the subject's
 
skill in image discrimination and the inherent complexity of the photos,
 
it is somewhat surprising that higher dimensional cognitive spaces did
 
not result in this study.
 
Since the photos differed only on two objective attributes,
 
blur and noise, it might -be argued that the cognitive spaces ought
 
But noise did not
 
feature in either of the spaces because the mathematically measurable
 
to be 2-dimensional and based on blur and noise. 

physical attributes might be quite different from the resulting subjec­
tive attributes of images. The noise objective attribute may be only a
 
part of the noise subjective attribute, perhaps even a minor part.
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Noise may have been overshadowed by blur since the subject reported that 
blur tended to obliterate distinguishing-characteristics-of-photos, more 
so than noise. The importance of blur to -the subject is suggestedthy--... 
its appearance -i-both--eognitive-spces-Finaily =wh-en-image-qua-ieY... 
w r f e l : 
was an issue; Huift-af&-Sera-N'1978 -) gtf d tha t- o d -ati-dn -etwel e T ­
noise and quality-.should be .expected--due to the profound capability--of .-­
man to "filter out 'noite-. h also.suggests-.that-noise-i's-no a_sig=. - ­
nificant Mscrimina~tor--of--photos-and-should--no-t--eatu-r-e- in-cogni -t i-ve---- -. 
models of photos.- ..... 
The use of the sharpness and contrast attributes in the
 
unspecified objects cognitive space seems reasonable because the task
 
purpose in this context was to identify objects in general. Object iden­
tification requires-edge-detection-and-loca--reg±on analysis-which, 
ac--­
cording to the definitions of Table 6-1, should be compromised without 
sharpness and contrast. --These- attributes-have-al-so-been--reported-in ­
other studies on image perceptions (Marmolin and Nyberg 1975). 
When the purpose of the photos was changed to that of identi­
fying boat sizes (specified objects context), the subject appeared to
 
retain blur, dropped two other attributes, and adopted a granularity
 
attribute with major emphasis.---She acted as if these two attributes
 
were quite relevant in detecting the presence of a boat (distinguishing
 
a boat from its background) and finally determining its size. This
 
suggests that an excess amount of either blur or granularity can cause
 
an object to blend into the background.
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For all replications of the study, the subject consistently
 
yielded higher dimensional spatial models when the image application was 
to look for unspecified objects than when it was to look for specific 
From this fact, it might appear that for unspecified-objects ­objects. 

the subject uses all attributes that might be bf any value in detecting
 
objects. Then, when,a specific object is stated, the subject selects
 
only 'those attributes from the previous. set-which arerelevant -to.,the.
 
new context. --The--second space-should then.be a-subset-of the first.- But
 
this was not found to be the case-as was-determined-by-the master-space-­
dimension weights and the labeling analyses. Whether the consistent dif­
ference in dimensionality is peculiar to this experimental task or to
 
the subject cannot be determined from the data.
 
106
 
CHAPTER 7
 
2NGES-I- S IMULS'*PPL ! AT*I N-JPON"A-SPATAL - -THE-EFFECTS-OF-CE 
COGNITIVE MODEL OF SiMD-LATED FLOOD HISTORY PROFILES 
7.1 Summary 
..... -Fi-fteen---subjer-t s_]udg ed-th e-dis similax-it-y-of-Zhigh--t ex--]-e e-l_- .. 
points on a line with a reference mark? but-Mith-no indication-of the 
sequence in which they were supposed to have occurred. The points were 
actually samples from a normal distribution. The context was varied 
by connoting a change.in--the-use -or-application of-the samples.- - In- ­
the first part of the experiment the subjects were asked to judge the 
-In the second- ­dissimilarities of the histories (history context).-

part, they were asked to judge the dissimilarities of the meteorological
 
processes that supposedly caused the histories (process context).
 
The results for 12 of the subjects were that the history context
 
produced cognitive spaces of 3 or more dimensions and were based on vis­
ual pattern attr-ibutes of the. stimuli. The subjects--appeared to--perfoxm­
this task as a pattern comparison activity. The process context pro­
duced spaces with less than 3 dimensions and were based on sample esti­
mates of the parameters of the underlying random processes. The data
 
for 2 of the 15 subjects were not consistent with spatial cognitive
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models at all and for a third subject the spaces were not stable over 
replication. 
The effect of context change was to produce different spatial 
cognitive models for-each-subject. The-di'fferences were both-structural ­
and spatial-and Were demostrated-by -changes in-dimensior-wetght 
- of .-..
 
master space for each subject that spanned his two context spaces. But
 
the cognitive spaces were sufficiently similar across individuals that
 
a common cognitive--space- -was -deve-loped -for each context,_-spanning. all... 
subjects; ......
 
Generated data suggested that subjects familiar with stochastic
 
phenomena would have lower dimensional cognitive spaces than others
 
without this background, and that for them the difference in dimension­
ality across-context change would -be reduced. The data, however, were
 
not statistically significant.
 
7.2 Experiment Background
 
This experiment is similar to the one reported in Chapter 6.
 
Both address the task definition facet of context, or more specifically,
 
stimulus use or application. The difference in the two experiments, how­
lies in the manner in which the statement of stimulus application
ever, 

was made. Whereas the experiment in Chapter 6 explicitly specified the
 
purpose for which the stimuli should be used, this experiment only
 
connoted a stimulus use. It did not suggest how the subjects were to
 
apply the stimuli to the judgment task. Consequently the subjects were
 
free to select any application they perceived to be relevant.
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The study was performed at a time when the rainfall had been par­
ticularly -heavy in--the Houston area- In fact, since-many bayous are
 
used for runoff in most of Houston, there had-been recent serious water 
- --damage- -cau-s e& -by-b-ayou--ove r-fowsAr--Th e-e--poi-nts-nd-i t-e---r-ei eva.nce-,­
judgment was seen less as a-labratory artifact and more as research on
 
a current problem. Because the results of this experiment have implica­
-- t-i-ons--for-human--ss-s~sme~nt-,o-ncextain-ty,-tl--ect-ti-px-o-jda--a--bri--­
background- of-tha:t -area% I - - -
People often7 make-decisions--concerning-the- outcome -of'uncertain-- ­
events on the basis of fallible or incomplete data, a state of mind, or 
the perception of a particular situation (i.e., context) without the con­
scious use -of-we-l-l-defined--reasoning-In some cases.,. they. rely.on-,­
heuristics by which they reduce the complex tasks of assessing likeli­
hoods and predicting-values to-simpler judgmental operations. Tversky
 
and Kahneman (1974) have noted that, in general, these heuristics are 
quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors. 
They further note that it is possible to -learn to recognize the contexts 
in which judgments are likely to be biased, and to make appropriate al­
lowances for the biases (Tversky an& Kahanemanl1973D._ One_stch circum- ­
stance is that in which the person making decisions does not interpret 
the phenomena as stochastic, but instead uses a deterministic internal 
model (Alberoni 1962). Gaines (1976) demonstrated that people commonly
 
generate elaborately complex internal deterministic explanations or
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models of a stochastic phenomenon if determinism is postulated and often
 
these models produce erroneous results.
 
Based on these authors' findings, a change in context which
 
o

would make it more appropriate-tovie---astochas tic--phenomenon-as sto- . ­
chastic rather than determiriistic,-tould--be expected--to-cause a-change--.. 
in the spatial cognitive model of that phenomenon. The model should
 
change from a more complex deterministic-based representation toward a
 
simpler stochastic~based-representation.-.The-experiment described in.­
this chapter -was--designed-to-see if- such -a-context -change wou-ld-effeo...­
a change from a cognitive space related to patterns of the stimuli
 
one related to statistical descriptors of the
(deterministic-based), to 

stimuli (stochastic-based). The descriptors would be expected to be es­
timates of the characteristics of the stochastic phenomenon.
 
7.3 Method
 
7.3.1 Stimuli
 
The stimuli were 14 random samples, computer generated from nor­
mal distributions with known means and variances. The samples were
 
posed as water level histories of Houston bayous. The stimuli are
 
illustrated in Figure 7-1.
 
7.3.2 Subjects
 
The study began with 15 subjects who were employees of a large
 
government facility. Their professions ranged from secretary to senior
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Figure 7-1.- Stimuli used in water level hist6r7 experiment.
 
engineer and their ages ranged from about 25 to 45 years. Five of the
 
subjects were female.
 
7.3.3 	Procedures 
The 15 s-ubjec ts fated- the-'subj'ective-di-similarit-ies -of-the-9.1­
pairs of the 14 samples in accordance with the general procedures de­
tailed in Chapter 4. The subjects were told that the stimuli were the 
last five yearly high water-levels at gaging stations-along various 
bayous in Houston;-.-.The.subjec-ts-were-advised that--the--data.were-not,­
given in chronological order, but only ranked from low to high levels, 
and in addition that the "0" on each line was an arbitrary but fixed ref­
erence mark. The dissimilarity judgments were considered under two dif­
ferent contexts-. For the -first context (history-context), the subjects 
were requested to judge the dissimilarity of the histories of the water 
levels. Approximately a week after the first set of judgments, the sub­
jects received essentially the same instructions for the second context 
(process context) as they did for the history context. The subjects 
were requested to judge the dissimilarity of the processes that produced 
the water levels. All judgments for each context were replicated a few 
days later using different random orderings of the stimulus pairs, but 
they were otherwise the same. Each subject completed each set of judg-

Three subjects
ments for both contexts in less than 30 minutes. 

failed 	to give reliable dissimilarities and were dropped from further
 
consideration and analyses, leaving 12 to complete all experimental
 
requirements.
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Six different subjects were interviewed after each context pres­
entation (excluding-the replications) todetermine-.the,-stimulus charac­
teristics they perceived or considered in making their judgments.. --The
 
7 most commonly-mertioned--ttribute-s-n-c-aibe -expres-sed- as- ssample-meantr 
point clusters; locah-symmetry, (the degr-ee-olfrinternaL.ymmetr-y ofxhe. 
sample ignoringA.the-reference-mark);. global symmetry (the degree of­
_. ove ra-l-lymmetr -f.the--ap-la--iftl--r e pact-_to.-h e--rRfezpmnce-mpr) and--
Following an-explanation-of--the attributes-the -final -phase of 
the experiment required the subjects to rate the stimuli on the 5 subjec
 
tive attributes (the last 5 above). A rating was to indicate the degree
 
-to which -a-water..leve-l-samle-posas-sed--t-e-,at-tbr-ibte-.-.--se- -of.-7-._propr
 
erty vectors was formed for each of the 12 subjects from these ratings;
 
the 2 property- vectors--of -sampl-a-mean.-and- samp-le--s-tandar-d.-de-iation-were
 
common to all subjects. The description of the analysis and the discus­
sion which follow refer, for convenience, to one subject chosen at ran­
dom from the 12 who completed all phases of the experiment because his
 
data are typical. He is referred to as subject 11. (Results for the
 
other 11 subjects- for whom -property--vec-tors-were-also.der-ivd,--will-bhe 
referred to where appropriate.) Subject H's property vectors-for-.the-14 
water level samples are given in Table 7-1; intercorrelations are given 
in Table 7-2.
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TABLE 7-1.- PROPERTY VECTORS FOR SUBJECT H: WATER LEVEL HISTORY EXPERIMENT
 
Attribute History sample ­
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14
 
Sample mean -4.2 -4.2 -4.0 -4.4 -4.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.4 
Sample standard 5.3 6.9 4.3 7.9 8.9 2.9 6.4 6.2 9.5 ,5e7 .4.2 5.7 9,. 7.7 
deviation
 
.'10
Regularity* 2 12 3 1 7 11 5 14 8 9 6 13 4 
Number of 2 11 3 5 9 1 4 13 8 10 7 14 12 6 
clusters* 
Global symmetry* 9 1 5 3 2 14 11 13 12 7 8 6 4 10 
Local symmetry* 7 3 2 1 4 9 8 13 5 12 10 14 6 11 
Degree of 14 12 13 9 11 8 6 7 10 3 5 4 1 2 
sh i f t** 
*Rank orders, most (14) to least (1).
 
**Rank orders, most left (14) to most right (1).
 
TABLE 7-2.- RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS OF PROPERTY
 
VECTORS FOR SUBJECT H: WATER LEVEL
 
HISTORY EXPERIMENT-

Standard 27
 
deviation... 
Regularity 20 20
 
Clusters 43 22 33
 
Global symmeatry 16 21 52 59
 
Local symmetry 59 26 38 34 27
 
Shift 	 -85 03 -19 -52 -09 -55
 
*-Decimals-omitted.
 
7.4 Analysis
 
7.4.1 	 Construction of Cognitive Spaces
 
Two cognitive spaces were developed for each of the 15 subjects
 
under the two contexts using the techniques discussed in Chapter 4. One
 
to four-dimensional spaces resulted for each context. The stress values
 
for each number of extracted dimensions for subject H.are-shown inEig­
ure 7-2. Using the dimensional selection procedures described in Chap­
ter 4, subject H's spatial models for the history and process context
 
were defined to be 3- and 2-dimensional, respectively. Figure 7-2 indi­
cates that-these values of dimensionality are statistically significant
 
at better than the .05 level.
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.3 
.2 
Process 
context
 
50/. acceptance level
 
Appendix A, Table A-1
 
.0 1 2 3 4 5
 
Number of dirnens;ons extracted
 
Figure 7-2.- Final stress vs. number of dimensions extracted for
 
subject H: Water level history experiment.
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Two subjects' data were dropped from further consideration be­
cause the stress measures for their spatial models were not significant 
for even I extracted dimension. An analysis of their dissimilarity judg­
ments reveaieda b--sbantt-irinumber-of-vi'o1ations-othert-riangl: ir .... 
ric (see Appendix A for further discussion). The various dimension­
alities selected at .a significance level of .05 or'better for each of
 
the remaining 13..subjects-are-.prov-ided-inTable--3 .... . .
 
TABLE 7-3.- COGNITIVE SPACE DIMENSIONALITY SELECTED
 
FOR EACH SUBJECT: WATER LEVEL HISTORY EXPERIMENT
 
(p < .05) 
-Conitext -Subject 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M
 
History 2 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 2 2 4 3
 
Process 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 1 2 2 2
 
7.4.2 Comparison of Judgment.Data -

Procedures defined in Chapter 4 described how sets of dissimilar­
ity judgments were compared using the Pearson product-moment-correlation
 
coefficient r, and cognitive spaces derived from the judgments were
 
compared using the matrix similarity measure MSM. Table 7-4 presents
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TABLE 7-4.- CORRELATIONS (r) BETWEEN DISSIMILARITY JUDGMENTS AND SIMILARITY MEASURES (MSM)
 
BETWEEN COGNITIVE SPACES FOR EACH SUBJECT: WATER LEVEL HISTORY EXPERIMENT
 
(p < .05)
 
[Sample size = 91]
 
Parameter Subject
 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M
 
Contexts compared: Same
 
91 85 87 77 83 78 92 82 71, 80 73 79 63
rS 

61, 72 63 71 51
 
-S 87 79 82 69 76 70 88 75 

co
 
MSMN* 93 88 91 85 89 87 90 88 78 83 77 83 58
 
Contexts compared: Different
 
rD 39 41 28 20 35 49 45 21 31 27 39 33 50
 
63 59 36 46 42 53 48 64
PD 53 55 43 36 50 

MSM * 37 40 31 25 37 47** 47*** 27 36 35 37 39 49**
 
72 57 70 60 68 46
rDmax 86 75 80 65 74 67 88 

*Decimals omitted.
 
**p < .01
 
***p < .10
 
- -
worst-case summary statistics for comparison of judgments for the re­
maining 13 subjects. Listed are rS and MSMS (reliability coefficients)
 
for assessing reliability of judgments,-and stabi-lity of cognitive
 
spaces, respectively,--andrD and-MSMD(---ditfference-:coeffcients-) o r-l
t-fo

.a~ss-esskiag- he~e-fferdc-ts-.o= -cn-tex--ch- ane-o--j ge-nt--and- an-i-ve-

spaces. The highest value of the difference correlation coefficient 
rDmax such that it is statistically different from rS at a .05 signifi­
cance- level-is. -so-.given. Tab-le 4-shows-th .ith-theexcep-tioxL.o--­
-sub-j ect 4te-~---b-------p--~6it.ca-ea~pedate0--~~~ 
for each subject for 0S-> .61 and the -difference-hypothesis..ocan -be-...
 
accepted at the .05 level for each subject (except M) for a population
 
difference correlation coefficient PD < .55.
 
The reliability corre-l-at-ion -coefficientDr-S for subject M.-was .sub-­
stantially less than those of the other subjects. While there was no a
 
priori minimum acceptable-value for-rs-or maximum acceptablevalue~of. rD....
 
that would lead to rejection of a subject, the value of rDmax .46
 
compared with the sampled value of rD = .50 indicates that the hypothe­
sis PS > PD cannot be accepted at the .05 level for subject M. The anal­
ysis indicates that for subject M, the reliability of judgments within
 
context was not statistically-greater than the difference in judgments...
 
across context. In isolation, the difference coefficients suggest that
 
the change in context influences and modifies this subject's judgments.
 
But the reliability coefficients indicate that replication within the
 
same context also affects his decisions, and to about the same degree as
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a context change. Hence, this subject was dropped from further anal­
ysis, leaving 12 subjects.
 
The difference coefficients in Table 7-4 show that the change in
 
context causes substantial'-repnsitioning-of-the- stimul-i in an-individ­
ual's cognitive -s&Ice7; -That thse -changes -are-nat'attributab-l-e-to-incon-..­
sistency of subject responses or instability of- the cognitive model is
 
supported by the reliability coefficients. For the remaining 12 (of the
 
original 15) -subjects,--the worst-case .difference.coefficient-is.substan...­
tially less -thairthe --respee-tive-worst-oase re-ii-ab-ili-ty-coef-ficient,-for-­
the correlation coefficients, the difference is statistically signifi­
cant. This supports the conclusion that each context evokes a unique
 
cognitive space for an individual and the same one is evoked for the
 
same context. -When the context changes, another appropriate cognitive
 
space is evoked.
 
7.4.3 Master Cognitive Space
 
INDSCAL analyses of subject H's 2 context spaces indicated that
 
5 linearly independent dimensions were required to account for the
 
spaces. The dimensional weights for subject H are given in Table 7-5.
 
The two contexts appear to use different dimensions, indicating that the
 
two respective cognitive spaces are independent. There is little or no
 
dimensional sharing between the history context and the process context.
 
Master cognitive spaces were developed for each of the 12 remain­
ing subjects with results strikingly similar to those of subject H.
 
Table 7-6 presents a summary of pertinent results extracted from these
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TABLE 7-5.- DIMENSION WEIGHTS hn
 
THE 5-DIM4ENSIONAL MASTER SPACE
 
FOR SUBJECT H: WATER LEVEL
 
HISTORY EXPERIMENT* 
Dimension- Cognitive Space, -- -
History Process
 
1 69
 
2 50 13
 
3 18 25
 
4 13 79 
5 10 38 
Fit** 79 86 
*Decimals omitted; weights <
 
.10 deleted.
 
**Sum of squared weights.
 
TABLE 7-6.- SUMMARY OF MASTER COGNITIVE .SPACE-ANALYSIS FOR
 
EACH SUBJECT: WATER LEVEL HISTORY EXPERIMENT
 
Parameter Subject -
A B C f E F G H I J K L
 
Dimension 4 6 5 5 5 6 6 5 7 3 4 6 
upper bound 
Dimensionality 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 3 4 5 
History fit* 83 95 88 75 89 96 83 79 88 83 87 91 
80 86 86 83 91 94 87 86 79 84 86 90Process fit* 

Shared 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
 
dimens ions
 
*Decimals omitted.
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analyses. The upper bound on dimensionality is the sum of the dimen­
sionalities of the individual spaces and is noted for reference. The
 
master space dimensionality for the majority of subjects is equal to
 
the upper bound-of -dimensionality.-- A 7-dimensional-common space-was-­
constructed from the 24 ihdiVidual'cognitive spaces (-12 subjects x 2--­
contexts) in order to investigate the-commonality of the various
 
dimensions among the subjects. The weights for the common space are
 
given in Table 7-7. -
The number of-significantweights-( i.e., >.10) suggests the -di­
mensionality for each context space for each subject. This number
 
matches perfectly the dimensionality listed in Table 7-3 except for two
 
cognitive spaces. The history context space for subject G is one dimen­
sion shy, and the process context space for subject J has two 	extra
 
are only
dimensions. The low values of fit indicate that these spaces 

marginally spanned by the common space.
 
There is almost complete segregation of weights between the his­
tory and process contexts; the first context uses only the first 4 di­
mensions while the second context uses the last 3 (subject G's process
 
context space is an exception). This suggests that when the context
 
changed from history considerations to process considerations in making
 
dissimilarity judgments, every subject appeared to drop one set of
 
attributes and adopt another set. The labeling analysis below tended
 
to confirm this by identifying the dimensions used.
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I 
TABLE 7-7.- DIMENSION WEIGHTS FOR THE 7-DIMENSIONAL COMMON SPACE (ALL SJBJECTS):
 
WATER LEVEL HISTORY EXPERI4ENT* |
 
Dimension 'Subject -
A B C D E F G H I J I L 
H** P H P H P H P 11 P H P H P 11 P H P P H P H P
 
1 18 66 49 59 65 58 77 j66 40 9
 
2 60 62 55 17 53 48 14 64 79 45
 
3 87 26 29 43 66 53 57 60 15
 
4 22 63 26 44 64 16 25 1 40
 
5 62 79 87 46 88 59 82 56 71 74 89
 
6 61 43 20 77 12 71 16 38 39 33 54 13
 
7 55 23 17
 
L 
86.77 79 68 81 86 87 83
Fit*** 82 77 91 83 87 82 74 82 87.80 93 88 63 75 81 85 

*Decimals omitted; weights < .,10 deleted. '. I
 
**Cognitive space contexts: H = hi~tory; P = process.1 I
 
d.**Sum of squared weights.
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7.5 Dimension Labeling
 
All of the 15 subjects supplied information that could be used
 
to label their cognitive spaces. However, 3 of the subjects were
 
dropped from the -experiment-for--reasons -discussed above-,' and no attempt
 
-	 wasimade to labe- -thleir-sp-ace-s--. -A--set-of 7ropertyvetors-,was' ob - , 
tained for each of,-the 12-remaining subjects using the-information 
according to the procedures discussed in Chapter 4. The vectors repre­
sented the subject's-ratings of the 14 water level samples according to
 
the 5 attributes --specif-ied-in--Table--7--3;-two--vec-tors .repeented sample­
statistics and were the same for all subjects. Cognitive space labels
 
were developed for each subject's two context spaces using a linear
 
or monotonic linear regression (depending on the property vector meas­
urement scale) property fitting technique-as discussed in Chapter -4.
 
Table 7-8 represents the factor loadings weighted by the multiple cor­
relation coefficients for subject H's cognitive space under the history
 
context. The regularity, local symmetry, and shift attributes have the
 
highest individual weighted loadings on the three dimensions that define
 
this space. Hence, the history context space for subject H can be
 
defined by the labels representing these attributes.
 
Table 7-9 summarizes the results of dimension labeling for all
 
subjects.- A check mark appears in an attribute-cognitive space combina­
tion if labeling analyses indicated that the particular attribute was
 
used in making dissimilarity judgments in that context. Of the 5 attri­
butes mentioned by the subjects, 4 appeared to be sufficient to identify
 
dimensions in the 2 spaces for all subjects. The comparison of labeling
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" --
TABLE 7-8 --WE-IOHT-E--F-A&TOR--OAD-NGS-YROM
 
INTERLABEL-CORRELATION4MATRTX FOR HISTORY _iI
 
CONTEXT: SUBJECT H OF WATER LEVEL
 
HISTORY EXPERIMENT
 
2 * * "
 
Attribute 
 - Factor**-... r 
1 2 3
 
Mean -57 35 31 74
 
Standard deviation 14 01 54 56
 
Regulari.v'..... -86 -I-9- 10 89
 
Clusters 21 08 41 47
 
Global symmetry 68 06 -11 69
 
Local symmetry 19 27 75 82
 
Shift -25 61 45 80
 
*Decimals omitted.
 
2

**Loadings rescaled to rms value of r .
 
***Multiple correlation coefficient from
 
monotonic linear regression (ra=01 = .78).
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TABLE 7-9.- SUMMARY OF COGNITIVE SPACE LABELING FOR EACH SUBJECT AND FOR EACH CONTEXT:
 
WATER LEVEL HISTORY EXPERIMENT
 
Attribute Subject -
A B C D E F G H I J -K L
 
H*P H P H P H P H P H P H P H P H P H P HI P H P
 
Mean X X X X X X X X X X 
Standard X X X X X X X X X X X X
 
deviation
 
Regularity X X X X X X X X X X
 
Clusters X X X X X X X X X
 
Global X
 
symmetry
 
Local symmetry X X X X X X X X X K
 
Shift X X X K XK
 
MSM** 78 72 91 89 69 74 83 76 85180 74 79 71 84 86 83 91 86 53 31 81 76 94 88
 
*CognLtive apace contexts: H = hist6ry; P = process. 
-. 
**Comparison between cognitive space and the cognitive space~represenLed byithe 
component scores for that context; decimals omitted. e I 
results across context shows a clear tendency for subjects to use char­
acteristics of the water-level samples-closely-related to the statisti­
cally relevant properties of mean-and standar&.de-viation.when-the ­
process context is-e-onsiderfdqbut--to- bes-conce-ne&;.wizth:patternpecu- - . 
--li ar i'ti es-tofrt tsmp hEt-hi~s fy- t -
The statistical- properties -of -the samples -were used -to- label -two 
dimensions of the common space. The results in Tables 7-7 and 7-9 sug­
- gest that-dimenaions-5Lr, a nd-7--o--the-conon-spac-shoul-d b-areLated ­
-t--the-stat-itica- p.oper.t- as-o f-t e-sapl1 es.,.. Tha.abeding-anLyis-- -­
f or the common sp-ce--confirmet-thisy -as the -sample- mearr and--standard-... 
deviation labels were found to be essentially orthogonal and signifi­
cantly correlated with dimensions 5 and 6 of the common space (r2 of .78
 
-and .81,--respectivesT).. This-.strongly.-suggests.-that-these-two-at.tri. 
butes were considered by the subjects under the process context. None
 
of the candidate - labels seemed. appropriate _foridentifying--dimension-7 ...-
On the assumption that the label for 7 would be statistical in nature,
 
various statistical measures were tried as alternatives; coefficient
 
of variation (ratio of standard deviation to mean) of the samples pro­
duced the largest correlation (r2 = .46) and hence seemed the most
 
satisfactory. for. this- last- dimension- -------.
 
7.6 Conclusions
 
The change in judgment context produced different spatial cogni­
tive models for 12 of 15 subjects. All of the differences were due to
 
changes in the number and identity of dimensions of the models, and most
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subjects completely replaced one set of dimensions with another. These
 
changes strongly support the major hypothesis of this research that
 
changes in the context of judging stimulus objects can cause changes in 
a spatial trepreserta'tion-of-their'pe-rcepto-(-e'j- a-spatiallcognitive­
model) for'd -iven indivi-duai-.......... . 
The cognitive space dimension weights-and labels clearly showed
 
that the subjects considered the history context to be one requiring
 
what could be called a-visual pattern nomparison-task.. All the labels
 
-selected-were -based-o-on-v-sual- or.-pattern-attributes -of.- the water- his-

tories. The subjects appeared to consider the samples to be no more
 
than just a pattern of points.
 
In the process context, the subjects acted as if a stochastic
 
process caused the water histories and they switched to attributes more
 
appropriate for describing such processes. The dimensional weighting in
 
this context indicated that sample mean- was- generally more important
 
than standard deviation in discriminating among the histories. This
 
seems reasonable if a shift of central tendency or average is easier to
 
detect or quantify than a measure of scatter. The apparent emphasis on
 
sample mean may be due to the fact that water level (and not, for exam­
ple, the chance of flooding) was the variable emphasized in the experi­
ment.
 
Based on the dramatic shift in attribute weighting, it appears
 
that the subjects did not consider the stochastic nature of the under­
lying process in the history context. Initial consideration of the
 
stochastic nature by the subjects could have lead to the statistical
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descriptors being more relevant for use under the history context. Con­
sequently, -had the order of -context -presentation-.been-reversed (-ire.-,
 
process before history), -one-might expect to find more weight for the
 
-

statis-ticaP-dimen-s nder-ei--to-r-conte-t -.- i-f--suf- icien-t ­
- a	 w e 
.....tn was alo~edbwen i -f--Mn± brtext-e-ta-as ---say k=a-was­
used here, -then.the-effects of ap@rior consideration.f-the stochastic_o 
nature of the-samples might have decayed sufficiently, and the results
 
would not differ.much-r.om-thoae.xraponted.her.e,. - .. 
miliar with--s-tocta-s ti penmena-wontd-have-lower-dimensional-cogn-itive­
spaces and less change in dimensionality across context change than
 
others without this background. To evaluate this hypothesis, subjects
 
were asked at the end of the experiment to report the number of years of
 
work experience and formal education they had in dealing with stochastic
 
--	 phenomena. -T-he--author--also--rated-eachsub-ject- n-s-tati-ti-an-aophistia. 
tion based on his own knowledge of the subject. These two ratings were 
each used as independent variables to predict the dimensionality of each 
context space, and the algebraic difference of dimensionalities between 
context spaces for each subject. Six linear regressions were performed 
using each .independent.variable--(2 _to-predicteachdependen-vaxb-e-_ 
(3) for each subject, but none resulted in a statistically.significant.,
 
correlation coefficient. Though not significant, there was a slight
 
trend: The more background the subject had, the lower the cognitive
 
space dimensionality produced, and the less change in dimensionality
 
across context changes.
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Three subjects were dropped from the experiment; two because
 
their dissimilarity judgments were not consistent with a spatial cogni­
tive model, and the third because his judgments did not appear to be
 
replicable. - There was- litte' noti-ceable'simi-larity-btween -the first ­
'
 two subjects-. - One--was -2-fema-le secretary- and-the- -o-ther-was' , -male en-' 
gineer with about 5 years-of background in stochastic phenomena. The
 
latter was interviewed after the experiment and informed that his judg­
ments appeared to violate the- triangle. inaquality, - a. basic assumption 
of -the spatial cogn-t-ive-mode.-..--He -could.-of-fer no-.explanationufor-the 
violations but concluded-with the observation "I-guess that model
 
doesn't fit my judgment style."
 
Discussions with the subject whose judgments did not appear
 
replicable suggested that, because of his "dedication" to the experiment
 
he continued to think about the samples between experiment sessions.
 
He admitted that,- as a-consequence, this caused-him to-consider the.­
stimuli with a new perspective and to change relevant attributes between
 
replications for judging the stimuli. Effectively, this subject changed
 
his judgment context for every experiment session.
 
The finding that the dimensionalities of the spaces from the his­
tory context were as least as great as those-fr-om-the-process context
 
parallels a similar result from the previous experiment. In Chapter 6
 
it was conjectured that the second context space might be a subset of
 
the first context space. But as was also found for that experiment, the
 
weights and labeling analyses for this experiment showed the two context
 
spaces to be completely independent.
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CHAPTER 8
 
THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN JUDGMENT PERSPECTIVE UPON
 
A SPATIAL COGNITIVE MODEL OF MICROPROCESSOR COMPUTERS
 
8.1 Summary
 
To demonstrate the change in comparison-judgments caused by a
 
change in-judgment-pe.rspective-.subects-wer-e- asked-to make dissimilar­
ity judgments about microprocessor computers (micros) from their own
 
viewpoints as sellers and from the viewpoint of a purchasing agent or
 
buyer. The situation was part of an actual procurement process for the
 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the micros
 
were offered in proposals in response to the client's advertised needs.
 
One of the subjects (the buyer) was a principal member of the team
 
established to evaluate and ultimately select one of the nine micros
 
offered. The other three subjects were micro marketing salesmen
 
(salesmen) who represented three of the seven companies bidding on the
 
proposed contract.
 
Under the first context, the experiment required of each subject
 
his own individual judgments of the dissimilarity of the micros with re­
spect to appropriateness for the stated needs of the buyer. A spatial
 
cognitive model was formed for each subject using his individual judg­
ment perspective. Under the second context, the experiment required the
 
salesmen to judge the micros as each thought the buyer would. This
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change required a buyer judgment perspective and created a torm ot role
 
playing for the salesmen. Cognitive models were formed for the salesmen
 
using the buyer perspective and comparisons were drawn between the two
 
perspectives for each salesman.
 
The change in judgment perspective produced-differences in--the- ­
cognitive spaces for the- sa-lesmen. The differences were botlh- structural 
and spatial and were demonstrated by changes in dimension weights of a 
master space for each salesman that spanned his two cognitive spaces.
 
The dimensional-it-y-of- the- individua-l -cogni-tive--spaces was-high (i.e.,. 3
 
or more); the objective physical attributes of the micros proved to be
 
better labels for cognitive space dimensions than were the
 
subjectively-supplied attributes.
 
Of the three salesmen investigated, the one most able to emulate
 
the buyer's perspective represented a micro that was a more serious con­
tender for winning the contract than those of the other two. That sales­
man's knowledge of the buyer and of what the buyer "actually" considered
 
to be important may have enabled him to understand the buyer and influ­
ence his selection process in a more effective way.
 
8.2 Experiment Background
 
In Chapter 2 the individual perspective was defined as the rela­
tionship of the person judging the stimulus objects to the task, to the
 
objects, or to the purposes which the task or the objects serve. It is
 
the other aspects
essentially the role the person plays in relation to 

of the task. This chapter presents the results of an experiment dealing
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with the effects of individual perspective on spatial cognitive models.
 
This section discusses the background of the experiment setting because
 
of the implications of the experimental results for marketing tactics,
 
especially-in thearea-of inf.+uenci-ng.industria-l-urchasingde-isions.. z 
Classicat-economi: theoryras~snmes--tha a-consumer-sbehav-iDr 
--t 
motivated solely by rational economic considerations. However,.in addi-_ 
tion to such considerations, empirical evidence has led to an increasing 
rec ognition__tha t indu atrial-byexs_ Ioarmexampi,--n--signifi antly 
---in-f-luenced-by--p sy eho &og-i-ca;l-(-non= e o nomi ) mo£tiv s - Lazo "L9,6 )-"-Re­
r
search findings--further suggest -that--the--se-ection of ---one-vendor-from- - ­
several competing ones is always accompanied by some perceived risk on
 
the part of the individual buyer (McMillan 1972). Consequently, the
 
buyer, by selecting-that.vendor for which- the least-risk-is perceived.,._
 
selects a course of action which reduces or at least allows him to han­
dle the perceived-risk-.-(Bauer- 1960, Cardozo and Cagley--19-71).. McMillan ­
(1974) lists three sources of buyer risk: product, salesman, and com­
pany. However, the uncertainty assigned to each of these sources will
 
vary greatly with the individual buyer involved. Each buyer views the
 
buying process with a unique perceptual bias reflecting his own psycho­
logical perspective and the specific characteristics-of--the-particular­
purchase under consideration. It is therefore plausible that the-extent
 
to which a vendor can understand the buyer's perspective affects his
 
ability to sell to the buyer. A discrepancy in the perception of the
 
purchase between the buyer and the salesman, if it exists, could have an
 
impact upon the buying decision. A spatial cognitive model provides a
 
133
 
means of quantifying the relation between the buyer's perception and the
 
salesman's understanding of it.
 
A NASA facility recently issued a request for proposals (RFP)
 
for a microprocessor computer-to--control subsystems-of-a manned-vehicle
 
simulator. The propbsals were to-be---evaluated-by-a-team-composed-of-con­
trol engineers and computer systems analysts,in two steps, point-by­
point comparison, then overall evaluation. The evaluation would be
 
based on predef-ined-c-riteria applicable to all micros,
 
Nine micros-were- -proposed-.4yy-seven--companies. -- The-experime n t.. ­
reported here deals with three of the seven micro--sales representatives 
and one of the evaluation team members. The three salesmen, referred to 
in the experiment as A, B, and C, represented micros 2, 1, and 8, respec­
tively. The experiment was performed after the team had completed the
 
previously mentioned comparison step and prior to the actual evaluation
 
step. However, some data were obtained after the evaluation step.
 
Legal aspects of letting U.S. Government contracts formalize any
 
In the sub­communication between themselves and suppliers or vendors. 

ject case, specific requirements for the micros (required interfaces, ap­
plication, etc.) and criteria for selecting the contract winner were con­
tained in the written RFP issued to all companies interested in bidding
 
on the contract. No other communications to the companies or their
 
salesmen were allowed. Furthermore the companies could only communicate
 
their response to the RFP through a formal written proposal. Request
 
for further clarification, etc. by any company, or by the Government
 
selection team are strictly prohibited. At the Government's option,
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however, if sufficient general ambiguity exists, they can make an oral
 
presentation of contract requirements to all companies, or each company
 
can make an oral presentation..of~their written-respons.: These options
 
-

were not exercised-for zhis---contract. wr-r'­
........ Study of-hi stAirdmst -lvr s ~~rniedame~enc v
 
opportunity to demonstrate that experimenta-changes inuthe perspective
 
characteristic of judgment context can cause,substantial changes of.
 
-practical -significance in-,piairogniti3_e-modeLs--fer--indiv-iduaL.. 
----There- -are-no known-s ~des-f-c~atLzmd-z-ht--v-aeueoE 
such real -situations-of-comparabie-importnce-to-the pnrt-icipants, that­
have had subjects as highly skilled in their professions, and have had
 
stimuli as complex as the experiment reported here.
 
8.3 Method
 
Nine micros offered in proposals, served as stimuli. Relevant,
 
attributes were obtained from the proposals and company brochures list­
ing the characteristics of each micro. Subsequent discussions with
 
micro salesmen not in competition for the subject contract helped to fa­
cilitate data presentation. Twelve attributes common to all micros
 
(listed in Table 8-1). were -used-to -decribe._themnont_3_x-5--cards........
 
8.3.1 Procedures
 
Experimental tasks consisted of having the 4 subjects rate the
 
subjective dissimilarity of the 36 pairs of 9 micros in accordance with
 
the general procedures detailed in Chapter 4. Under the first context,
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the dissimilarity judgments were to represent the individual's own per­
ception of the appropriateness of the micros to the stated requirements
 
of the buyer (i.e., the RFP). These instructions specified the judgment
 
context to be that of individual perspective.
 
Under th-e-senond-context;-the-salemer'were-ins-tru cted-to-re-r- ­
judge the micros, but this time from-the perspective of how each thought 
the buyer would perceive the micros. Essentially, the salesmen were 
asked to play the- role-nf the buyer-when- they- considered -the.hy perr -_ 
spective Judgments-wete-xepl icatedfor -eachn.ntext.ton-the-same-day.-.. 
using different random orderings of the stimulus pairs, but the pairs
 
were otherwise the same. The buyer perspective was introduced to the
 
salesmen about a week after the individual perspective.
 
All subjects were asked to specify, in addition to those listed
 
in Table 8-1, the attributes of the micros they considered in making
 
their dissimilarity judgments.. Because of legal requirements of the pro­
posal evaluation, the buyer declined participation in this phase of the
 
experiment. Collectively, the salesmen offered 6 attributes. These are
 
listed in Table 8-2. Because McMillan's (1974) list of sources and char­
acteristics of perceived risk by a buyer in choosing a vendor is simi­
lar, that list is also included in Table.8-2 for comparison. Contrary
 
to McMillan's results, the salesmen did not list themselves as a signifi­
cant factor in a buyer-salesman transaction.
 
The salesmen were then asked to rate the micros on the 6 attri­
butes checked in Table 8-2. A set of 6 property vectors was formed for
 
each salesman from these ratings; 12 property vectors formed from the
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TABLE 8-1.- PHYSICAL PROPERTY VECTORS USED IN MICROPROCESSOR EXPERIMENT
 
Attribute Computer index number -
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Number of instructions 46 50 45 28 60 27 70 46 96 
available 
2. Typical cycle time, 12 24 10 15 10 1 6 20 2.5 
Psec 
3. Program addressing 2 1.3 1.5 0.756 8 0.512 65 65 4 
range, kilo words 
4. Data addressing 128 96 1000 64 1000 32 65,000 65,000 320 
5. 
range, words 
Decimal arithmetic* 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
6. Address stack depth, 1 2 2 2 7 2 1 3 8 
number of jumps 
7. Number of conditional 1 30 10 5 16 3 9 3 14 
jumps I ' 
8. Input/output expanda- 2 1 2 1 1 3 3 3 
bility** 
9. Memory expandability* 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
10. Program memory, 2 1.8 1.5 0.76 1 0.51 1 2 1 
kilo words 
11. Data memory, words 128 94 96 64 89 32 64 256 64 
12. Number of input/output 28 31 18 33 21 24 32 & 23 27 
lines ! 
*Yes (1), No (0). 
**Yes (3), limited (2), No (1). 
TABLE 8-2.- COMPARISON OF SALESMEN-SUPPLIED ATTRIBUTES 
WITH MCMILLAN,!.S,(41973) ,LIST OF SOURCES 
OF BUYER-PERCEIVED RISK 
McMillan Salesmen-supplied
 
Source
 
Product:
 
Cost / 
Performance / 
Quality / 
Quality consistency 
Salesman:
 
Honesty
 
Dependability of promises
 
Competency
 
Effectiveness
 
Company: 
Ability to deliver / 
on schedule 
Innovative nature 
Dependability of promises 
Capability of supplying / (Service) 
future demand 
Reciprocity 
Technical capability 
Emergency assistance / 
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physical properties listed in Table 8-1 were common to all subjects.
 
The description of the analysis and the discussion which follow refer,
 
for convenience, to-one subject chosen-at xandom-from-tbe3 salesmen-be-.
 
cause his pia-.-e-&-seferred. subject -. , (Resnlts,-- zdata-i-e t to-as . 
-tfor-the-buy-er and-thet thar?2-zsalemenw--iAi-be-reeTredt-o-wheI eappr---­
priate.) Subject A's property-vectors for.the 6-subjective.attributes 
are given in-Table 8-3; intercorre-attonsxfor-all 18-propertytvectors -­
are given inTable-8-4._-. - . -
TABLE 8-3.- SUBJECTIVE PROPERTY VECTORS* FOR SALESMAN A:
 
MICROPROCESSOR EXPERIMENT
 
Attribute Computer index number ­
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Cost 2 7 5 6 3 4 9 1 8
 
Performance 7 6 5 9 1 3 2 8 4
 
Quality 4 2 8 5 9 7 3 6 1
 
Delivery 5 9 6 4 8 7 2 3 1
 
Service 9 6 7 4 5 8 2 1 3
 
Emergency 5 6 1 7 3 8 4 9 2
 
assistance
 
*Rank orders, most (1) to least (14).
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TABLE 8-4.- RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS OF PROPERTY VECTORS 
FOR SALESMAN A: MICROPROCESSOR EXPERIMENT 
o 
Datr e07-3  
r4~~P 
oo 
2 0 
ot ' o 
C c o 
1 
W 
0 
03 
-
o/O 
Pm 
xpad-) 35 
Memory ex 45 
P04 -
68 S8 
-2 
-4 
24 
4 
-i0 
>1 
-25 
r9 
0 
045 
0 
a) 
> 
a) 
U 
H4 
C) 
> 
0A 
0 
47 
P 
.Ia 
cd1 
U 
li n 
fm 
Cd 
MCl Z H 
0P 
P4 
4 
n 
* 
0Z 
t 
0 
UA 
P$ 
NA 
wd 
aY 
i 
a)
Im 
$ 
0
M 
42 *ecimal26 02 23Stack~dept 9 4035 8 ;>-5 
Cycle time 12 
Program range 37 -33 
Data range -07 -30 26 
o Decimal 26 02 23 40 
Stack depth 15 -25 19 35 85 
No. jumps -44 31 -55 -25 35 41 
1/O expand 29 -20 55 35 68 38 -13 
Memory expand 29 -45 35 45 78 68 07 70 
Program memory 21 -04 -42 -22 -22 -22 -27 -10 -25 
Data memory 22 -04 -42 -22 -22 -22 -27 -10 -25 99 
No. [/0 lines -15 40 -73 13 10 -13 28 -18 02 32 32 
Cost -42 40 -12 25 -27 -73 35 38 18 13 13 10 
Performance -72 37 -23 -30 07 15 28 -33 -28 20 20 50 42 
Quality 50 -40 38 12 37 -62 25 35 -20 07 07 -48 13 -62 
Delivery 15 -58 15 -50 62 -25 47 -08 -68 12 12 -13 07 27 32 
Service -17 -37 -20 -22 68 -07 67 -30 -70 20 20 48 08 47 08 75 
Assistance -47 13 35 -28 -23 13 -42 05 05 23 23 07 O 62 -60 17 00 
*Decimals omitted. 
8.4 Analysis
 
8.4.1 Construction of Cognitive Spaces
 
Two 	cognitive spaces-were developed.for-each-of the.-3salesmen ­
t
under-the 2 .contex,-s--ingl~the terhniqueszdi:scuzsed 	-inCh ap er .4-t One 
spaces resulted fromeach -context.z- Th-e:-s tress: vaiues: for- -ech-number--of­
extracted dimensions for all subjects are shown in Figure 8-1; dimension­
alities -selec-tei fno anhsnbjctaregvsenJin-Thle-8-5 ... 
TABLE 8-5.- COGNITIVE SPACE DIMENSIONALITY
 
SELECTED FOR EACH SUBJECT: MICROPROCESSOR
 
EXPERIMENT (p < .05)
 
Context ----Buyer ..-...-Salesman- .....
 
A B C
 
Individual --- 3 3 3
 
Buyer 4 4 2 3
 
8.4.2 Comparison of Judgment Data
 
- Table S-6-&presents. worstrcase summary statistics -of-comparison., 
of judgments for the 4 subjects-(intrasubject comparison) and for compar­
ison of the judgments and cognitive spaces between salesmen and buyer
 
(salesmanbuyer comparison). The latter part of the table is discussed
 
later. Listed here rS and MSMS (reliability coefficients) for assessing
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.3 
--. 05 significance level 
Append ix-A,,,, ablIe-A- i--' 
.2 
Salesman 
C 
A 
Buyer 
-
UJ­
mBCC / 
Bue 
0 
II 
1 2 3 4 
Number of dimensions extracted 
I 
5 
(From Buyer context 
shown for comparisor 
Figure 8-1(a).- Stress vs. number of dimensions extracted for 
individual context: Microprocessor experiment. 
142 
.05 signifibance level 
Appendix A, Table A-1 
.3
 
Salesman 
B 
C 
A 
-
.2 Buyer 
-o
 
7 	 C 
A 
I I 	 Buyer 
1 2 54 	 50 
Number of dimensions extracted 
Figure 8-1(b).- stress vs. number of dimensions extracted for buyer
 
context : Microprocessor experiment.
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TABLE 8-6.- CORRELATIONS (r) BETWEEN DISSIMILARITY JUDG-

MENTS AND SIMILARITY'MEASURES (MSM) BETWEEN 'COGNITIVE
 
SPACES FOR EACH SUBJECT: MICROPROCESSOR EXPERIMENT
 
(p < .05)*
 
[Sample size = 36]
 
Parameter Intra-subject Salesman-buyer
 
comparison comparison
 
Buyer A B C A B C
 
Contexts compared: Same
 
84 88 79 75 76 64 39
rS 

PS 73 80 65 60 61 44 11
 
76 78 86 71 78 53** 13**
MSMS 

Contexts compared: Different
 
--- 38 41 36 36 41 28
rD 

PD --- 59 62 57 59 62 32
 
MSMD --- 31 40***431** 42*** 46*** 06 
rDmaX --- 75 56 50 --­
*Decimals omitted.
 
**Not significant.
 
***p < .10.
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--
reliability of judgments and stability of cognitive spaces, respec­
tively. Values of rD and MSMD-(difference coefficients) for assessing 

the effects of context change on judgments and cognitive'spaces, and-the.
 
highest- valnes" of *the-differ-ence7,co-re-ati'oncoeff-icient---T 'such-t-a max 
- ° 
-It- i& s ta-fitstihANlly diff~~fe t a at s igniiancreewate as .... 
given. Table 8-6. shows that th reliabilityhypothesis can be accepted
 
at the .05 level for each.subject for -pS > .60 and the difference hypoth­
- es-is--an-be-aecep.t-d--a --the--O--lvl-for--ach--saleza e y-r------­
--n ­
---not-expos d te~x-t ange=)-f-r---pop-a-n-d-iffenceo-e~a±
 
coefficient PD < .62.
 
The difference coefficients in Table 8-6 show that the change in 
context causes substantial repositioning of the stimuli in each sales­
man's cognitive-spacee..-. That- this--reposi-tioning-is-not attributableto...-. 
inconsistency of subject responses or instability of the cognitive 
models is supported by the reliability--coefficients.- For each salesman,
 
the worst-case difference coefficient is substantially less than the
 
worst-case reliability coefficient; the difference between the correla­
tion coefficients is statistically significant. This supports the con­
clusion that each context evokes a unique cognitive space for an individ­
ual and the same one-is- evoked- for-the same context.
 
Since one part of the experiment required the salesmen to judge­
the micros from the buyer's perspective, comparisons were made between
 
each salesman's cognitive space developed under the buyer perspective
 
and the buyer's cognitive space. Those comparisons are also given in
 
Table 8-6, and indicate that salesman A's buyer perspective space is the
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best approximation to the buyer's space (rS = .76) while salesman C's
 
buyer perspective space is the worst approximation (rS = .39). Salesman
 
B's individual perspective space, however, was a better approximation to
 
the buyer's space -(rDF-.41)+than-was -As.indi-viduaL-pe-spectiv.,space.­
- i - -i s ub-s e ­n(rD = .36). Th ftatu-h df- these-pproximiations s -addtesse 
quent sections.
 
8.4.3 Master Cognitive Space
 
An INDSCAL analy sis --ot-. -salesman A---s,-two -context--spaces. indicated­
that 6 linearly independent dimensions were required to account for the
 
spaces. The dimensional weights for salesman A are given in Table 8-7.
 
For the individual perspective,- the dimensionality previously chosen for
 
salesman-A's cognitive space-was-3. According--to-Table 8-7, the three
 
largest weights are for dimensions 1, 2 and 6 which suggests that these
 
master space dimensions are used in this context. The buyer perspective
 
appears to use dimensions 3, 4 and 5 in addition to dimension 1 featured
 
in the individual perspective. Master cognitive spaces were developed
 
for the other two salesmen with results similar to those of salesman A.
 
Table 8-8 presents a summary of pertinent results extracted from these
 
analyses.
 
The primary objective of this experiment was to determine if one
 
individual could adopt another's perspective in making comparison judg­
ments. In particular, it was of interest to assess the ability of the
 
salesmen to adopt the buyer's perspective in judging the micros. This
 
assessment was made by defining a common space for all the subjects and
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TABLE 8-7.- DIMENSION WEIGHTS FOR THE 6-DIMEN-

SIONAL MASTER SPACE FOR SALESMAN A:
 
MICROPROCESSOR EXPERIMENT*
 
Dimension Cognitive space-

Individual Buyer 
perspective petspective ­
1 40 57
 
2 80
 
3 65
 
4 14
 
5 32
 
6 13
 
Fit** 83 89
 
"Decimals omitted; weights < .10 deleted.
 
**Sum of squared weights.
 
TABLE 8-8.- SUMMARY OF MASTER COGNITIVE SPACE ANALYSIS
 
FOR EACH SALESMAN: MICROPROCESSOR EXPERIMENT
 
Parameter Salesman
 
A B C 
Dimension 7 5 6
 
upper bound
 
Dimensionality 5 4 5
 
Individual fit* 83 91 86
 
Buyer fit* 89 87 93
 
Shared 1 1 1
 
dimensions
 
*Decimals omitted.
 
147
 
of dimension weights which were unique to each individual. When
a set 

applied to the common space, an individual's dimension weights provide
 
Three different collections
an approximation to his cognitive space. 

of cognitive spaces-were-used-to form commonspaces: ( >-all cogni­
tive spaces for all subjedts, -(2 -al-l individual-persecti-vesspaces1;.
 
and- (3) the buyer's space and-the salesmerr's buyer perspective spaces.
 
The last two collections were no more informative than the first, and
 
hence, subsequent discussions will address that common space using ,the.
 
seven (buyer -+ 3,salesmen x-2-perspectives.-cognbt-ive -spaces, -A-com-_
 
Table 8-9 provides the
mon space dimensionality of 8 was selected. 

dimensional weights for this common space.
 
A comparison of each salesman's judgment data under the buyer
 
perspective to judgment data from the buyer (see the values for rS in
 
Table 8-6) suggests that the salesmen should be ranked A-B-C (best to
 
worst) based on their ability to adopt the buyer's perspective. The di­
mensional weights in Table 8-9 indicate why this ranking might be appro­
priate. Salesman A achieved a good approximation to the buyer's space
 
by appearing to adopt three of the four attributes the buyer used and
 
having about the same weighting (emphasis). C appeared to adopt one of
 
the attributes the buyer used (dimension 8) but underemphasized it. The
 
fact that salesman's C buyer perspective space was marginally included
 
in the common space suggests that he used other attributes to judge the
 
that the other subjects did not use and are not represented
micros; ones 

in the common space. Salesman C's two context spaces are included in
 
the common space only because of his strong emphasis on dimensions 3
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TABLE 8-9.- DIMENSION.WEIGHTS FOR THE 8-DIMENSIONAL
 
COMMON-SPWCEQ(AIM'SUBUECTSI .TMTCROPRO CESS0R?:"'' -

EXPERIMENT*
 
Dimension Subject
 
o
Buyer AI*- AB---BI -- BB---CI- --CB 
1 66 41 53 10
 
2 19
 
3 10 65
 
4 82
 
5 62 41 12
 
6 16 61
 
7 34 14 39 81
 
8 45 33 85 16
 
Fit*** 81 87 85 94 87 51 48
 
*Decimals omitted; weights < .10 deleted.
 
**Contexts: I = individual; B = buyer.
 
***Sum of squared weights.
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-- -
and 6. Furthermore, one of the three dimensions from C's buyer perspec­
tive space (see Table 8-5) is missing from the common space. Because of
 
the poor fit between these two spaces, it is obvious that this unknown
 
dimension constitutes--s -significant--port-ion-of-C's buyer perspective 

w
-c-...space which- -the- bd n--spa-ce-fai--l-s-torepresent---Te-anly s i -sbelo 
tended to confirm this by identifying the dimensions used.
 
8.5 Dimension Labeling
 
Twelve proper-ty-vectors --der-i-ved- If-rom- knowniphysiaat -measures ..of 
the micros were used to label cognitive spaces. The salesmen also sup­
plied rating information on 6 attributes (listed in Table 8-3) and these 
data were used to form an additional set of 6 property vectors for each 
subject. 
Cognitive space labels were developed for each salesman's two
 
context spaces and the buyer's one context space using a linear or a mon­
otonic linear regression property fitting technique (depending on the
 
property vector measurement scale) as discussed in Chapter 4. Table
 
8-10 represents the factor loadings weighted by the multiple correlation
 
coefficients for salesman A's cognitive space under.the buyer perspec­
tive. The number of instructions, I/O expandability, program memory
 
size, and data memory size attributes have the highest individual
 
weighted loadings on the four dimensions that define this space. Hence,
 
the buyer perspective space for salesman A can be defined by the labels
 
representing these attributes. Table 8-11 summarizes the results of di­
mension labeling for all subjects. Of the 6 attributes collectively
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TABLE 8-10.- WEIGHTED FACTOR LOADINGS FROM INTERLABEL
 
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR BUYER PERSPECTIVE: SALESMAN A
 
OF MICROPROCESSOR EXPERIMENT*
 
Factor **
 
Attribute -----­
r2*** 
1 , 2 3 4 r 
Instructions 04 -09 85 16 87
 
Cycle time 08 -41 -06 -06 43
 
Program range -54 -38 08 05 67'
 
Data range- -22 -13 23 16 38
 
Decimal 36 20 22 41 62
 
Stack depth -32 -08 38 -28 58
 
Number jumps -21 31 13 23 46
 
I/O expand -88 -14 17 -08 91 
Memory eipand -; -01 -09 -22 12 27 -
Program memory- --- 0 -- 78 05 08 79-
Data memory 17 -11 13 79 83
 
Number I/0 lines 21 11 09 16 31
 
Cost 30 -14 -08 11 36
 
Performance 26 01 39 -27 54
 
Quality 13 33 -29 04 46
 
Delivery 66 03 13 10 68
 
Service 09 -04 26 -04 28
 
Assistance 08 -01 -15 02 17
 
*Decimals omitted.
 2
 
.
^*Loadings rescaled to rms value of r

***Multiple correlation coefficient from monotonic 
linear regression (ra=.01 = .94). 
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TABLE 8-11.- SUMMARY OF COGNITIVE SPACE LABELING FOR EACH SUBJECT
 
AND FOR EACH CONTEXT: MICROPROCESSOR EXPERIMENT
 
Attribute Subject .
 
Buyer AI* AB BI BB CI CB
 
Number of / / V / 
instructions 
Cycle time / 
Program range / 
Decimal arith- / 
metic 
Number of jumps / 
I/O expandability / / / 
Memory expanda- V/ / 
bility 
Program memory V / / / 
Data memory / / / 
Number I/O lines / / 
82 91 37 42
MSM** 78 84 86 

*Contexts: I = individual; B = buyer. 
**Comparison between cognitive space and the cognitive space rep­
resented by the component scores for that context; decimals omitted. 
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mentioned by the salesmen, none appeared to be adequate for identifying
 
cognitive space dimensions-..- Of. the 12 vhysicaL.attributes. available -_..
 
from micro company brochuresuotnniy_--the -data.addressing-xange -and_address 
-
stack- depth --attributesid of e a s '-ce 
tive space and -the 'cognitive-spacer-fomedi from-thecomp-onet-s cores ob7:z--_ 
-

tained from the factor analysis of label intercorre-latior-for- each:-conr-­
text-sp-ace-i s-glven_ inTab.le_ _Th e-- us--o-i-the-lMS L­
spective context -space. The low values for salesman- Cp-however,- support -­
earlier observations that C appeared to use attributes other than 12 
physical or 6 subjective attributes analyzed in this study. 
- Table 8-12, provides-a;'b.ina-ry, class~f icat-ior -(abo.ve- or-be low). of-.­
how a micro compared to the "average" micro in competition for the con­
tract, on the- attributes the- salesman- representing.±that.-micro--appeared -... 
to use in each context. For example, a plus appears under A's individ­
ual perspective for the number of jumps attribute because that attribute
 
was used by A in that context (see Table 8-11) and A's micro (micro #2)
 
has a 30 jump capability compared to the overall micro average of 10,
 
i.e., #2 was above average.- From-this-table-it-can.be- seen-that-_wi than. 
individual perspective the salesmen gener.ally-app-eared.to hoose-attri­
butes for which their micros surpassed the average micro but with a
 
buyer perspective they seemed to choose attributes for which they were
 
surpassed by the average micro. C was an exception. In both contexts,
 
he appeared to use attributes on which his micro excelled. What this
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signifies is not clear. The results suggest that salesmen A and B
 
believed that the buyer would rate the micros on attributes for whic
 
their micros would rate only fair--a somewhat pessimistic attitude.
 
C, on the other -hand,-seemed. to -take :an optimistic view_.. .
 
TABLE 8-12.- COMPARISON OF EACH SALESMAN'S MICRO TO
 
"AVERAGE" MICRO ON ATTRIBUTES USED IN CONTEXT SPACES:
 
MICROPROCESSOR EXPERIMENT
 
Attribute Subject*
 
AI AB BI BB CI CB
 
Number instructions
 
Program range +
 
Decimal 
 + 
Number jumps +
 
I/O expand +
 
Memory expand + +
 
Program memory + + +
 
Data memory +
 
Number I/0 lines + + 
*Contexts: I = individual, B = buyer; symbols: "-" is 
less than average micro, "+" is equal to or greater than 
average. 
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8.6 Conclusions
 
The change in judgment context produced different spatial cogni­
tive models for-all salesmen; -Some-of-the differences -wer'-estucturalv<:
 
in that the number- and-denbitty efdimerrsjosslef-h.madel s- changd,-r 
of the stimulus configuration. .These changes support the major hypothe-­
sis of this research that changes in the context of judging stimulus ob­
j ec-t s can. cau secch ang es-in.a-.-spat-iarepxes taton-of--thi-rp er.cepti-on­
*(--e-.,.- sp at-i alI. cegnitivesmo de+l)-f-e- e ~ m~-i ~l .......-

The re-l-iab i-ity- analy-sis-of-the--s-ae sment-s--u dgment-dataind±i .... 
cated cated more variability using the buyer perspective than using the 
individual perspective (i.e., their own). This is quite reasonable. 
Taking on another Ls *va'lue-system -and--using--i -to-make certain -judgments--= 
skillfully (i.e., as the other person would have), requires a complex 
cognitive process. Because of the individual's unfamiliarity with ­
another's process, the individual would be expected to be prone to 
biases, etc., which might appear as judgment replication errors. -
Although 6 subjective property vectors were supplied by each
 
salesman to aid in identifying the dimensions of his cognitive space,
 
they were of limited value .(see,-for-example,-Tabe.-8-10.-in comparis-n-.
 
to the 12 commonly known physical attributes of the computers. -It ap- ­
pears that although the subjects could suggest what characteristics they 
felt were important to their judgments, they were not consciously aware 
of which attributes they actually used.
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Of the 3 micro salesmen considered (out of 7 bidding on the
 
micro contract), A apparently did the best job of role-playing, while
 
C was the worst if role-playing success can be measured by the number
 
"
 
of attributes that- az -s-alesman chnseT-in- common- with, the-buyer Tand - - - ­
weighted- by -ab-outrth-satneamount.---The-abi--i-ty--to--prerceive-whi -...--
attributes a buyer considers important constitutes a powerful asset
 
for marketing strategy formation. These attributes are of major
 
interest to industrial -mark-eting- researchers - ha-areconee.ned-.with.. 
"What fac-tors a-f fe-ted -the buyer-sele-ting-- vendor--X-4ns tead -of _ !.­
(Wind, Green and--Robi-nson--l-968-)--KKi-ely" and-Hense-l- (-197-4-)- suggest -- ­
that in his role as gatekeeper of the flow of informationp the salesman
 
can increase his effectiveness by concentrating his efforts on using
 
only sources of information-considered -to-be of high value by the
 
buyer and favorable to the salesman's product. The salesman who
 
does not (or cannot) perceive what the buyer wants might present
 
his product in a poor light (i.e., emphasize the wrong qualities
 
in a written or oral proposal) and have his product rejected. On
 
the other hand, a good salesman (in terms of ability to role-play
 
or perceive what the buyer wants) may be able to get a mediocre product 
accepted. There is some evidence to suggest that A's-goodandl's -- ­
poor perception of the buyer's viewpoint may have been reflected 
in the buyer's perception of the salesmen's proposals.
 
After the experimental data were obtained, salesman C's company
 
challenged the legality of the original request for proposals, claiming
 
ambiguous and biased requirements. The charge was made .after the evalua­
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tion team's comparison of the micros and before its evaluation. Follow­
ing the charge, the proposal request was withdrawn pending review of the
 
charges. At this point, the buyer was asked his view-of the salesmen's
 
proposals.- -His- esponsewas.t_ theeffe-thate_ _=d3dnLt-knowzwhat.thew i. 
-- contrart -required -what--the-compe-t-tio -wa--rwor-even-whhat-hs-p-odu tr' 
could offer, whereas A would have been a serious contender for winning
 
the contract.
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pm~v~gThtO pAG MANK NOT nD 
CHAPTER 9
 
CONCLUSIONS
 
9;l Summary
 
This chapter briefly -summarizes-the-results -of research on the
 
effects of- context on spatial cognitive-models from the four experiments-­
and draws some conclusions about the methodology used. (For specific re­
suits from each experiment refer to the appropriate chapter.) Possible
 
areas of practical application of the context sensitivity of spatial
 
models are then outlined. Areas of promise include project implementa­
tion, diagnostic information, product perception, analysis of decision
 
making, attitudes and taliefs, and- context specification..-.
 
9.2 Experimental Conclusions
 
9.2.1 Conclusions About Context
 
Previous work on spatial cognitive models has shown that an indi­
vidual appears to simplify judgments of the dissimilarity of stimuli by.
 
reducing them to comparison of the stimuli on a few relevant dimensions.
 
The present research investigated whether the dimensions or attributes
 
used depend upon the context of the judgments required of the individ­
ual. Context involves a perceptual interpretation and cognitive under­
standing of a judgment situation, and cannot be directly assessed or
 
manipulated. In the experiments reported here, the stimuli were kept
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the same but the situation was redefined by asking the subjects to give
 
it a different interpretation or to adopt a different perspective. In
 
effect, they were asked to assume a different context. This had a sub­
stantial and replicable effect on the cognitive spatial model.
 
As the result of analysis, context was classified with respect
 
to five characteristics, physical environment, social environment, task
 
definition, individual perspective and temporal setting. Attention was
 
focused on the social -envi-ronment,. task defini.tion and individual. per­
spective. Experiments selected to demonstrate that changing these con­
text characteristics would change individual spatial cognitive models
 
were notably successful. This confirms a speculation by certain authors
 
(e.g., Attneave 1950, Green and Carmone 1972, and Day 1972) that context
 
might affect a spatial cognitive model and discredits Cliff's view
 
(Cliff 1966a, Cliff.and-Young 196g)Sthat.it would not. This-research
 
found that the effects on the models were both structural and spatial.
 
Structural changes were statistically significant changes in the number
 
and nature of dimensions when context was modified. Spatial changes
 
were changes in the representation of stimulus points and could be de­
scribed by changes in attribute weighting. That the spatial models ac­
tually changed was always verified by replication.
 
Structural and spatial changes in the cogni-tive model show that
 
the individual can be characterized as using a master cognitive space in
 
making the dissimilarity judgments. The perception of a specific situa­
tion (i.e., context) appears to cause the individual to weight the stimu­
lus dimensions (some perhaps with zero weight) such that the stimulus
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interpoint distances in..the individual's-cognitive space-reflect the
 
perceived dissimilarities among the stimuli under that context. When
 
the context changes, the individual appears to change the dimension
 
weights such that the new spatial configuration of the cognitive model
 
represents a different,set of dissimilarity judgments-made under the new
 
context. The master.space -concept is that a.specific context -evokes-a
 
specific subspace .of Jthe-mas.ter- space.,- an resul.ts.sugges.t .that..it -would­
be rare to find -a context-so .comprehensive that it-would.evoke..the-en-­
tire master- space........ 
9.2.2 Methodology Conclusions
 
The uncommonly high dimensional (e.g., 3 or more) cognitive
 
spaces formed in this research may be due to the subjects attempting to
 
make inter.v-aLscaLad diasimiLa-i-±-iigments.- htsucont""""as.tsnQth:osZt 
other studies which_.prodaced-onlny_2--dimensional--spacesbut,-r-qLie d-onl.y-­
rank order judgments.
 
The use of factor analysis in the interpretation of cognitive
 
space dimensions provided insight to the labeling problem and is unique
 
to this research. Cognitive space labels were selected by factor load­
ings where the loadings represented correlations between each label and
 
a set of independent factors. The factors were derived from a factor
 
analysis of label intercorrelations. Factor analysis was an important
 
aid in identifying labels which were significantly correlated with the
 
cognitive space but mutually orthogonal.
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In spite of the many studies which have used some form of a spa­
tial model, no one has proposed a statistical test whereby cognitive 
spaces can be compared. Consequently, a matrix fitting procedure was 
adopted from another application along with a goodness-of-fit measure 
for comparing two cognitive spaces. In addition, this research devel­
oped an empirical significance test for a modified goodness-of-fit mea­
sure. Present application of-the test,-however, is limited,to comparing 
two cognitive spaces from-dif erent contexts- Ci.-e.,. testing whether the. ­
two spaces are independent)..--The use of such techniques for cognitive 
space replication analyses would require the development of the sampling 
distribution for the test statistic under the alternate hypothesis that 
the two cognitive spaces are not independent. This development is 
expected to be complicated by the need to incorporate the effects of an 
error distribution dua-to subject inconsistencyor -responseme-asurement,-­
biases.
 
9.3 Applications
 
The fact that the spatial cognitive model is sensitive to con­
text has implications for a variety of practical situations in which con­
text is important. There is, of course, the very practical implication
 
that all those who use spatial models in their research should control
 
carefully for context or else consider it to be a relevant variable.
 
kside from that, particular applications of interest are (1) human per­
formance measurement, (2) congruence of individual perspectives, (3) mea­
surement of consumer perception, and (4) research about context.
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9.3.1 Human Performance Measurement
 
An individual may-change-the-perspective with which.he.views- a 
set of stimuli through experience with the stimuli or acquisition of a 
skill in dealing with them. Since the spatial cognitive model is sensi­
tive to 	changes in-perspective, it-can be-used to determine whether or
 
not an 	individual has -masteed-- skill -onattained- a..cert"ain skill
 
level. 	 This may be useful- in- analyzing-compIex-man=.machIne-s&ystems .. ­
(e. g. , helicopter-pil o-ahulity--in-Zavala.et alW__lq65)___ Inpa.r.ticuLar,_, 
-current studies Df--the- percption-of--orkLoad_(4Siapkaras-19 7_,_Sheidan_ 
et al. 1978) using cognitive spatial models should take context into ac­
count since it is likely to have a strong effect on the perceived diffi­
culty and demand of a task.
 
Spatial model sensitivity to context can also illuminate biases 
-in suhject9 
nitive model can-be used to modelt-subxctivezprpobahilt-teszwi.th.stimtrlus 
events represented as points in the space. The present research-sug­
gests that one would expect to find systematic biases in probability as­
sessment due to context effects (see Tversky and Kahneman 1974 for a re­
view of certain biases).
 
9.3.2 	 Congruence of Individual Perspectives
 
Congruence of individual perspectives is basic to the efficient
 
functioning of most project teams. The effective implementation of a
 
project, for example, depends upon certain psychological factors which
 
can be examined with a spatial cognitive model (DeBrabander and Edstrom
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1977). Context effects in general and individual perspectives in par­
ticular are especially important in the light of Ulrich's (1977) six
 
points of view which a project implementer must consider to get accept­
ance by managers. To the degree that the implementer's perspective of
 
the project is at odds with the manager's, the project will have limited
 
success (Doktor and Hamilton 1973, Bariff and Lusk 1977). Spatial cogni­
tive models can be used to detect such differences in individual perspec­
tives. Erlandson (19278. uses _cogntive-models to-ihtegrate-the-value­
systems of various individuals-to-establish-a-reference point-for spe­
cific systems evaluation.
 
In a similar way, the spatial cognitive model can be used to de­
tect and quantify the extent to which one person can "empathize" with,
 
or adopt another's viewpoint. This can have important application in
 
areas ranging from-choosing-ortraining sa-es=wpesonnel(Churchill,_..... 
Collins and Strang 1975), to conflict resolution-(Janis.195.9>-and to ­
determining advertising strategy (Wright 1973).
 
9-.3.3 Measurement of Consumer Perception
 
Consumer product perception can be altered for marketing pur­
poses by context manipulation. Slovic and MacPhillamy (1972) and
 
Tversky (1977) have shown that common- attributes of stimulus objects are
 
more heavily weighted in comparison judgments than are distinctive attri­
butes. This phenomenon could be precipitated by appropriate context
 
manipulation (e.g., product advertising messages) designed to invite
 
consumer comparison of competing products along a few common attributes.
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These attributes are carefully preselected to enhance the marketing
 
image of an advertising sponsor's product. (See Kelly and Hensel 1974
 
for further details.) -Methods of affecting attributeselec-tion and­
- t i ­
-weighting by contetand~pula~tn-cowldbe-ex-Irord-wit--s ra-- o gn

... - ~ reefo d T
-tive-'mode 1-s S e~'~ ~osd~--r rin-i"n-9od 

sign. There the objective is not only to develop the product with-the ­
"best" attributes, but. also to determine how these attributes should be
 
A.isplayedto-the--ncir "n-wha-con-ext-they-should-be.-pr-sented: ­
for effective marketing-. -....
 
9.3.4 Research About Context
 
Several studies which have attempted to classify the characteris­
tics of context Mave-.ither--been too.,-detai-l-ed,-with. -es pect to--the sit-- ­
uational factors (e.g., Sells 1963) or else lacked measurement (e.g., 
Moos 1973). These problems stemmed from an apparent failure to realize ­
that context results from an individual perception of situation. Since
 
perception is unique to the individual, the same situation can yield dif­
ferent contexts for different individuals. Yet context could be "stand­
ardized" for an individual by constructing a spatial cognitive model
 
using a .standard seL of-stimulus.obj ects.-The_-context-_woud-then-be
 
considered to change to the-degree that- the 2standard" cognitive model
 
changes.
 
Wyer and Goldberg (1970) have suggested that many social phe­
nomena (e.g., attitudes and beliefs) can be viewed in terms of processes
 
of classifying objects or events on the basis of their attributes, or of
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inferring attributes on the basis of class membership. This suggests
 
that such phenomena can be represented as spatial cognitive models.
 
Since a cognitive model is expected to be sensitive to context, use of
 
the model would enable one to assess the effect of context manipulation
 
on attitudes (Wyer 1970a) or beliefs (Wyer 1970b). If attitudes or eval­
uations are context dependent, one could use the spatial cognitive
 
model, for example, to probe the widely observed phenomenon of people
 
maintaining different values-in different-spheres of. activity.
 
9.4 Final Word
 
There appears to be an extraordinarily consistent pattern that
 
emerges from this research. Experimental treatments intended to be ma­
nipulations of context (although they cannot be proven independently to
 
be manipulations of.context exceptby the.original arguments as:to the
 
nature of context), have resulted in very clear distinct, and unambig­
uous changes to individual spatial cognitive models. These-changes are
 
of a sort that can be explained in a reasonable way with the master cog­
nitive space and the labeling of axes.
 
The weight of the evidence appears to this author to be that con­
text has been affected and it is the context changes that have produced
 
the observed effects on the cognitive spaces. The results seem to be
 
too consistent and clear of interpretation to admit any other explana­
tion. It would appear now that context must be explicitly taken into
 
account in this kind of work simply because judgments are so dependent
 
upon it.
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APPENDIX A
 
AN OVERVIETrOF-NONMETR-IULTIDhIENSITON A-CAING(NIf-ISY ) ' 
A.i Introduction 
-_ 
The typicalsproblem-to beahandledz-by-amnltidimensional scaling.­
(MDS) -procedures mightbe-rr.oru ghly-sta-red--asz o*-l-os-T-rzfr-en:azseto-f­
stimuli which-vary with-respect- to-a -number of--dimensions--(-not-al1--of
which may be known to the subject nor the the experimenter), determine 
from comparison judgments of the stimuli 
a. A configuration of points representing the stimuli in a
 
Euclidean space of minimum dimensionality
 
sions involved
 
The procedures attempt to assign these-scalar values so that the
 
numbers, when considered in terms of a specified geometric space, re­
flect relations among the stimuli. These relations are usually dis­
similarities (or similarities) which are interpreted to be psychological
 
distances and are represented by the interpoint distances in the spatial
 
model. The Euclidean geometric space is chosen for a number of distinct"
 
advantages: It is familiar; graphical representation is convenient for
 
two and possibly up to three dimensions; and it has particularly simple
 
mathematical properties.
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A.Z NU lypes 
There are two basic types of MDS analysis, metric and nonmetric
 
or NNDS. The difference depends on how the dissimilarities are measured
 
and used. If 6ij is the psychological dissimilarity measured on an in­
terval scale (at least) between stimuli i and j and if dij is the dis­
tance to be derived between the two stimuli represented in-nspace then,
 
metric MDS analysis requires......
 
6.. = ad.. + b (1) 
where a is non-negative. The parameter b is determined so that all dis­
tances satisfy the triangle inequality (dik < dij + djk). The triangle 
inequality requires: .that::i-f _.-ti=i1l4 - -and-j_ areclosern-thecogritive: :.:= 
space (i.e., if they are viewed as being similar), and stimuli j and k 
are close, then stimuli i and k must also be close (i.e., be similar). 
(For further discussion see Beals and Krantz 1968). Torgerson (1958) 
was the first to develop systematic procedures for deriving the dis­
tances based on interval-scaled dissimilarity measures.
 
Algorithms to produce INMDS configurations were lacking until a
 
major advance was made by Roger Shepard (1962a, 1962b) who pioneered two
 
significait innovations: First, he introduced, as a central feature of
 
MDS, the goal of obtaining the same rank order in the experimental dis­
similarities and the interstimulus distances. He clearly stated that
 
the satisfactoriness of a proposed solution should be judged by the
 
1 tp 
degree to which this condition is approached. Second, he showed that 
simply by requiring a high degree of satisfac-toriness in this sense, one ­
generally obtains very tightly constrainec-o-lutions: -Tf-rthe rank--­
orders of interpcintLvdAistancesz-a--input,--t hen-.the--Dnte-permd-i.st-ancesr--2= 
can- be accuraeivy rerortret -nzthe w dshshwed--ttattthernnkr--­
order of the dissimilarities is itself enough to determine the solu­
tion. In addition, Shepard describedand used a.practical iterative 
-_computer.. p rocedure -- r--finding-b is-_solnuion,-Sincathen ,-Krukal-; -­
what each consioders-to be--an--improveme-nt-over-the--origi-aI- Shepard -..... 
program. One of Kruskal's versions, MDSCAL-V was used in the research
 
reported here.
 
The NMDS-prcedures -require -only- that. the- dissimilari-ty -judg.-­
ments be made on an ordinal scale. (Although judgments in this research
 
were obtained on a presumed-interval scale, only the rank order informa­
tion was used.) The solution technique used for MDSCAL begins with a
 
random or assumed starting configuration which is used to compute stimu­
lus interpoint distances. The distances are then used to compute psuedo
 
dissimilarity measures (6*) from a regression equation:
 
6ij - adij + b (2) 
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with special conditions that
 
6* >* "
 
ij st (3)
 
whenever
 
6.. > 6 (4)ij st 
MDSCAL offers alternate forms other than (2) and special techniques for
 
handling tied ranks in (4) and the reader is directed to Kruskal for
 
these details. The starting configuration is iteratively adjusted until
 
(3) is s'atisfie :st-res-s, .
and :agoodness.=o f-Iitmeasure cs minimize-----

Stress is generally measured by
 
sj= " 
 (5)
 
iEdij2 
Since the minimization of stress requires an iterative algorithm
 
for solution, there is the problem of obtaining a local minimum. MDSCAL
 
uses a technique of steepest descent for solution search, however, which
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seems quite robust-to the local-minimum problem as-:evidencedfr.omw:sev -...
 
eral studies on the sampling distribution of stress (K-lahr 1969, Spence
 
and Ogilvie 1973). In addition, both MDS and NMDS procedures must be
 
concerned with proper choice of dimensionality, and with the statistical
 
significance of goodness~of-fit measures. Fortunately, recent studies 
have begun to address these issuesi Before these topics are-discussed,;. 
however, an example of.the-use of-NMDS withZMDSAlzwll-be -given- V.. 
A.3 Hypothetical Example
 
Consider an example of a hypothetical subject who judges 4 cups
 
of coffee, A through D. The cups have 2, 2, 1, and 0 teaspoons of
 
sugar, and 2, 0, 1, and 1 teaspoons of cream, respectively. The subject
 
is asked to judge the dissimilarity of the cups and his judgments are
 
cates least dissimilar and 6 indicates most dissimilar-.
 
"
The cups can be represented-as points in-a-2-dimensiona-l-prop - ­
erty space (lower part of Figure A-I). Of course this space says noth­
ing about how this particular judge views the cups of coffee. The prop­
erty space can be looked upon as an input to the-cognitive-process, but
 
it does not result from the process. The cognitive space, on the other
 
hand, is purported to represent the psychological dissimilarity of the
 
cups of coffee and can be derived by an NMDS analysis of the dissimilar­
ity judgments.
 
One of the first questions concerning the space deals with its
 
dimensionality. What dimensionality is required to represent the
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A B C 
B 4 
C 2 3 
D 5 6 1
 
Hypothetical dissimilarity-judgments­
2( B A 
CC 
2 C 
D 
01 2 
Cream, teaspoons
 
Property space
 
Figure A-I.- Dissimilarity judgments and property space for four
 
hypothetical cups of coffee.
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dissimilarity judgments adequately. Cognitive spaces of I through 4 di­
mensions were constructed from.the dissimilarity-data--of Figure A-i ­
using MDSCAL. In all but the 1-dimensional, space-, the-stress was- zero 
to three s ignifi cant; figures ;-or-the-ldimens-ona l-caa-2 
The 2-dimensi-onal: cognitive-- space is given in-the upper- part- of-
Figure A-2 and the -Shepard Diagram (named-for-Roger-Shepard wh-o-intro­
duced it) is presented in the lower-part._ The-_(rotate&) c-agnitive-_space­
isclqTuit-ep r.sta - menis--­
and 2 can be. related -to the proper-ty- att-ributesy cream- and- sugarj - respec­
tively. One of the main differences is that cup D lies at an extreme
 
along dimension 1 in the cognitive space, whereas D does not occupy such
 
a position in -the-proper-ty-spAae..,. Whilethe-ankorden-of-simulus--coor 
dinates for dimension 2 matches that of the sujar dimension the rank
 
order of coordinates for-dimension-l. doesnot match that of -the-cream..- ­
dimension. There is, of course, no a priori reason the order should 
match. The problem of identifying or labeling the dimensions of the 
cognitive space is discussed at length in Appendix C. 
The Shepard diagram demonstrates the satisfaction of the mono­
tonicity criterion: for increasing dissimilarity, the recovered dis­
tance must not decrease. The depicted relationship between these two
 
measures is nonlinear.
 
Figure A-3 represents the lowest stress 1-dimensional solution
 
(cognitive space) for the problem and the Shepard Diagram is in the
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Dimension 1 
Twvo-dimensional cognitive space 
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BD
 
60 
AD
 
5 -

S4­
" AB
 
BC
 
(,.n
2 -AC
 
1-

CI 

II 
1 2 3 
Recovered distance 
Shepard diagram: Dissimilarity vs. recovered distance in two dimensions 
Figure A-2.- Two-dimensional cognitive space and Shepard diagram for
 
four hypothetical cups of coffee.
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B A C D 
One-dimensional cognitive space 
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7 
BD
 
6 
5>5 AB 
.=4 
C 3 C 
2 A 
I jC 
1 2 3 
Recovered distance 
Shepard diagram: Dissimilarity vs. recovered 
distance in one dimension 
Figure A-3.- One-dimensional cognitive space and Shepard diagram for
 
four hypothetical cups of coffee.
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lower part of this figure. The Shepard Diagram indicates that the mono-­
tonicity criterion was not satisfied for this solution. The configura­
tion in 	the upper part of Figure A-2 suggests that the problem is with
 
stimulus 	A; it cannot lie on the same line with the other stimuli and
 
still satisfy the monotonicity criterion. The stress measures this lack
 
of fit and its magnitude suggests that the 1-dimensional cognitive-space
 
is an unacceptable representation of the dissimilarity judgments.
 
A.4 Statistical Analysis
 
A.4.1 	 Significance of NMDS Results
 
Kruskal's iterative NMDS analysis technique seeks to find an
 
n-dimensional spatial representation of points representing the stimuli
 
such that the rank order of the interpoint distances matches the rank
 
order of the input-di ssimilaity.measures .__Th:degree oft -match at a . 
given number of extracted dimensions is determined by stress which in­
dicates the degree of non-monotonicity between the computed distances
 
and the original dissimilarities. Other measures of fit have been sug­
gested (Sherman and Young 1968, Hall and Young 1975, and Trunk 1968) but
 
these have not proved to be popular.
 
Kruskal (1964a) describes a resultant stress of .10 as a "fair"
 
fit, .05 as "good", and .025 as "excellent." He further suggests that
 
one pick the dimensionality of the cognitive space corresponding to the
 
"elbow" 	of the stress vs. dimensionality curve -- the point at which an
 
increase in dimensionality gives no appreciable decrease in stress.
 
Most researchers have taken this suggestion as a criterion (if they take
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any at all) ior:-Aimensionality set'ettio' in NMDS analyseso; -But, stress
 
is only a descriptive statistic; Stress may be due to having extracted
 
fewer dimensions E than actually underlie the data, or it may be due to
 
variability unrelated to the spatial representation, or both. Thus sta­
tistical hypothesis tests are needed to test for -the true underlying
 
dimensionality T of a particular-matrir oft-dissimiar--ty-.dat-afor-nt.stim­
ulus objects.-. DestrableItests -ara: ­
1. Significant :structure.:in:_:the data =-
H0 T= 0 
H1 T> 0
 
2. Tests for--dimensionality
 
H0: T < E
 
H1 : T > E
 
In neither of these cases has a completely satisfactory test
 
been developed. This is because few researchers have recognized the two
 
sources of stress and that separate statistical tests (i.e., those
 
above) are needed to deal with these sources. A number of authors have
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developed an approximate test for the hypotheses.
 
H0 T = 0
 
HI: T > E
 
by obtaining-the conditional distributions of stress given the-number-of
 
dimensions extracted using Monte Carlo methods. Their work is described
 
below.
 
Klahr (1969), Wagennar and Padmos (1971), Stenson and Knoll (196
 
and Spence and Ogilvie (1973) have approached the problem of attempting
 
to identify the underlying stress distribution by experimentation.
 
Ramsay (1969) and&Youngz-(197f)-have treated thezproblem theoreticnly 
but neither provide for direct application of their analyses. The exper­
imental approaches consist of a Monte Carlo simulation in which randomly
 
formed n x n matrices are analyzed by an NMDS algorithm, generally
 
MDSCAL. The matrices are usually formed from random samples of permuta­
tions of the first (n(n-l)/2 integers, which represent~dissimilarities
 
(or rank orders of dissimilarities) among n stimulus objects. The occur­
rence frequency of different stress values as a function of the number
 
of dimensions extracted E are collected for selected values of n and E.
 
In spite of the differences in randomization techniques or number of
 
replications, the reported means and variances of these stress values
 
by the various authors are quite close. This agreement justified the
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present author' s-regressing _the-stras& meanhand=varance-oven-extractedr 
-
dimensionality to obtain predictions of these -parameters-for dimension­
alities not considered by these authors but which were of interest to
 
the present research. Based on a technical discussion by Young (1970)
 
indicating that stress can be assumed to be--normally--dl-stributed--Gwhich­
Klahr's empirical data supports), Table A i-list .sel-ectedpercetil-ez-.­
points froman empi -rcaltyn-de.e= ed.cumwrativezd -srbitoi.-functtomcof: ­
-- st-ness-for- .9--and- " "s'ti"" "3 "" 
number of dimensions -extracted;..-:
 
At a chosen extracted dimensionality E, one can use these re­
sults to test the null hypothesis Ho that the dissimilarity matrix is
 
random with no meaningful structure, represented against the alternative
 
hypothesis HT that this is not so, and that the proper dimensionality is
 
T ,. - whe r eu.L -isnot-km own >, Areasoa_1 -&-t a­
that if H0 is accepted at the number of extracted dimensions E-, then-the
 
true dimensionality T, if nonzero,- is less -than--E.--When the-nu-1-hypoth­
esis is rejected at E, the true dimensionality is assumed to be no less
 
than E. There is no direct test for the true value of T.
 
- If s(E) is -the observed-stress-value-of-therandom variateS-:at. 
extracted dimensionality E and F(slnE) is the cumulative probability
 
distribution function for S given n and E, then the procedure used in
 
the present research is to choose T equal to the highest dimensionality
 
E for which s(E) < sa(E) where s (E) is the stress level such that
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TABLE A-I.- SELECTED PERCENTILE POINTS FROM CUMULATIVE
 
DISTRIBUTION OF FINAL STRESS FOR DISSIMILARITY MATRICES
 
AS A FUNCTION OF NUMBER DIMENSIONSo-EXTRACTEW*. 
Dimensions Percentile ­
0.01 0;05. "-0.4I0 -O:25 tO.50
 
9 stimuli
 
1 .277 .308 .325 .353 .384 
2 .113 .133 .144 .161 .181 
3 .031 .047 .055 .070 .085 
4 .000 .017 .023 .028 .035 
5 .000 .005 .009 .016 .023 
14 stimuli­
1 .409 .424 .431 .444 .458
 
2 .224 .234 .240 .249 .259
 
3 .134 .143 .147 .155 .164
 
4 .079 .088 .092 .100 .109
 
5 .045 .054 .059 .067 .077
 
*Based on regression results using data obtained
 
from Klahr (1969), Spence and Oglivie (1973), and
 
Stenson and Knoll (1969).
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to:
 
i. Thus the procedure is 
=
F(satnE) 

iff s(1) > SO(l)
Accept H0 

or
 Accept HM iff s(M) si) 
.... 
and 1) > sC( + 1)s(H + 
sa are well-behaved 
so that
 
The functions s and 

1) <C sQAM)sO(M + 
1) -SaH)sa(H4 + 
True DimensionalitY
A.4.2 Extracted vs. 

Kruskal (1964a, PP.
 
Tn his development of the MDSCAL procedure 

1-2) criticized the rationale 
of previous MDS procedures 
which used the
 
a critical element in forming the distances
 
variability of the data as 

example, incorporated
Torgerson (1958), for 
in a spatial configuration. 

case V of the law of 
comparative judgments ("equally
 
Thurstone's (1927) 

often noticed differences 
are equal") into his 'LDS 
scaling algorithm to
 
Conven­for analysis. 

obtain interval scaled 
dissimilarity measures 

MSCAL) make no provision 
for variability or
 
tional NMDS methods (e.g.-
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error in judgment data, -although it seems likely that this situation
 
arises in practice. The error could, in fact, be caused by the sub­
ject's inconsistency in replicating judgments, or it could originate
 
with the researcher's imprecise tools in measuring the judgments, or
 
both. The source is really irrelevant -- the importance lies in acknowl­
edging the existence of error and incorporating errot inthe,considera­
tion of dimensionality analysis. Although no one has stated it to date,
 
it would-appear that-stress should be-considered to- be a multivariate
 
probability distribution function dependent upon true dimensionality T,
 
extracted dimensionality E, and judgment data error e such that
 
S = f(T, E, e)
 
The next section reviews studies which have examined special cases of 
this distribution function. ­
A.4.2.1 Dissimilarity Data With Error. A rather large number
 
of studies (Sherman and Young 1968, Young 1970, Wagennar and Padmos
 
1971, Sherman 1972, Issac and Poor 1974, and Cohen and Jones 1974) have
 
been conducted to assess the "robustness" of NMDS when varying degrees
 
of systematic error were built into the input dissimilarity data. Their
 
technique was to randomly perturb a fixed but arbitrarily chosen spatial
 
configuration of points of known dimensionality T. The perturbation was
 
introduced by multiplying each interpoint distance by a variate with dis­
tribution N(1,a 2 ) where a took on various values. MDSCAL was then used 
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to scale the _modified _distancesu(takenr as: -dissim--1ari-tymeasure)and-ex ­
tract the same number of dimensions as the original (error-free-) -configu­
ration (i.e., E = T). The resulting value of stress was noted in each
 
case. Finally, this procedure was repeated in a Monte Carlo fashion and
 
provided an empirical-sampling -distributio- of stress-when recovering a ­
-
configuration of known dimensionality which had:been-sub-jcted--tou--error. 
With- tne-exce ptionsof .Wagennar a-dmoszarrd-zs-s az_ ozr.it-he~ se .. 
_Mojnte_ Carlo.-s t ud-e.s d~iAno t~d~eak= p _fcheoI 
mining -the true, bu~t-unknown-, dimensionatity- of--aconf.igurati-or -
Shepard (1966) found that the true configuration was found satisfacto­
rily with "moderately high" amounts of error added, but there was no men­
tion of the problem of finding the true dimensionality when it is not
 
known a priori.
 
and Poor (1974) described-an elegant approach-by--defining- an-index-of . 
"constraint" C for a NMDS solution
 
Ck = E[S(k)] - s(k) 
where
 
E [S(k)] = expected stress of a configuration based on random
 
data with extracted dimensionality k
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s(k) = sampled stress- from- aconfiguration with extracted
 
dimensionality k
 
The authors argue that the true dimensionality T should be chosen such
 
that
 
CT = max Ck
k
 
The primary virtue-of the-index-isits--simplicity--having a rough aiat­
ogy to hypothesis testing of means. An obvious drawback is that it
 
gives a single point estimate of true dimensionality since it does not
 
use the entire stress distribution.
 
While the previous authors analyzed dissimilarity data and ex­
--tracted .tesame-number .otstidmensionsas~thesoigia&inierror---fre ) -­conn 
figuration (i.e., E = T), the Wagennar and Padmos (1971) study was 
unique in that these authors extracted dimensionalities other than the 
"true" dimensionality (i.e., E # T). Their study produced an empiri­
cal sampling distribution for stress as a function of any dimension­
ality extracted (less than 5), given a known true dimensionality and
 
error distribution N(1,a 2). This is a significant contribution since
 
a researcher generally does not know the true dimensionality, and the
 
Wagennar-Padmos study provides additional information whereby one may
 
determine the most probable dimensionality.
 
Their procedure involves plots of stress against amount of error
 
introduced, with a different curve being plotted for each extracted
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dimensionality. A different set of such plots is required for each
 
true dimensionality T and number of points n. Thus, their procedure, in
 
effect involves comparing an obtained stress curve s(E) with curves with
 
known true dimensionality and amount of error F(sjE, T, N(I,0 2 )). The
 
authors' example suggests that one select that true dimensionality T for
 
which the interval defined by one standard deviation from the mean
 
= 
stress contains the sampled stress.for E T, given a known error distri­
bution. This procedure is illustrated inoFigure-A-4;.In this example,
 
the "true" dimension should be selected as 2; the stress is too high for
 
T to be 1 and too low for T to be 3. The implied strategy is to reject
 
as true, dimensionalities which give extreme values of stress.
 
Based on their brief example, it appears that Wagennar and Padmos
 
did not realize the possible limitations of their approach. First, the
 
authors appear- to ignore- the-sample,s.t-ess-values-whenE#-T;__their - .
 
example only examined the stress values when E = T. Second, they do not
 
address the possibility of Type I and Type II errors. That is, the sug­
gested procedure could easily lead to rejection of the true dimension­
ality or acceptance of an untrue dimensionality.
 
A.4.2.3 Suggested Procedure. The proper dimensionality underly­
ing a set of dissimilarity data could be posed in the form of hypotheses
 
and a probability could be formed concerning the truth of each hypothe­
sis. The probabilities could be derived from likelihood ratios
 
f [s(1), s(2), ... , s(m)IT, e] 
ij f [s (1), s (2) 1], . s(m)ITV, 
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Distribution for true dimensionality 
T=3 T=2 T=1 
Ct 
0 
-2o­
o 
-- 2o----- 2or---­
E=3 E =2 E=1 
Sampled stress, s(E) 
Figure A-4.- Distributions for sampled stress for extracted 
dimensionality, s(E), given a true dimensionality T and 
error distribution: Example problen. 
which provides the likelihood that the sampled stress history s(E) in 1
 
to m dimensions would result from a set of dissimilarity data having an
 
underlying dimensionality of Ti rather than Tj , given an error e in the 
data. This technique would require, howevet, joint multivariate proba­
bility distributions of stress. Unfortunately, previous studies con­
sidered or developed only conditional distributions. Generating the 
required joint probability Aistributions was considered to-began effort 
beyond the objectives of this research. o ­
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APPENDIX B
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE INDSCAL MODEL
 
B.1 Introduction
 
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) was originally developed to de­
termine a Euclidean space underlying a two-way matrix of dissimilarity
 
data; two-way meaning n stimuli are compared with each other and the
 
resulting data are represented by a two-dimensional matrix. But situa­
tions arose in the social and behavioral sciences, and elsewhere, in
 
which several dissimilarity matrices for the same stimuli were availa­
ble and a three-way MDS was needed; n stimuli are compared with each
 
other N times and the dissimilarity data are represented by a three­
dimensional matrix. One would generally like to account for all of
 
these data matrices in a single comprehensive analysis, based on an ap­
propriate and psychologically plausible model. The most typical situa­
tion arises when one wishes to compare dissimilarity matrices for each
 
of N different individuals. The INDSCAL (Individual Differences Scal­
ing) method (Carroll and Chang 1970) derives its name from just this
 
situation. INDSCAL offers some special advantages over other three­
way methods (such as Tucker and Messick 1963, Bloxom 1968): (a) unique
 
determination of dimensions which eliminates (in most cases) the need
 
for rotation of coordinate axes to obtain interpretability; (b) a com­
posite multidimensional space with respect to which different "cognitive
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types" can be directly and reliably compared; and (c) quantitative in­
formation about the cognitive saliences of different dimensions for each
 
subject, and about the degree to which the multidimensional space as a
 
whole reflects the perceptions or judgments of any individual.
 
B.2 The INDSCAL Model
 
The input to INDSCAL normally consists of two or more dissimilar­
ity matrices, all pertaining to the same stimulus objects. Each matrix
 
typically represents one subject's dissimilarity data, but it could be
 
one judgment context, as in this research. It is assumed that a set of
 
M dimensions underlie n stimuli and these dimensions are common to the
 
N cognitive spaces (or individuals). For example, it is as if different
 
individuals perceive the same stimuli in terms of a common set of dimen­
sions but that-these: dimensions are differentially important or- salient
 
in the perception by these individuals. If the salience is zero, the
 
corresponding dimension does not affect the subject's cognition at all.
 
Distances between stimuli are linearly related to a kind of modi­
fied Euclidean distance between points representing stimuli in a compos­
ite cognitive space. The mathematical equivalent of this assumption is
 
6ijk = adijk + b ()
 
where 6ijk is the dissimilarity associated with stimulus pair ij in
 
matrix k (for subject k), while dijk is the derived Euclidean distance
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between these stimuli for subject k computed from his unique dimension
 
weights and the stimulus coordinates in the common cognitive space. The
 
modified Euclidean distance for subject k is given by
 
dijk Wkt(xt2 (2) 
where xit is a stimulus coordinate representing the value of stimulus i
 
on dimension t and wkt represents the salience or importance of dimen­
sion t to subject k in forming the dissimilarity judgments. The 
symbol = means approximation in a least sum of squares sense. 
The parameter b-in equation (1) is chosen such that the computed
 
distances will satisfy the triangle inequality. Techniques developed by
 
Torgerson (1958) are used. This transformation is necessary since
 
INDSCAL assumes that the input dissimilarity data are defined on an in­
terval scale (at least). A judicious value of b will produce minimum
 
dimensionality m. The parameter a (non negative) is chosen by the pro­
gram and serves only to scale the common configuration.
 
The INDSCAL procedure determines, by means of an iterative least
 
squares procedure, the stimulus coordinates common to the group and di­
mension weights unique to each subject that maximally account for the
 
variance in all the dissimilarity data (the variance is the goodness­
of-fit measure). (See Carroll and Chang for mathematical details of the
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algorithm.) When the stimulus space is normalized so that the sum of
 
squared coordinates on each dimension equals one, a subject's weight on
 
a dimension is approximately equal to the product moment correlation be­
tween differences in stimulus coordinates on that dimension and dissimi­
larity values in that subject's matrix. The squared weight indicates
 
the propbrtion of variance in the matrix which can be accounted for by
 
that dimension. The square of a weight underestimates the proportion of
 
variance accounted for it when, as is frequently the case, the dimen­
sions of the common space are correlated. If, however, the dimensions
 
of the space are orthogonal, then the square will exactly equal the pro­
portion of the variance accounted for. A dimension weight of zero can
 
be thought of as meaning that the attribute associated with the dimen­
sion is irrelevant to the subject when he makes his judgment; i.e., he
 
just does not-perceive'the stimulus di-fferences specified by-the dimen­
sion, or in any case, acts in that particular task as if he does not.
 
The procedure used in the research on context differed, however,
 
from the usual application of INDSCAL. A modified version of INDSCAL
 
(written by this author) accepts individual cognitive spaces (configura­
tions) as input previously determined by the MDSCAL program from indi­
vidual dissimilarity data), computes the interpoint distances based on
 
the input space, and uses the distances as dissimilarity data. Since
 
only interval scaling is required of the data, the parameter b is dis­
carded in equation (1) and the usual INDSCAL procedures is applied.
 
Effectively, this ad hoc version of INDSCAL accepts individual cognitive
 
spaces from one subject under several judgment contexts, and produces
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a master cognitive space. A master space refers to a cognitive space
 
for one individual that is common to several judgment contexts and dimen­
sion weights which are unique to each context. The basic interpretation
 
is that the individual acts as if he had the master space at his dis­
posal and differenti-ally weights-dimensions- according to--the context.
 
The weights indicate how the subject emphasizes or uses certain dimen­
sions in certain contexts and a change in weights demonstrates the ef­
fect of context.
 
B.3 Hypothetical Example Using INDSCAL (From Carroll 1972)
 
Consider an example in which 9 subjects judge 4 stimuli, A
 
through D. The common cognitive space in the upper left of Figure B-i
 
shows the stimuli arranged in a lattice configuration; the subject space
 
in the upper right shows the weights or perceptual saliences of the di­
mensions for the 9 hypothetical subjects. These weights can be thought
 
of as stretching factors that if applied to the dimensions of the group
 
stimulus space would produce the individual space.
 
The differential weights have the effect of producing, for each
 
subject, a "private" cognitive space by rescaling (stretching and con­
tracting) the dimensions of the common space. In the illustration, for
 
example, subject 3 has equal weights for the two dimensions. His pri­
vate space would therefore look exactly the same as the common space
 
(except for an overall scale factor that could stretch or contract both
 
dimensions uniformly, leaving their relative saliences unchanged).
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3 
A B 5 4 
7 2 
D C. 
Master cognitive space Subject weight space 
ARB 
A B 
A B 
I 
D C 
D C 
Subject 2 cognitive space Subject 4 cognitive space 
Figure B-i.- Hypothetical illustration of INDSCAL: Individual
 
differences in multidimensional scaling.
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The private spaces for subjects 2 and 4 are shown in the lower
 
left-hand and right-hand corners of Figure B-i respectively. Subject 2,
 
who weights dimension I more highly than dimension II, has his cognitive
 
space compressed along the dimension II axis (or what amounts to the
 
same thing, stretched-in the'dimension-' direction)--The-reverse ap-----­
plies to subject 4 who has a higher weight on the second than on the
 
first dimension.
 
Although subjects 3 and 7 have the same pattern of dimension
 
weights, a higher proportion of the variance in subject 3"s data can be
 
accounted for by the hypothetical INDSCAL solution. The data for sub­
jects closer to the origin are generally less fully accounted for by the
 
analysis, so that all dimensions of the common space are less relevant
 
for them. The lower commonality for subjects closer to the origin may
 
be due to their being idiosyncratic dimensions not contained in the
 
M-dimensional solution or to lower reliability (more random error)
 
in their data.
 
Subject 9, who is precisely at the origin, is completely removed
 
from this analysis. Either he responded randomly or he appeared to do
 
so by responding reliably to a completely different set of dimensions.
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APPENDIX C 
COMPARISON OF SPATIAL COGNITIVE MODELS 
C.1 Summary 
Comparison between spatial cognitive models is important when
 
the effects of context on the models are to be investigated. Comparison
 
distinguishes differences in cognitive models due to context change from
 
differences due to inconsistency of subject response or instability of
 
the cognitive spaces over time. This Appendix reviews techniques re­
lated to a matrix similarity transform that was used to compare two
 
spaces. Disadvantages of each technique are identified. Finally, a ma­
trix similarity measure (MSM)-used in this research-for -cognitive space
 
comparison is described along with certain statistics for testing hy­
potheses concerning the relationship between two cognitive spaces.
 
C.2 Introduction to the Problem
 
The researcher may often want to compare the result of two multi­
dimensional scaling solutions (i.e., cognitive spaces). Comparison is
 
especially important when the effects of context are to be investigated.
 
If a cognitive space is replicated with the same context, a comparison
 
is needed to determine if the space is sufficiently stable or defined to
 
serve as a basis for quantifying subsequent changes. If the context is
 
PRE(TPJNG; 7W.A 7T('Tvt97 
varied between two cognitive spaces, then a comparison can identify the
 
-changes in the spaces.
 
Comparisons may be simple if the spaces are 2-dimensional and
 
"look" the same. However, a comparison index is still needed to quan­
tify space similarity and often the dimensionality is larger than 2 mak­
ing visual comparis6n quitedifficult. Sometimes- the: dimensionality of
 
the two spaces may not be the same. Since the cognitive spaces can be
 
represented as n xm rectangular matrices (n stimuli x m dimensions),
 
most of the techniques to be discussed approach the problem of cognitive
 
space comparison as a matrix comparison problem and that convention is
 
adopted here. If A and B are two cognitive spaces, B is said to compare
 
to or "fit" A if a matrix similarity transform S can be found such that
 
A 
A = S(B) 
where A is an approximation to A. A similarity transform does not af­
fect the rank order of the stimulus object interpoint distances defined
 
by the cognitive space. The goodness of the approximation or the fit is
 
given by f(E) where E denotes an error matrix or a "spatial difference"
 
between A and B;
 
A 
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and where f is a monotonic decreasing function of the norm of E, bounded
 
between 0 and 1 (perfect fit). The matrix comparison techniques re­
viewed in the next section differ in the generality of the similarity
 
transform S, or in the fit metric f.
 
C.3 Review of Previous Comparison Techniques
 
C.3.1 Identity Transform.
 
One frequently "occurring.:technizqu, usesthe -dentityzmatnix 
for a similarity transform and compares B directly to A; i.e.,
 
^0 
A = BI 
or 
A= B 
and 
E=A-B 
The goodness of fit measure is the product moment correlation r of in­
terpoint distances d calculated from the n x m matrices (e.g., Green,
 
Maheswari and Rao 1969), i.e.,
 
Fit = r(dADB) 
Similarity transforms allow orthogonal rotations, translations
 
and rescaling, but the identity transform does not. Consequently, this
 
restriction may mask possible systematic relationships between the two
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spaces, so that very precisely related spaces will be rejected as being
 
different. Furthermore, as Cohen and Jones (1974), among others, have
 
pointed out, the use of r has certain undesirable properties:
 
1. Since r is computed on all n(n-l)/2 interpoint distances which
 
are intrinsically interdependent, displacement of a single point in a
 
space affects -n-i interpoint distances; In this manner, a.large dis­
placement of one or two points in a space could lead to a misleading
 
value of r.
 
2. The coefficient r is not a suitable measure of the relationship
 
between two ratio scaled variables (i.e., distances) since r is invari­
ant under transformation of either or both variables by an additive con­
stant whereas distances are not.
 
C.3.2 Orthogonal Rotation ----

Cliff (1962) proposed an orthogonal rotation to replace the
 
rigid identity transform and later operationalized the technique
 
A = BP
 
where P was now an m x m orthogonal rotation matrix (Cliff 1966b).
 
Schonemann (1966) produced a similar technique but his solution is an
 
optimal one for minimizing the sum of squares of the error matrix E,
 
(i.e., trace EE' is minimized) and is more amenable to computer imple­
mentation. The problem with Schonemann's solution is that it does not
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allow the general simtlHarity-transformation; -matrixr'transl-ation--and-dila­
tion are lacking.
 
C.3.3 General Similarity Transform
 
Goodness of fit in nonmetric multidimensional--scaling (NMDS)­
is generally assessed in terms-of the.degree-of-monotonicity-between -.
 
observed dissimilarity-measues-zand .the intepointdistances of±Lthe;...... 
reproduced configurttmon:asnneasuwndzfysIressz(JseezAppendiiAmfor.fur=zz 
ther details)-. The--coordinates-of the reproduced--configuration-(-spa-----. 
tial cognitive model) are arbitrary in the sense of being defined up
 
to a similarity transform; a central rescaling (a uniform expansion or
 
contraction for every coordinate axis), a translation (a shift of the
 
origin), and a rotation of the entire configuration, as these transfor­
mations in no-wa-y-a-ffec-the-rmoaotoni-city-rnreanre 'ofg-tressF--Sinceaa--=-­
cognitive space is uniquely defined only up to a similarity transform,
 
two cognitive spaces- ought to be compared-by-assuming that a-similarity--- ­
transform exists between the two. Schonemann and Carroll (1970) de­
veloped such a procedure
 
A = cBT + GH' 
where G' = (1, 1, . . i) and where the orthogonal m x m matrix T, the 
m x 1 vector H, and the scalar c are to be chosen so as to minimize 
trace EE'. Schonemann's computer program (a copy of which he supplied
 
201
 
to the author) provides a solution to this problem and has been used
 
throughout this research for comparing cognitive spaces.
 
Schonemann and Carroll (1970) also proposed two measures of fit.
 
These were later criticized by Lingoes and Schonemann (1974) as being de­
pendent upon the norm of the target matrix A; i.e, the goodness of fit
 
to A would be different from that to kA where k is a scalar constant.
 
Lingoes and Schonemann instead proposed -the goodness of fit measure F
 
2
 
F = I- (trace T'B'WA)
trace B'WB - trace A'WA
 
where W = I - (GG'/n)
 
F is norm invariant and-bounded-by-0-(perfect-fit-)and-i. --Amore in-----.
 
tuitively satisfying matrix similarity measure MSM was defined -by the
 
present author as
 
1
 
(i - F)2
 MSM = 

MSM is also norm invariant and bounded by 0 and 1, where 1 means cogni­
tive spaces A and B are identically related by a similarity transform.
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C.4 Significance Data for MSM
 
The MSM (or its equivalent F) is a descriptive measure for a
 
goodness of fit between two cognitive spaces. No significance test, how­
ever, was proposed by Lingoes and Schonemann, and with the exception of
 
a product moment correlation measure of fit, no significance test is
 
available for any comparison technique. Since a comparison index and a
 
significance test for space comparison were essential to the objectives
 
of this research, an empirical distribution for MSM was generated.
 
Matrices A and B were generated randomly for various values of
 
n and m, using coordinates uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The
 
choice of the uniform distribution follows Sherman (1972) and is sup­
ported by empirical evidence from this research which suggests that the
 
distribution of stimulus coordinates appears uniform. Then, in keeping
 
with most NMDS procedures;--the matrix columns were--shifted and scaled
 
to give zero mean and unit variance. Finally the goodness of fit meas­
ure MSM was computed between matrices A and B and the results accumu­
lated for 1000 pairs of A and B. Table C-1 presents selected percent­
ile points from the empirical cumulative distribution of MSM for 9 and
 
14 stimuli.
 
As an example, suppose two cognitive spaces existed for 14 ob­
jects in 3 dimensions. If the MSM between the two spaces was found to
 
be .626, then Table C-I indicates there would only be a .01 probability
 
that two random spaces would produce a higher value of the MSM. Then
 
one might state with 99% confidence, that such a fit did not come from
 
random cognitive spaces.
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TABLE C-I.- CRITICAL VALUES FOR THE GOODNESS-OF-FIT MEASURE (MSM)
 
BETWEEN TWO RANDOM COGNITIVE SPACES* 
P{MSM < tabulated valuel = y 
Dimensions y equal to -­
0.001 0.010 0.050 0.950 0.990 0.999
 
9 stimuli
 
2 080 124 184 649 733 816
 
3 192 258 324 672 748 822
 
4 291 360 412 709 756 802
 
5 381 436 490 746 788 830
 
6 453 499 550 774 799 859
 
14 stimuli
 
2 048 096 150 520 641 708
 
3 139 194 251 548 626 705
 
4 253 277 323 574 619 645
 
5 289 342 384 606 655 678
 
6 365 395 442 635 679 716
 
*Decimals omitted.
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The significant test used above assumes for a null hypothesis,
 
that the two cognitive spaces A and B are independent and randomly gen­
erated with uniformly distributed coordinates. This would be a conserva­
tive hypothesis when the effects of context change are being examined.
 
For this hypothesis to be accepted a changed context must completely
 
change a cognitive space, making it appear independent of-the cognitive
 
space prior to the context change. The significance test, however, is
 
weak when cognitive space stability is analyzed since the sampling dis­
tribution for the fest -tatistic under the dlternate hypothesis that the
 
two cognitive spaces are not independent is unknown.
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